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The need to continue codifying international law is apparent...
But an even greater challenge for us now-and, in many respects
an even greater opportunity-is enforcement. Although interna-
tional law is often caricatured as elusive and abstract, there is
nothing abstract about its enforcement ....
-Madeleine Albright'
INTRODUCTION
Traditional models of international law enforcement assume that
disputes between sovereign States will be adjudicated by a supranational
tribunal, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Such models rely on a unified international
legal system bound together by a hierarchical appellate authority. A more
recent development is the direct enforcement of international legal rules
by national courts. This has taken place in a number of substantive areas
of law, most notably in international economic law, international envi-
ronmental law, and international criminal law. This Article characterizes
1. Madeleine K. Albright, International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: A
U.S. Perspective on Enforcement, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1595, 1596 (1995).
A Community of Courts
and evaluates the dispersed enforcement of international law through a
close analysis of international criminal law.
Despite the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute), international criminal law enforcement
authority remains nonhierarchical, distributed throughout the interna-
tional system and largely centered in national courts, not supranational
tribunals. For a variety of practical and political reasons explored herein,
the opportunities for enforcement of international criminal law are far
more promising at the national than at the supranational level. Interna-
tional criminal law enforcement is effectively migrating from
international tribunals to national courts. National courts form the front
line of a system of enforcement. Supranational tribunals act as a back-
stop where national courts are unwilling or unable to adjudicate.
The emerging system of international criminal justice can be con-
ceived as a community of courts, a set of adjudicatory bodies in
interdependent, self-organizing relationships. This emergent community
of courts is engaged in a common endeavor-ensuring accountability for
serious international crimes. Within the community, courts-both na-
tional and supranational-interact in numerous ways. Their jurisdictions
often overlap; they are linked both horizontally and vertically; they apply
a common set of laws.
Central to this emerging community are semi-internationalized tri-
bunals grafted onto or linked to the domestic courts of many States.
Semi-internationalized tribunals, the newest members of the community
of courts, are being used to enforce international criminal law in coun-
tries recovering from ethnic violence and mass atrocity. Such courts-
now operating in East Timor and Kosovo and under development in
Cambodia and Sierra Leone-are based in domestic legal systems while
drawing on international judges, jurisprudence, and resources.
This Article argues that, for political reasons, the future of interna-
tional criminal law enforcement will largely be at the domestic level. It
anticipates the emergence of a community of courts-domestic,
semi-internationalized, and supranational. A decentralized system of
international criminal law enforcement may give pause for concern: How
can such a system be regulated? How can uniformity and effectiveness
be assured? It is the claim of this Article that, in a world in which
2. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 372 (1997) (referring to a "recognition of a
community of courts around the world, units engaged in a common endeavor"); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 187 (1997) (noting that citing
international decisions helps courts "gain legitimacy by linking [themselves] to a larger com-
munity of courts").
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information is power,3 the relationships between these courts-the ex-
change of information, ideas, and personnel-brings order and regularity
to the system. These interdependent relationships are defined by the core
principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. Normatively, this decen-
tralized, horizontal enforcement system is a positive development with
the potential to greatly strengthen the enforcement of international
criminal law. Such relationship-based communities of courts may hold
great promise for other areas of international law enforcement as well.
The first Part of this Article reviews presently available mechanisms
for international criminal law enforcement and suggests conclusions
about their continued effectiveness. Part II draws on international rela-
tions and comparative politics to provide a close analysis of the political
decisions behind the creation of international criminal law enforcement
mechanisms and includes case studies of Cambodia, East Timor, and
Rwanda. Part III considers the operation and effectiveness of semi-
internationalized courts (i.e., mixed panels of national and international
judges applying international law) through a case study of the Special
Panels in the District Court of Dili, East Timor. Part IV provides the
theoretical basis for this emerging system, considering the nature of en-
forcement in international criminal law and the horizontal and vertical
relationships in the community. Part IV then presents guiding principles
for regulating the system of international criminal law in the context of
international constitutional principles. Finally, the Conclusion calls for a
code of conduct in international criminal law enforcement and suggests
that the model of a community of courts may be effective in other areas
of international law enforcement.
I. EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
In the past decade the possibilities for the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law have expanded dramatically. While this Part does not
seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of all of these mechanisms, it
is intended to situate the overall argument of this Article in the context of
presently existing mechanisms for international criminal law enforce-
ment. To this end, these mechanisms-namely, the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the ad hoc tribunals, national courts, prosecutions
under the universality principle, military tribunals, and semi-
internationalized courts-are briefly reviewed. Attention is focused, first,
on structure and jurisdiction and, later, on the normative considerations
3. See generally JOSEPH NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE
WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE (2002).
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of effectiveness and appropriateness. The most novel and potentially
most significant development in international criminal justice is the op-
eration of semi-internationalized tribunals in which mixed panels of
national and international judges sit within the domestic judiciary of the
host State. These semi-internationalized tribunals are considered in par-
ticular detail as crucial constituents of the community of courts.
A. The International Criminal Court
Upon the ratification of the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002, many
world leaders heralded the maturation of international criminal law en-
forcement. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that
"[i]mpunity has been dealt a decisive blow.' 4 The New York Times re-
ported that the ICC "closes a gap in international law"5 and the
Economist noted the world had fulfilled "a promise made after the Nur-
emberg trials ... [to] provide a permanent forum for trying the world's
most despicable criminals.
Yet, not everyone has considered the emergence of the ICC as a
positive development. Pierre Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes,
described the ICC as "an attempt to impose a justice mechanism" on the
world.7 The United States has taken the unprecedented step of repudiat-
ing the Rome Statute,8 with one senior administration official describing
it as "a product of fuzzy-minded romanticism," and "not just naive, but
dangerous."0 Writing in the Weekly Standard, Jeremy Rabkin described
the ICC as a "kangaroo court," an "absurd ... political spectacle."' °
Whichever side of this debate one takes, when the Rome Statute en-
tered into force in July 2002, the ICC became a reality; the new Court
will form a significant part of the newly emergent system of
4. Press Release, United Nations, Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo
Ciampi of Italy and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Videoconfer-
ence (Apr. 11, 2002) (following ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in Rome, Italy).
5. Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 12, 2002, at A3.
6. A World Criminal Court: Give It a Welcome, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2002, at 14.
7. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Remarks at the Harvard Colloquium on International Af-
fairs (Apr. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
8. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y.
TiMES, May 5, 2002, at Al8.
9. John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, quoted in Lewis, supra
note 8, at A 18.
10. Jeremy Rabkin, The International Kangaroo Court: Get Ready for the International
Criminal Court to Go After Israelis and Americans, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 29, 2002, at 14.
Likewise, in a Wall Street Journal editorial Ruth Wedgwood called the court a "bad idea" that
offers "no protection against magistrates from abroad." Ruth Wedgwood, An International
Criminal Court Is Still a Bad Idea, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at A17.
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international criminal justice. Yet, as its detractors often fail to see," and
its supporters regret,' 2 the role of the Court is limited both by its statute
and its likely capacity constraints. The purpose here is merely to high-
light the possible role for the ICC-based on its inherent strengths and
weaknesses-in the emerging system of international criminal justice.
The limitations of the ICC arise largely from two major compro-
mises on jurisdiction and admissibility pushed by the United States at
the Rome Conference.'3 The first compromise imposed temporal, sub-
stantive, and political limits on the Court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
ratione temporis is limited to crimes "committed after the entry into
force of the Statute."'' 4 Likewise, the Court's temporal jurisdiction for
States that subsequently become Parties is limited to crimes "committed
after the entry into force of [the] Statute for that State."' 5 Thus, the Court
will have no jurisdiction for crimes committed before July 2002 and,
with respect to States that subsequently ratify, the Court will not have
jurisdiction over events before their respective ratifications.
Substantive jurisdictional constraints limit the ICC to consideration
of only the gravest international crimes. According to article 1 of the
Rome Statute, the Court only has jurisdiction over "persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern."' 6 Article 5 deems genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression to be
11. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 10 (claiming that the ICC provides no protection
against magistrates from abroad).
12. See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 57, 58 (2001) (arguing that "US-influenced compromises in the final treaty produced a
fatally-flawed international criminal court" which is too weak to be effective).
13. See Young Sok Kim, The Preconditions to the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute, 8 J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 47 (1999) [hereinafter Kim, Preconditions] (describing the compromises and negotiat-
ing proposals at Rome); Young Sok Kim, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on
the Rome Statute (2000) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, on file with author) (describing the negotiation of the Rome Statute in great de-
tail). See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, Fourteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: A
Negotiator's Perspective on the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective] (describing the U.S. role in the negotiation
of the ICC Statute); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 68-87 (2001) (discussing the U.S. negotiating position at
Rome and how that is reflected in the Statute); David J. Scheffer, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 12 (1999) (considering the United
States' "compelling interest in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court").
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17
July 1998, art. 1I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
15. Id.
16. See id. art. I; see also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A
New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MicH. J. INT'L L. 869, 904
(2002).
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among these most serious crimes. However, that same article also reiter-
ates that jurisdiction shall be limited to the "most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole."'7 While it is clear
that the enumerated list of crimes is exclusive, the repetition of the seri-
ousness clause in article 5 has been read by some as a further restriction
on jurisdiction to those cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression that are of concern to the "international commu-
nity as a whole."'" Under such a reading, relatively isolated instances of
crimes against humanity would not be considered of "concern to the in-
ternational community as a whole" and would not vest the Court with
jurisdiction." While the effect of this clause remains ambiguous (pre-
sumably to be clarified through prosecutorial decisions and judicial
rulings), it is clear that only a relatively narrow range of crimes falls
within the ICC's jurisdiction.
Political limits on the ICC's jurisdiction depend on decisions by
States Parties. Where cases are referred to the ICC by States Parties0 or
the prosecutor initiates the investigation proprio motu,2' the Rome Stat-
ute imposes significant preconditions on the exercise of jurisdiction. As
part of the last minute compromise in Rome, article 12(2) requires that
either the territorial State (the State where the crime occurred) or the
national State (the State of nationality of the defendant) be a State Party
or have accepted jurisdiction with respect to the individual in question.
What emerges then is a "consent regime" based on territoriality and na-
tionality.23 This is a relatively weak form of jurisdiction, unlikely to be
17. Rome Statute art. 5.
18. Id.; see also Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Juris-
diction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L.
REV. 20, 38 (2001) (noting that "in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, however,
the offense must be on the high end of a scale of relative severity, and must have some quality
that warrants the 'concern of the international community as a whole'). In deciding which
cases to investigate, the Prosecutor is again required by article 53 to take into account "the
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims." Rome Statute art. 53(l)(c).
19. This reading should be contrasted with one that sees any instances of the enumer-
ated crimes as of international concern. See Madeline Morris, Complementarity and Its
Discontents: States, Victims, and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
177, 185 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMES] (suggesting a read-
ing of the Statute to limit jurisdiction to "grave instances of the delineated most serious
crimes" is quite "damaging" and by "no means mandated by the treaty").
20. See Rome Statute art. 14.
21. Id. art. 15.
22. Id. art. 12. The final text is far weaker than proposals put forward by the United
Kingdom and South Korea, which would have allowed jurisdiction if the custodial State (the
State who has physical control over the accused) or the victim State (the State of nationality of
the victim of the crime), respectively, were a Party. See Kim, Preconditions, supra note 13, at
59-64.
23. Newton, supra note 18, at 50.
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triggered frequently because "in internal wars, the most common form of
conflict today-the present compromise provision ... does not allow for
any jurisdiction unless the State in question is a Party to the Statute. 24
Despite ratification by a wide variety of States, those States most likely
to be the sites of international crimes are also the least likely to be a
State Party.
2
'
A stronger form of jurisdiction arises under article 13 of the Statute
when the case has been "referred to the prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII.'26 In these cases, the requirement that
the national or territorial State be party to the Statute is waived.27 This
follows from the fact that, according to the U.N. Charter, States are re-
quired to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,"2
thereby "overrid[ing] a State's inherent national authority to insist on
using its own judicial processes."" However, for the Security Council to
refer such a case requires chapter VII authority as well as agreement of
all five permanent members not to exercise a veto. This is an unlikely
scenario at present given the Bush administration's open hostility to the
Court. °
The second major compromise pushed by the United States during
the Rome negotiations limits the admissibility of cases before the ICC
through the principle of complementarity. 3 The Rome Statute requires
that the Court find the case inadmissible when the case is being "investi-
gated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction" unless the State is
''unwilling or unable to prosecute" or where the case has already been
32investigated by such a State and the State has decided not to prosecute .
The principle of complementarity has a history dating back to the Treaty
of Versailles, in which the "Allies agreed to accept Germany's offer to
try a select number of accused offenders before its Reichsaericht Su-
24. Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger Mecha-
nisin and Relationship to National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 49, 60 (Mauro Politi &
Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
25. Examples might include States such as Iraq, the Russian Federation (signed but not
ratified), North Korea, and Burma.
26. Rome Statute art. 13.
27. Kaul, supra note 24, at 60.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
29. Newton, supra note 18, at 49.
30. Crossette, supra note 5, at A3 (citing War Crimes Ambassador Pierre Prosper for
the U.S. position "that we continue to oppose the treaty and do not intend to become a party").
31. See El Zeidy, supra note 16, at 896-929.
32. Rome Statute art. 17(1). Two additional limits on admissibility are where (c) "[t]he
person has already been tried for the conduct"; and (d) "[tihe case is not of sufficient gravity
to justify further action by the court." Id.
[Vol. 24:1
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preme Court sitting at Leipzig."33 Likewise, complementarity appeared in
the first proposals for an international criminal court in 1943.34 The prin-
ciple reflects the "sovereign right of states to prosecute their own
nationals" where they are able and willing to do so." David Scheffer,
former U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes, describes complementarity as
a "primary deferral to national courts" and an "extraordinary ... protec-
tive mechanism.
'36
The application of complementarity and, particularly, the meaning of
"unwilling or unable to prosecute" will rest with the Court itself,37 al-
though the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence38 provide
some guidelines. According to the Statute, a State is unable or unwilling
to prosecute when the prosecution has been undertaken for the purpose
of shielding the accused from proceedings before the ICC, where there
has been unjustified delay in prosecution 9 or where proceedings are not
"being conducted independently or impartially."4° In making such deter-
minations the Court is instructed to "consider whether, due to a total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence ... to
carry out its proceedings., 4 The Prosecutor is required to notify States
Parties of investigations and to give those States the opportunity to initi-
ate their own investigations. Likewise, the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provide an opportunity for a State to present evidence that "its
courts meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the
33. El Zeidy, supra note 16, at 872.
34. According to the 1943 draft proposal for an international criminal court: "[Als a
rule, no case shall be brought before the Court when a domestic court of any one of the United
Nations has jurisdiction to try the accused and is in a position and willing to exercise jurisdic-
tion." London Int'l Assembly, Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal
Court art. 3 (1943), reprinted in MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.I, U.N. Sales No. 1949.v.8 (1949).
35. Newton, supra note 18, at 26-27.
36. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective, supra note 13, at 10.
37. See El Zeidy, supra note 16, at 899 (observing "some subjectivity had to be retained
to give the court latitude on its decision on unwillingness").
38. PREPARATORY COMM'N FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, FINALIZED DRAFT TEXT
OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, ch. 3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.l.
(2000) [hereinafter ICC R.P. & Evo.].
39. Such unjustified delay might well apply in situations such as currently seen in
Cambodia, where domestic prosecutions have been delayed for decades. See infra Section
II.B.1. Though, of course, the ICC would not have temporal jurisdiction over the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge.
40. Rome Statute art. 17(2)(C).
41. Rome Statute art. 17(3).
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independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct," so as to avoid
ICC jurisdiction. 2
The complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute create a system
in which national courts are given the opportunity to prosecute locally
and the ICC serves as a backstop when States are unable or unwilling to
prosecute. This has been described by commentators as a "tiered
allocation of authority, 43 or as "stratified concurrent jurisdiction."" In
such a system, the interests of the national State to prosecute are pro-
tected up until the point where they conflict with the "thin preferences of
the transnational polity in favor of prosecution," at which point the case
becomes admissible in the international forum.45 While the role of com-
plementarity in the emerging system of international criminal justice will
be discussed more thoroughly below, 46 it is sufficient to observe here that
the complementarity principle significantly limits the circumstances in
which cases are admissible before the ICC. While there will certainly be
cases in which States Parties are unable or unwilling to prosecute, they
are likely to be few and far between.
In addition to the two major compromises of jurisdiction and admis-
sibility, a third limitation on the ICC is sheer capacity. The ability of the
ICC to hear cases is constrained by staffing and resources. Since 1995,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has only issued nineteen judgments 7 and, while some of these have cov-
ered more than one individual, an international adjudicatory body is not
likely to have the capacity to hear every case of crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes that falls within its jurisdiction. While future
high level offenders, such as Milosevic or Pinochet, could well find
themselves before the ICC, the Court will presumably lack the necessary
capacity to deal with the hundreds of thousands of possible defendants
likely to be incriminated after mass genocide or ethnic strife such as in
Rwanda. Commentators have observed that this will likely produce a
situation in which "the international forum seeks to prosecute the leader-
42. ICC R.P. & EvID. 51, supra note 38. Prosecutorial decisions on admissibility are
reviewable by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. See Rome Statute an. 18.
43. Newton, supra note 18, at 67.
44. Morris, supra note 19, at 196.
45. William W. Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law
Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 476 (2001) (using
liberal international law and international relations theory to justify referencing domestic
policy choices where they do not conflict with an "international constitution" defined through
the preferences of the transnational polity).
46. See infra Section IV.A.2.
47. Judgements, at http:l/www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003)
(ICTY website).
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ship stratum and leaves the lower strata of defendants to be tried in na-
tional courts."4
Taken collectively, the two major compromises on jurisdiction and
admissibility along with de facto capacity constraints make the ICC an
inherently limited tool. While the ICC's role is important, it is unlikely
to deal the "decisive blow.., to impunity" predicted by Kofi Annan. For
the Court to be truly effective then, it must be part of a larger system of
international criminal justice.
B. The Ad Hoc Tribunals
The jurisprudence, practices, and contributions of the two ad hoc tri-
bunals-the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)-have been
the subject of much scrutiny. It is indisputable that the ICTY and ICTR
have handed down important and well-reasoned judgments that have had
a profound impact on the development of international criminal law. The
Tadic case articulated the rules of command responsibility, the Kunarac
case found rape to be a crime against humanity, and the Akayesu case
was the first modern international decision to find an individual guilty
of genocide.4 The simple fact that Slobodan Milosevic currently stands
before the ICTY accused of genocide and crimes against humanity is a
significant step in the fight against impunity.0 Opinions of suprana-
tional tribunals will continue to shape the contours of international
criminal law.
For the purposes of this argument, however, the larger question is
what role such tribunals will play in the future enforcement of interna-
tional criminal justice. The short answer to that question is little to none.
While the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals will have far-reaching
consequences as applied by other courts, the tribunals themselves have
such limited jurisdiction that they are unlikely to have a meaningful role
in future enforcement. The ICTR can only hear cases from the Rwandan
genocide of 19945' and the ICTY only has jurisdiction over crimes on the
48. Morris, supra note 19, at 196.
49. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7,
1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T, Judgement (Feb. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org.
50. Bill Keller, The Monster in the Dock, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at A19 (op-ed, ob-
serving that Milosevic's trial "would serve as a check on cyclical vengeance, and that it might
even give pause to some future monster").
51. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), amended by S.C. Res.
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territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 5 While these two courts will
continue to help resolve the pressing need for justice in Rwanda and Yugo-
slavia, they have no ability to hear cases from other parts of the world.
As the two ad hoc tribunals were created by the U.N. Security Council
acting under chapter VII authority,53 the Security Council could create ad-
ditional ad hoc tribunals or vest the ICTY with additional jurisdiction in
514
appropriate circumstances. However, given the political alignments nec-
essary for and the expense of creating additional ad hoc tribunals, this
seems most unlikely. The 2001 budget for the ICTY was U.S.$96.4 mil-
lion, with a similar amount spent on the ICTR.55 As these funds come from
assessed (required) contributions to the U.N., they are the subject of much
criticism.56 Proposals for an ad hoc international tribunal for East Timor,
for example, have been scuttled due to the potential cost.57 The creation of
further ad hoc tribunals is strictly limited by politics on the Security
Council. Because such tribunals are created under chapter VII, all of the
permanent members must agree not to veto the enabling resolution. Given
the outright hostility that the Bush administration has shown toward inter-
national criminal justice and the recent testimony of the U.S. War Crimes
Ambassador that the ad hoc tribunals should end their work by 2008, it
seems highly unlikely that the United States would support their prolifera-
tion." While the creation of an ad hoc tribunal might fall within the
1165, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/I 165 (1998); S.C. Res. 1329,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/l329 (2000).
52. Statute of the International Tribunal [for Yugoslavia], adopted by S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 8, U.N. doc. S/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF THE ICTY (1998).
53. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, supra note 52 (creating the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, supra
note 51 (creating the ICTR). See generally Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 539 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (discussing the legal basis and history of the ICTY and ICTR).
54. This possibility was raised in the wake of September II as a "better alternative" to
the use of military tribunals for the prosecution of Al Qaeda members. See Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Terrorism and Justice, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at 23.
55. See Key Figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last visited Apr.
1I, 2001); see also Patricia Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence, 42
HARV. INT'L L.J. 535, 536 n.3 (2001).
56. Patricia Wald, the U.S. Judge at the ICTY from 1999 to 2002, has criticized the cost
of the tribunals given their slow pace. See Patricia Wald, Inside A War Crimes Tribunal: Does
International Justice Really Work?, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Feb. 6, 2002).
57. Nelson Belo & Christian Ranheim, Prosecuting Serious Crimes in East Timor,
Address at Justice and Accountability in East Timor: International Tribunals and Other Op-
tions 5-7 (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.etan.org/lh/pdfs/justeng.pdf (last visited Dec. 6,
2002) (report of a one-day Seminar in Dili).
58. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Statement
Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/rm/2002/8571.htm (testifying that "this Admini-
stration is calling for action. We have and are urging both Tribunals to begin to aggressively
focus on the end-game and conclude their work by 2007-2008."). For further discussion of the
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perceived national interests of the permanent Security Council members in
some circumstances, it appears unlikely to happen in the near future.
Moreover, with the entry into force of the ICC Statute, the Security Coun-
cil could simply refer the case to the ICC, pursuant to article 14(b) of the
Statute, rather than create a new tribunal.
While ad hoc tribunals have served an important role in bringing jus-
tice to some individuals and in the articulation of international criminal
law, their future effectiveness as enforcement mechanisms of interna-
tional criminal law seems limited.59 The creation of ad hoc tribunals
appears to be a particular phenomenon of the 1990s. Patricia Wald, for-
mer U.S. Judge at the ICTY, has described the ad hoc tribunals as
"successful weigh stations, warts and all, on the path to permanent and
effective judicial mechanisms."6 ° She is correct to note the past successes
of ad hoc tribunals as well as the fact that they are not likely to be far-
reaching or long-lasting mechanisms to combat impunity.
C. Domestic Courts
Given the above considerations, domestic courts are playing and will
continue to play a key role in the enforcement of international criminal
justice. Such domestic enforcement comes in two principle varieties that
warrant independent consideration: first, domestic courts operating un-
der the territoriality or nationality principles of jurisdiction and, second,
domestic courts operating under the universality principle. Taken to-
gether these domestic courts represent the "backbone of the emerging
system of global justice. 6'
1. Domestic Courts Exercising Territorial
and National Jurisdiction
Every day throughout the world, national courts operate locally, ex-
ercising jurisdiction over their citizens and those who commit crimes on
their territory. This alone is nothing new. But, many of these courts are
rapidly expanding schism between the United States and Europe over this issue, see Andrew
Moravcsik, The Human Rights Blame Game; Europe and America Are at Odds over the New
International Criminal Court. They Shouldn't Be., NEWSWEEK (International Edition), Apr.
22, 2002, at 26 (noting the ideological divide between European egalitarianism and American
libertarianism, whereby "human rights institutions lie closer to the core of Europe's interna-
tional identity; unilateral military action against perceived enemies lies closer to America's").
59. Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 41, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note
53, at 735, 19.
60. Wald, supra note 56.
61. William W. Burke-White, What If? Prosecuting Crimes of Chemical Terror, in
TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 77, 78 (Rodrigo Yepes-
Enriquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002).
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also empowered to prosecute serious crimes subject to international
law-namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. When
they do, they become part of the community of courts, the enforcement
mechanisms of international criminal justice.
Today, nearly all domestic courts are able to prosecute the constitu-
ent elements of international crimes, such as murder. A significant
proportion of States have also enacted the necessary domestic legislation
to criminalize the actual international wrongs. While U.S. practice in this
regard is limited,62 other States are far more progressive and have provi-
• 61
sions covering international crimes in their domestic laws.
62. While the United States has codified the Genocide Convention, U.S. courts only
have jurisdiction where the crime is committed on U.S. territory or by a U.S. national. See 18
U.S.C § 1091(d) (2000). U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity,
except where they constitute torture or where the perpetrators are military officers subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) (2000); see also Douglass
Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 429 (2001) (observing that "crimes
against humanity are not codified as such"). Likewise, war crimes are only partially codified
in U.S. law, with the added requirement that the victim or perpetrator be a U.S. national. See
18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (2000).
63. See MARC WELLER & WILLIAM BURKE-WHITE, No PLACE TO HIDE: NEW DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN THE EXERCISE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript ch. 3) (providing the text of the domestic legislation in a variety of States). For
instance, Australia has criminalized war crimes as well as some crimes against humanity. See
War Crimes Amendment Act, 1988 (Austl.). See also Polukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991),
172 C.L.R. 501, for an Australian crimes against humanity trial. Austrian courts have jurisdic-
tion to punish those crimes which Austria is obligated to punish based on its treaty
ratifications, including the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention. See § 64 Abs 7
StGB. Belgian courts are empowered to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
as well as crimes against humanity. See Belgian Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, translated in 38 I.L.M. 918 (Act of June 16,
1993 concerning the punishment of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and their Additional Protocols I and 1I of the Geneva Conventions of 18 June 1977, as
amended by the Act of 10 February 1999 concerning the punishment of grave breaches of
international humanitarian law). Bosnian courts can hear cases of genocide and war crimes.
See Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ch. XVI, arts. 153-66 (1998)
(Criminal Offences Against Humanity and International Law), available at
http:/www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal. Botswana's courts can hear cases of war crimes. See Geneva
Conventions Act of 1970, Government Gazette 237 (Supp. F) (Aug. 26, 1970). Canadian
Courts have jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, ch. 24, 2000 S.C. (Can.) (implementing the Rome Statute).
See also R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.R. 701 (Can.), in which the Canadian Supreme Court ruled on
crimes against humanity committed during World War II. Chile can prosecute war crimes and
international crimes specified in international treaties. See C6digo Penal 1874 (Chile) (as
amended). Croatian courts are empowered to hear any crime that Croatia is obligated to pun-
ish under international law. See Penal Code (Kasnemi Zakon), Official Gazette of the Republic
of Croatia 110/1997 (Oct. 21, 1997). This is but a small sample of the more than one hundred
States that can prosecute international crimes domestically.
For a more extensive list including the text of implementing legislation, including Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, Finland, France, Guatemala, Hungary,
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New
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Examples of local courts being used to prosecute international
crimes are numerous. Even in the United States, domestic courts have
been used for the prosecution of international crimes including piracy,
slave trading, and, more recently, international terrorism. 64 Three recent
cases are illustrative of these possible charges under domestic federal
and state law. First, Richard Reid, the alleged "shoe bomber" who is ac-
cused of attempting to bring down an American Airlines flight from
Paris to Miami in December 2001, has been indicted in U.S. federal
court for attempted murder, hijacking, and use of a weapon of mass-
destruction.65 Second, Zacarias Moussaoui, accused of conspiring with
Al Qaeda as the twentieth hijacker of September 11, has been indicted in
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on charges
of conspiracy to commit terrorism, conspiracy to commit aircraft hijack-
ing, and conspiracy to kill U.S. employees. 66 Likewise, the 1993 World
Trade Center bombers were tried in U.S. federal court in New York for
terrorism.67 Domestic courts from Rwanda to Kosovo have also been ac-
tive in prosecuting international crimes that occurred locally.
The reasons why national courts are bound to play a significant role
in the enforcement of international criminal law are clear. Local courts
are ubiquitous. Nearly every State has courts of justice, though these
differ in form, structure, and procedure. Given the omnipresence of local
judicial mechanisms, nearly every international crime is subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts of some State. Whether those courts
are empowered and willing to exercise jurisdiction is another question.
Likewise, local courts are close to the acts in question. Given physical
proximity, local courts often have the best access to information, evi-
dence, and testimony about the alleged events.
There are, however, significant dangers in the local prosecution
of international crimes. First, local courts are more likely to be biased or
politically motivated than the international courts discussed above. The
very proximity to the crime, the local press coverage, and the
searing pain of knowing victims and survivors (all the reasons why
Guinea, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, China, Portugal, Russia, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadjikistan, Uganda,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe, see WELLER & BURKE-
WHITE, supra.
64. Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2001, at A39.
65. Indictment, United States v. Reid, (D. Mass. 2002) (No. 02-10013-WGY), at
http://news.findlaw.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
66. Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, (E.D. Va. 2001) (No. l:01-cr-00455-A), at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
67. Benjamin Weiser, Suspected Chief Plotter in Trade Center Blast Goes on Trial
Today, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at B I.
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venue change is often sought in ordinary trials) may undermine the
fairness of the procedure. Second, the quality of justice in local courts
differs dramatically. While some States have extremely well-developed
legal systems," others lack even the most rudimentary legal tools. 69 Third,
in the prosecution of international crimes, there is often a need to convince
both a local and a global polity of the fairness of the proceedings and the
legitimacy of justice rendered. Local courts are least likely to be viewed as
fair and unbiased by outside observers.
Given their ubiquity and the omnipresence of their jurisdiction, local
courts will likely find themselves on the front line of adjudicating inter-
national crimes. While many States may be fortunate enough to avoid
having international crimes committed locally, September 11 is illustra-
tive of the growing "threats posed by non-State actors ... by civil
conflict spilling across borders, by shadowy global criminal networks,
and by chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.,,70 However, there re-
mains a gaping hole in the ability of States to prosecute international
crimes locally. Many States, including the United States, have not en-
acted the requisite domestic legislation to prosecute certain major
international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity. If
national courts are to play a significant role in a system of international
criminal justice, there is a need to close this gap.7
2. National Courts Exercising Universal Jurisdiction
In addition to hearing cases based on the territoriality and nationality
principles of jurisdiction, many of the ubiquitous national courts de-
scribed above are also able (based on the principle of universality) to
hear cases of the most severe international crimes committed extraterri-
torially. 72 When States exercise universal jurisdiction, they become
"independent actors in the international arena ... apply[ing] interna-
68. Koh, supra note 64 (arguing for the prosecution of September II crimes and ob-
serving "if any judicial system in the world can handle a case like this fairly, efficiently, and
openly, it is ours").
69. Interview with Gerald Gahima, Attorney General of Rwanda, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Aug. 27, 2001) (noting the need for pencils and paper to record statements in trials).
70. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,2 (2002).
71. Cassel, supra note 62, at 436.
72. This principle was first articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1624. See HUGO GROTIUS,
DE JURE BELL! AC PACIs LIBRi TRES, book II, ch. XX, § XL(I), at 504 (James Brown Scott
ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans. 1925) (1624) ("[T]he fact must also be recognized that kings, and
those who possess rights equal to those kings, have the right of demanding punishments not
only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account
of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of
nations, in regard to any person whatsoever .... ).
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tional norms impartially, without deferring to their governments."73 For
the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to provide a detailed ac-
count of the exercise of universal jurisdiction.74 Rather, the goal is to
consider briefly where and how universal jurisdiction will be exercised
and where it fits within the emerging system of international criminal
law enforcement.
In order for a court to hear a case under the universality principle,
the State in which the court sits must make an a priori political decision
to grant its courts universal jurisdiction.75 This is often a contentious
decision for the domestic legislature and national executive. Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and victims groups advocate the
enactment of universal jurisdiction, while military and diplomatic au-
thorities argue the need to protect State sovereignty and to avoid, in the
words of Henry Kissinger, "substituting the tyranny of judges for that of
governments."76 Nonetheless, many States have enacted the requisite
domestic legislation to exercise universal jurisdiction over the most seri-
ous international offenses. " More than 120 States have adopted
legislation to prosecute war crimes under the universality principle"' and
at least 95 have adopted legislation with respect to crimes against hu-
manity.79
73. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104
(2000) (borrowing from the French Institute of International Law).
74. For a more detailed discussion of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, see PRINCE-
TON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES] (offering a framework of guidelines
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction); AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE
DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION, Al No. OIR 53/005/2001 (2001)
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION] (for an exhaustive fifteen-part review
of the domestic implementing legislation); WELLER & BURKE-WHITE, supra note 63 (review-
ing the history of universal jurisdiction, the crimes subject thereto, and domestic legislation
authorizing courts to exercise universal jurisdiction); William J. Aceves, Liberalism and Inter-
national Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of
Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (2000) (considering the Pinochet case
as a move toward more general enforcement of international criminal law); Kenneth C. Ran-
dall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tx. L. REV. 785 (1988) (discussing
the history of universal jurisdiction); Marc Weller, On the Hazards of Foreign Travel for Dic-
tators and Other International Criminals, 75 INT'L AFF. 599 (1999) (discussing the impacts of
the Pinochet case on universal jurisdiction and accountability).
75. Cf PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, at 30 (finding that the lack of domestic
implementing legislation should not be a bar to prosecution).
76. Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2001, at 86, 86; cf Christopher Hitchens, Court Time for Henry, THE NATION, Nov. 5, 2001,
at 9 (arguing that the time has come for a trial of Henry Kissinger under the universality prin-
ciple); CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2000).
77. For an exhaustive list of such States, see WELLER & BURKE-WHITE, supra note 63.
78. AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 74.
79. See id. ch. 6 (providing a complete chart of domestic implementing legislation for
the exercise of universal jurisdiction); see, e.g., C.P.M. art. 208 (Braz. 1969); Code
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Laws authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction vary signifi-
cantly in scope and character, from highly restrictive applications of
universal jurisdiction to legislation, such as that of Belgium, which
opens the door to its nearly unfettered exercise. Because of the broad
scope of universal jurisdiction legislation, Belgium has found its courts
flooded with cases and, according to its Foreign Minister, is now consid-
ering restricting the exercise of universal jurisdiction, at least "to modify
the issue of immunity for serving politicians."80 The scope of legislation,
and whether to enact such legislation at all, remains a political choice for
executives and legislatures around the globe.
The second prerequisite for the exercise of universal jurisdiction is
that a prosecutor, an investigating judge, or, in the partie civile system, a
victim must decide to initiate a case. There are a growing number of ex-
amples where this has occurred. The most obvious, of course, is the
Pinochet case, in which an NGO-the Progressive Union of Prosecu-
tors-filed a complaint against Pinochet with the Spanish Audiencia
Nacional.8 A human rights entrepreneur s8 namely the Spanish magistrate
Baltazar Garz6n, who was already familiar with the dirty war in Chile,
catalyzed the investigation of Pinochet and eventually sought his extradi-
tion from the United Kingdom.83 Those to whom Harold Koh refers as
d'instruction criminelle art. 10 and Law of Dec. 3, 1998 (BeIg.); Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes Act, ch. 24, 2000 S.C. (Can.); C6digo Penal art. 150 (1999) and C6digo Or-
gfnico de Tribunales arts. 6, 8 (Chile 1990); Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1957,
art. 17(l); C6digo Penal de El Salvador art. 361 (1973); Penal Code of Finland (1975), ch. 13;
§§ 6(), § 6, 220a StGB; Penal Code of Honduras, arts. 5.5, 320 (1984); Penal Code §§ 12,
223-225 (Nor. 1902); Penal Code art. 358 (Rom. 1968) (the act must also be criminal in the
place of commission for Romania to be able to exercise jurisdiction); L.O.P.J. art. 23.4
(Spain); Lag om Straff f6r Folkmord [Law on Punishment of Genocide] art. 169 (1964)(Swed.); Swiss Military Penal Code art. 110 (1937) (Switzerland can only exercise universal
jurisdiction if the crime is committed as part of an armed conflict); C6digo Penal art. 10.7
(Uru. 1934); Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ch. 16 (1976); see
also Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann (Isr. S. Ct. 1962), reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 277, 299,
304 (the trial of Adolph Eichmann for crimes against humanity). See generally Marianne
Holdgaard Bukh, Prosecution Before Danish Courts of Foreigners Suspected of Serious Viola-
tions of Human Rights or Humanitarian Law, 6 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 339 (1994) (on Danish
law).
80. Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood into Belgian Courts, N.Y
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A8.
81. See Aceves, supra note 74, at 162.
82. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 31 (1998) (referring to "organizations
and individuals within advocacy networks" as "political entrepreneurs who mobilize resources
like information and membership and show a sophisticated awareness of the political opportu-
nity structures within which they are operating").
83. See Aceves, supra note 74, at 164. For the British proceedings, see Regina v. Bow
St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), I A.C. 147 (H.L. 2000).
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"international norm entrepreneurs, 84 such as Judge Garz6n, have been
following this pattern around the globe.85 Belgium has convicted numer-
ous individuals of war crimes against civilian populations in Rwanda86
and "targets of other lawsuits include officials from Cuba, Iraq, Ivory
Coast, Rwanda, Cambodia, Chad, Iran and Guatemala."8 7 To comply
with the ICJ's recent Congo decision, Belgium has had to drop prosecu-
tions of sitting officials such as Israeli Prime Minister Sharon. Germany
and Switzerland have likewise prosecuted Bosnian war crimes under the
principle of universal jurisdiction.89 In light of this growing State prac-
tice, M. Cherif Bassiouni has observed that "[u]niversal jurisdiction has
become the preferred technique by those seeking to prevent impunity for
international crimes."9
Notwithstanding the Congo decision limiting prosecutions of sitting
heads of State and foreign ministers, universal jurisdiction is likely to
play a significant role in the future enforcement of international criminal
law. Again, comparative politics helps explain decisions to enforce inter-
national criminal law. The initial decision to enact legislation authorizing
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction is relatively low cost for the leg-
islature and executive of the enacting State. At the time the enabling
legislation is passed, it is unlikely for there to be particular cases pending
and therefore fewer entrenched interests against passage. While some
States such as the United States are unlikely to support universal
84. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How International Human Rights Law is Enforced,
74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1409 (1999).
85. See generally REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, TOR-
TURE, AND GENOCIDE (1999).
86. Loi relative A la r6pression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire
§ 7 (Feb. 10, 1999) (Belg.), reprinted in MONITEUR BELGE (Mar. 23, 1999), allows prosecu-
tion under the universality principle. Cases have included the trials of two Catholic nuns,
Consolata Mukangango and Julienne Mukabutera, who were sentenced to over ten years im-
prisonment. See Appeal of Three Rwandans Convicted of Genocide Put Off to December,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Oct. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28793236.
87. Simons, supra note 80, at A8.
88. Given the recent International Court of Justice decision in the Congo case, in which
it was found that the Belgian arrest warrant for the sitting foreign minister of the Congo vio-
lates international law, Belgium may well need to carve out an immunity exception for serving
politicians. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.) (I.C.J. Feb. 14, 2002), re-
printed in 41 I.L.M. 536 (2002).
89. See, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, No. 20/96, S. Ct. Bavaria, 3d Strafsenat
(1997), reprinted in 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 (1998) (prosecution under the universality princi-
ple for killing unarmed Muslim civilians); see also BGHSt 45, 64. For the Swiss case, see In
re G. Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switz., Apr. 18, 1997, discussed in Andreas R.
Ziegler, International Decision, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1998).
90. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (2001).
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jurisdiction,9' a sufficient number of States already have demonstrated
the exercise of universal jurisdiction to be a potent tool.
The second prerequisite necessary for the exercise of universal juris-
diction-namely, that a prosecutor, investigating judge, or victim initiates
a case-is also likely to be met frequently. Victims seek redress in any
forum available. For prosecutors, universal jurisdiction satisfies humani-
tarian concerns and may provide career-enhancing publicity.92 While the
challenges of obtaining extradition and custody over an accused remain,
the Pinochet case demonstrates the possibilities for apprehension. 93 Thus,
the procedural hurdles to initiating universal prosecutions are relatively
low, the political costs thereof to necessary actors are nominal, and the
potential benefits to human rights entrepreneurs pursuing such cases are
extremely high.
Given the growing importance of universal jurisdiction, a brief nor-
mative consideration is in order. The principle benefit of universal
jurisdiction is the provision of an alternate means of bringing to justice
serious criminals when the State where the crimes occurred is unable or
unwilling to prosecute. In the Pinochet case, for example, Chile was nei-
ther able nor willing to prosecute its former president. Universal
jurisdiction offered an alternative recourse to ensure that Pinochet was
held accountable for his crimes. There are, however, drawbacks. First,
the prosecuting court may be far removed from the locus of the crime,
making investigation and community engagement with the proceedings
more difficult and the potential reconciling effects of justice more elu-
sive. Second, some individuals and groups may not recognize the right
of the prosecuting State to exercise universal jurisdiction, impeding the
perceived legitimacy of the process. Third, many States have not enacted
the requisite domestic legislation to prosecute crimes universally, mak-
ing prosecution impossible in some cases. Finally, as the Pinochet case
indicates, such prosecutions are easily politicized and may cause conflict
between a State's judicial and foreign affairs functions. Nonetheless, in
many cases, prosecution under the universality principle may be the pre-
ferred way to avoid impunity for serious international criminals.
D. Military Tribunals
President George W. Bush's decision to create military tribunals for
the trial of Al Qaeda suspects and detainees raises the possibility of trials
91. See Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
323.
92. Before the Pinochet Case, Baltazar Garz6n was a relatively unknown regional mag-
istrate; today he travels the world on the lecture circuit in addition to his judicial duties.
93. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Er parte Pinochet Ugarte, I
A.C. 147 (H.L. 2000); see also Weller, supra note 74.
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by military tribunals for certain classes of international criminals. The
President's military order of November 13, 2001 requires the Secretary
of Defense to set regulations for and establish military courts to try any
non-U.S. citizen who "has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism. ' '94 As long as international crimes
are included in that grant of jurisdiction to military courts, such courts
will be able to enforce international criminal law.
While military courts are extremely rare, there are some precedents.
With varying degrees of constitutional legitimacy, the United States used
military courts after the Civil War and World War 1I to try, for example,
German nationals who infiltrated the United States via submarine.95 The
United Kingdom convened the Diplock Courts to deal with crimes in
Northern Ireland. 96 In so doing, it discarded many of the traditional pro-
tections afforded suspects, notably the right to a jury trial and limits on
admissibility of evidence. Abandoning these protections required the
United Kingdom to issue notices of derogation pursuant to article 15 of
the European Convention on the ground that there was an emergency
situation in Northern Ireland. 97 Nonetheless, challenges to the Diplock
process before the European Court of Human Rights were in part suc-
cessful, with the Court ruling that extended detention was inconsistent
with the Convention.98 Israel has also relied on military justice during the
First Intifada. 99
94. Military Order No. 222, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 16, 2001).
95. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
96. See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland's Criminal Trials Without Jury: The
Diplock Experiment, 5 ANN. SURVEY INT'L & COMr. L. 239 (1999).
97. John D. Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional Trials in Unconventional Times: The
Diplock Court Experience, 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 508 (1993); see also Communication of the Per-
manent Representation of the United Kingdom to the Council of Europe, No. 2, 1973 YB. Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 26-28; Note Verbale, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Coun-
cil of Europe Strasbourg, 1975 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 18; 1978 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 22
(Communication of the Permanent Representation of Turkey to the Council of Europe, No.
823/152). The European Convention provides that during "war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation," parties may "take measures derogating from [their] obliga-
tions under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
15, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232 [hereinafter European Convention].
98. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989); see also Jackson &
Doran, supra note 97, at 509; Wilson Finnie, The Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 52 MOD. L. REV. 703 (1989); Stephen Livingstone, A
Week Is a Long Time in Detention: Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 40 N. IR. L.Q. 288
(1989).
99. Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism, and the Problem of Administrative De-
tention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?,
18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721, 736 (2001) (quoting AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL'S FORGOT-
TEN HOSTAGES: LEBANESE DETAINEES IN ISRAEL AND KHIAM DETENTION CENTER (1997):
"[B]etween 1986 and 1988, eleven people were captured in Lebanon and brought to Israel.
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The structures, procedures, independence, and fairness of military
courts vary dramatically. President Bush's original order was drafted
with extreme breadth, allowing for secret tribunals without guarantees of
the core minimum rights to free and fair trial. A vigorous policy debate
in the United States helped shift the position of the Bush administra-
tion, '°° leading to the issuance of operating regulations that provide
significantly greater procedural protections including rights to public
trial, to confront witnesses and to representation by council.' °' Even
these more liberal regulations, however, have been criticized for
violating international legal obligations.'"2
The prospects for the use of military commissions as part of the sys-
tem of international criminal justice are mixed. On the one hand,
military commissions offer the promise of short-run efficiency. They are
easy to create (such as through Bush's military order) and can be vested
with the power to prosecute international crimes. Yet, as the proposed
use of military tribunals after September 11 indicates, they may produce
a significant backlash from civil society, imposing a different set of po-
litical costs. Moreover, military tribunals are often inconsistent with the
liberal motives States normally articulate for the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal justice. If enforcement is really, as Gary Bass claims, the
product of the "principled idea" of "legalism," then States will presuma-
bly choose enforcement mechanisms which better complement the
legalist paradigm.' 3 Thus, military tribunals are only likely to be used
where a nation feels directly threatened and international criminal justice
is being exercised for retribution and incapacitation, rather than as part
of a move toward legalism. While September 11 is unlikely to be the
only incident that produces such conditions, we may hope similar inci-
dents are few and far between.
Beyond the politics of military tribunals, normative considerations
militate against their use. Military tribunals, depending on their structure
and rules, may well violate core principles of international law, such as
There, they were put on trial before military courts and sentenced to prison terms, ranging
from eighteen months to ten years.").
100. For this debate see, e.g., Koh, supra note 64; Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Mili-
tary Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Slaughter, supra note
54; Ruth Wedgwood, The Casefor Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at Al8.
101. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Terrorism Tribunal Rights Are Expanded, WASH. POST, Dec.
28, 2001, at A 1; Katherine Q. Seelye, Pentagon Says Acquittals May Not Free Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at AI3; Editorial, How to Try a Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at
A32 (noting that the Bush administration was "about to release procedural rules for its pro-
posed military tribunals that are much fairer than originally feared").
102. See generally Jordan Paust, Anti-Terrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc
DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677 (2002).
103. GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRI-
BUNALS 7 (2000).
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the right-enshrined in numerous international conventions-to a fair
trial before an independent arbiter.'" In fact, prior to September 11, the
U.S. State Department was a vocal critic of the use of military tribunals
in Burma, China, Columbia, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, and
the Sudan. °5 President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld have sub-
sequently argued that military tribunals are necessary to allow swift trials
that do not jeopardize witnesses, judges, and the public at large.' °6 How-
ever, the successful trials of the first World Trade Center bombers in
federal court and of high-ranking Serb army commanders by the ICTY
suggest that domestic courts and specialized international tribunals are at
least as well equipped to handle such cases. The most significant argu-
ment against military courts is that, no matter how fair they may be in
practice, they lack the perceived legitimacy crucial to reconstructing so-
cieties and judicial systems in the wake of serious international crimes. '°7
The need for transparency, procedural regularity, and conformity with
international obligations advises against the use of military tribunals.
E. Internationalized Domestic Courts
The most recent enforcement mechanisms to emerge are internation-
alized domestic courts (semi-internationalized courts), which are part
of the domestic justice systems of their host countries, but include
a mix of local and international judges who apply both international
and domestic law. Such courts are currently in operation in East
Timor'00 and Kosovo.' °9 They will soon come into effect in Sierra
104. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 100, at 2 (noting that "the Military Order will create
military commissions that involve unavoidable violations of international law and raise serious
constitutional challenges"). The rights to a free and fair trial are recognized by all major po-
litical, social, religious, and cultural systems. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that everyone "is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal." Even in times of war, common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
requires that anyone accused of a crime be afforded "all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the European
Convention all contain similar guarantees of fair judicial process.
105. See Human Rights Watch, Fact Sheet: Past U.S. Criticism of Military Tribunals
(Nov. 28, 2001), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/ll/tribunalsl 128.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2002).
106. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 2002, at A 14.
107. Military courts, which, through the military chain of command are directly ac-
countable to the executive, are widely viewed as susceptible to executive pressure.
108. See On the Organization of Courts in East Timor, UNTAET Reg. 2000/11, §§ 10.1,
10.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (Mar. 6, 2000).
109. See On Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue,
UNMIK Reg. 2000/64, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000).
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Leone, "° and may eventually begin operation in Cambodia."' These
courts tend to be individualized to meet the needs of the domestic State
as well as the demands of the international community, which often con-
tributes finances, resources, and judges. Given the importance of these
new judicial forums, Part II argues that internationalized domestic courts
will become a very significant component of the international criminal
justice system. Part III reviews their operation.
From a normative perspective, internationalized domestic courts
offer a unique combination of the benefits of the models discussed
above. First, they can provide some of the legitimacy of an interna-
tional tribunal, as foreign judges are more likely to be impartial and
viewed as such both by domestic audiences and by the global commu-
nity. Likewise, internationalized domestic courts can demonstrate the
general global consensus that international crimes will not be tolerated.
These semi-internationalized courts are also far easier to establish and
much less expensive to operate than their fully internationalized coun-
terparts."12 They do not require chapter VII authority and, as part of a
State's preexisting domestic judiciary, they can draw on resource-s al-
ready in place without the need to create an entirely new judicial entity.
Like purely domestic courts, semi-internationalized courts are proxi-
mate to the events in question, have the best access to relevant
evidence, and may be able to play a positive role in the local processes
of reconciliation. Semi-internationalized domestic courts, when prop-
erly implemented, might then offer a powerful new mechanism for the
enforcement of international criminal law.
II. THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The overview in Part I argued that the ICC and other fully interna-
tionalized courts will play a role, but a limited one, in the emergent
system of international criminal law enforcement. The bulk of enforce-
ment work will have to be done by national courts-either operating
locally or universally and possibly borrowing judicial elements from
110. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), available at http://sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html.
Ill. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
(2001) (on file with author).
112. Of course, the quality of justice rendered will be directly proportional to the fund-
ing provided to the internationalized court. Savings may be available in terms of infrastructure
as the court may draw on the preexistent domestic legal system. However, a clear lesson from
East Timor is that where funding is limited or nonexistent, the court may not be able to func-
tion and certainly will not be able to meet the standards of well-funded, fully internationalized
courts.
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other States. This Part draws on comparative politics and international
relations inquiry to understand the creation of enforcement mechanisms
for international criminal law. It begins with a consideration of the poli-
tics of creating international tribunals-such as the ad hoc tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Then it presents three case studies of countries
where domestic and semi-internationalized adjudicatory bodies with ju-
risdiction over international crimes have been or are being established:
Cambodia, East Timor, and Rwanda.
The politics of the enforcement of international criminal law is of
significance for three reasons. First, political considerations may indicate
when one can expect States or groups of States to establish mechanisms
of enforcement. Second, comparative political analysis can suggest
where third States and international institutions may have the most lev-
erage in facilitating the creation of such mechanisms. Third, the politics
of establishing tribunals may highlight potential dangers and difficulties
inherent in particular approaches to international criminal justice.
On the surface, international relations inquiry provides the necessary
context for understanding State decisions to enforce international crimi-
nal law. As Kenneth Abbott has argued, "international relations helps us
... incorporat[e] the political factors that shape the law.""' 3 But, at a
deeper level, these interactions at the international level are dependent on
domestic politics. As Andrew Moravcsik notes, the "basic liberal insight
[is] about the centrality of State-society relations to world politics.",1
4
Understanding the decisions of sovereign States to establish enforcement
mechanisms for international criminal law must begin with an under-
standing of State-society relations and domestic politics. To that end, this
Part engages in an inquiry of how and why some States have created
semi-internationalized courts.
A. The Politics of International Tribunals
A body of recent scholarship addresses the question of when States
create international war crimes tribunals. Gary Bass argues that States
establish such international enforcement mechanisms when they seek to
export legal norms. Bass's comprehensive historical analysis of the poli-
tics behind Nuremberg and the ICTY provides a useful starting point. He
argues that war crimes tribunals are only established by liberal States;
they "spring from a particular kind of liberal domestic polity.""' 5 He
113. Kenneth Abbott, International Relations Theory International law, and the Regime
Governing Atrocities in International Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 362 (1999).
114. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
115. BASS, supra note 103, at 7. Bass's claim depends on the proposition that liberal
States do, in fact, behave differently. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World
of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995); cf Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave
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observes that when "illiberal states have fought each other, they have
never established a bona fide war crimes tribunal."' 6 The creation of war
crimes tribunals is a consequence of the fact that "liberal states tend to
operate abroad by some of the same rules they observe at home.""' 7 The
particular norm of the domestic polity which liberal States export in the
creation of war crimes tribunals, according to Bass, is legalism. For him,
legalism consists of a "fixation on process, a sense that international tri-
als must be conducted roughly according to well-established domestic
practice.""' Only liberal States, he claims, are committed to legalism.
Bass further suggests that the creation of international war crimes
tribunals will be limited to circumstances in which the risk of exposure
of the State's soldiers is extremely low."9 Such risk could come either
from the actual enforcement of international criminal law through, for
example, the apprehension of suspects, or from possible trial by a tribu-
nal itself. Recent examples demonstrate the accuracy of Bass's findings.
NATO has been extremely hesitant to locate and arrest Yugoslav war
crimes suspects such as Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb military
leader, as "there is much fear that it will cost lives to apprehend" such
individuals. 2' Likewise, the Bush administration has renounced the
Rome Statute of the ICC, fearing it may "open American officials and
military personnel in operations abroad to unjustified, frivolous or politi-
cally motivated suits."'2'
Bass also observes that war crimes tribunals will only be created
when States are outraged "by wars waged against them."'22 The public
outrage in the United States123 and Britain' 24 after World War II, for ex-
Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183, 194 (2001) (noting
that "[wie do not know for sure [whether liberal States behave better] but there is plenty of
reason to be skeptical").
116. BASS, supra note 103, at 19.
117. Id. at 18. In his War Message to Congress (1917), Woodrow Wilson noted, "We are
at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and
of responsibility for wrong shall be observed among nations and their governments that are
observed among the individual citizens of civilized states." Id. at 18-19.
118. Id. at 20.
119. Id. at 29.
120. [an Fisher, Ex-Commander in Yugoslavia Will Surrender to U.N. Tribunal, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at A3.
121. Crossette, supra note 5, at A3.
122. BASS, supra note 103, at 30.
123. In July 1942, for example, 39 percent of Americans desired Hitler to be shot, while
23 percent demanded imprisonment. Id. at 160. It is important to note, however, that public
opinion and mass outrage can undermine legalism if pushed too far. A May 1945 poll, for
example, showed that the majority of the American Public wanted German leaders placed in
forced labor camps, rather than tried. Id. at 161.
124. After World War II, 97 percent of Britons thought top Nazis should be punished and
53 percent demanded executions. Id. at 183.
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ample, played a significant role in the domestic politics behind the Nur-
emberg Tribunal. As Bass notes, "legalism without outrage [both mass
and elite] could result in a dreary series of futile legal briefs."'
25
These observations significantly narrow the range of circumstances
in which international war crimes tribunals are likely to emerge. Under
the constraints, Bass observes, for war crimes tribunals to arise, liberal
States must be the outraged victims of war crimes and be able to export
domestic norms of legalism without further jeopardizing their own citi-
zens and soldiers. This appears a highly unlikely proposition.
Democratic peace theorists assert that "[1]iberal states have created a
separate peace" and are unlikely to go to war against one another,1
26
thereby decreasing the number of conflict-dyads that could give rise to
war crimes enforcement mechanisms. If Bass's argument holds, only
when liberal States go to war with nonliberal States and those nonliberal
States commit significant crimes against the citizens of liberal States are
we likely to see war crimes tribunals. However, even when all of these
conditions are met-such as the United States' war on terrorism-
international war crimes tribunals do not necessarily emerge.
A second strand of emerging scholarship in the area of war crimes
enforcement stresses the realist power politics behind war crimes en-
forcement regimes. In an analysis of the creation and implementation of
the ICTY, Christopher Rudolph argues "the ICTY illustrates how the
strategic interests of powerful States ... shape the process of institution-
alization and its use."'27 Though powerful liberal States had not been the
direct victims of war crimes in the Balkans, their domestic liberal poli-
ties were nonetheless outraged as "vivid images from Balkan prison
camps recalled memories of the Holocaust."'28 The creation of the ICTY
was seen by States as a "means to respond to such calls in a politically
125. BASS, supra note 103, at 31.
126. Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1151,
1152 (1986). The literature on the democratic peace is extensive and suggests that due both to
belief systems and domestic structures, liberal States rarely go to war with other liberal States,
although liberal States may well have particular "liberal reasons for aggression" against
nonliberal States. Id. John Owen has argued that "liberal ideas [as mediated through liberal
institutions] cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the
same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal states." John M. Owen, How Liberalism
Produces the Democratic Peace, INT'L SEC., Fall 1994, at 87, 88. For further reading on the
democratic peace see, Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 205 (1983); David A. Lake, Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War, 86 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 24 (1992) (presenting an institutionalist explanation for the democratic peace
based on rent seeking); T. Clifton Morgan & Sally Howard Campbell, Domestic Structure,
Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
187 (1991) (explaining the democratic peace based on decisional rules in democracies).
127. Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War
Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT'L ORG. 655,660 (2001).
128. Id. at 665.
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inexpensive way."'' 9 Realist concerns dictated the creation of a court, but
one with little power and influence. According to Kenneth Abbott, the
ICTY was created precisely because realist power interests were limited:
"[T]he threat of prosecution was materially less costly than economic
sanctions or military intervention.""'3 Powerful States were not the direct
victims as they were at Nuremberg,'3 ' and they provided "strong rhetori-
cal support, but little aid in enforcement."'
32
Rudolph's conclusions likewise suggest international war crimes tri-
bunals will be created only rarely. While he notes that "expanding liberal
norms of state conduct and protecting human rights" may help "explain
the existence of tribunals in locales with little strategic or material im-
portance," he claims that effective international tribunals will only exist
where realist politics so dictate.' 3  He argues "realist variables of power
and interest best explain why tribunals may be established" and, even
once established, the same variables can lead States away from conduct-
ing "investigations in politically sensitive areas" and prevent them from
"allocating adequate resources ... in areas perceived to have little strate-
gic importance."'
3 4
Great powers will rarely identify such realist interests in the creation
of an international criminal enforcement mechanism.'35 U.S. inaction and
failure to intervene militarily in Rwanda, for example, is highly indica-
tive of this lack of great-power strategic interest where atrocities seem
most likely to occur.3 6 Other than in extremely rare cases where such
direct strategic interests exist, liberal States are only likely to create
international criminal enforcement mechanisms where domestic interest
groups can "raise the domestic costs in a liberal country for ignoring
foreign atrocities."'37 Even in those cases, however, Rudolph argues that
the mechanisms created may lack the political will and military muscle
to be effective.
The observations presented by Bass and Rudolph paint a relatively
bleak picture for the creation of viable enforcement mechanisms of in-
129. Id.
130. Abbott, supra note 113, at 373-74.
131. See BASS, supra note 103, at 147-205.
132. Rudolph, supra note 127, at 665.
133. Id. at 681-82.
134. Id. at 682-83.
135. See Abbott, supra note 113, at 374.
136. See, e.g., Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the
Rwandan Tragedy Happen, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 84; see also SAMANTHA
POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).
137. BASS, supra note 103, at 33; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 82, at 12-13
(describing the boomerang effect, whereby NGOs can raise domestic interests in liberal States
and thereby force such States to act in relation to human rights violations in foreign States).
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ternational criminal law. Their claims, taken collectively, indicate that
international criminal tribunals will emerge in two situations: first, where
liberal States are victimized and outraged and can create an enforcement
mechanism with little risk to their own citizens; and, second, where
States find significant power-politics strategic interests. Yet, both Bass
and Rudolph focus on international war crimes tribunals without recog-
nizing the broad array of domestic and semi-internationalized
enforcement mechanisms reviewed in Part I.
B. The Politics of Domestic International Criminal Enforcement
The future enforcement of international criminal law may not be as
dire as the observations of Bass and Rudolph suggest. By shifting the
focus from why powerful States create international war crimes tribunals
to when and why victim States enforce international criminal law at
home, significant opportunities emerge for international criminal law
enforcement.
Three case studies-the creation of tribunals in Cambodia, East
Timor, and Rwanda-illustrate additional political alignments, beyond
those identified by Bass and Rudolph, that may give rise to viable en-
forcement mechanisms in the victim State itself. The case of Cambodia
shows how political divisions within a powerful elite may lead to at-
tempts at domestic enforcement. The East Timor case demonstrates the
role of U.N. administration and suggests the circumstances in which
States may seek semi-internationalized enforcement mechanisms to ex-
ternalize the political costs of prosecutions vis-A-vis a powerful
neighbor. The example of the Rwandan Gacaca shows how domestic
demands for justice along with severe resource constraints can encour-
age innovation in the enforcement of international criminal law.
Each of the following case studies combines international law, inter-
national relations, and comparative political analysis, drawing
particularly on liberal theories of international relations.'38 None of these
case studies is intended to be exhaustive-further analysis particularly
through comparative politics methodologies would be required to ascer-
tain the exact political dynamics within each country. Nonetheless, the
following discussions do highlight important opportunities and align-
ments allowing for the exercise of international criminal justice by
domestic courts.
138. According to positive liberal international relations theory, individuals-the basic
actors in international society-organize to promote their own interests; States represent some
subset of those domestic interests; and international outcomes depend on the configuration of
national interests. See generally Moravcsik, supra note 114.
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1. Cambodia: Political Divisions and International
Criminal Enforcement
The ongoing process of establishing courts to try the leadership of
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia demonstrates that even illiberal States
will attempt to design mechanisms to enforce international criminal law
when policy externalities of international criminal law enforcement yield
net benefits for members of political elites and governing coalitions. The
argument here proceeds in four steps: First, it will be demonstrated that
divisions within the Cambodian political elite account for the stop-and-
go approach to the creation of a tribunal in Cambodia. Second, it will be
shown that this slow process has played directly into the hands of the
Cambodian governing elite, strengthening its position vis-A-vis political
rivals. Third, the way the U.N. and other international actors have guided
the process to date has further enhanced the Cambodian elite's political
power. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the Cambodian case for
the creation of semi-internationalized tribunals more generally.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to situate this political process in
the larger context of the recent history of the creation of a tribunal in
Cambodia.'39 The process of bringing the Khmer Rouge leadership to
justice has its roots in 1979 when Vietnam and its puppet government in
Cambodia tried and convicted Pol Pot and leng Saray-two of the senior
leaders of the Cambodian genocide-in a trial lacking any claim to fair-
ness or due process.4 0 In 1997, toward the end of the civil war in
139. Unfortunately, a history of the negotiations to establish the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
has not yet been written. Much of the negotiation process has remained secret and many key
documents from inside the Cambodian government, as well as most of the correspondence
between the Cambodian government and the U.N., have not been made public. See, e.g.,
Anette Marcher, UN Accepts Flawed Tribunal for KR, PHNOM PENH POST, Oct. 13, 2000, at 1.
The analysis that follows does not attempt a comprehensive history, but rather seeks to analyze
the political alignments behind the ongoing attempts to create a Khmer Rouge tribunal, based
on interviews and the limited documentary evidence available.
140. See STEPHEN HEDER & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECU-
TION: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE 13 (2001); see also DAVID
CHANDLER, BROTHER NUMBER ONE 160-62 (1999). The July 1979 law under which Pol Pot
was tried for genocide deviates significantly from international definitions of the crime. Under
article I of the law, genocide is defined as "the pre-planned mass killing of many innocent
people, expulsion of the people from the towns and their villages in order to concentrate and
compel them to work to the point where their strength was broken in conditions that destroyed
them both physically and mentally, smashing religion, wrecking the cultural infrastructure and
other relations with family and society." July 1979 Law, art. 1, reproduced in Somnomreuang
Robah Tolakar Kat-toh Ban Pralay Puch-sah Pol Pot-leg Sary [Dossier of the Court Judging
the Pol Pot-leng Saray Genocidal Clique], quoted in HEDER & TITTEMORE, supra, at 13 n.17.
This definition deviates significantly from that provided in article 2 of the Genocide Conven-
tion:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with an intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
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Cambodia that raged until the death of Pol Pot and the surrender of the
Khmer Rouge leadership in 1998, First Prime Minister Norodom
Ranariddh and then Second Prime Minister Hun Sen wrote to the U.N.
Secretary-General seeking international assistance to try "the persons
responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule
of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to.1979."' 41 In response, a U.N. Group of
Experts issued a report in March 1999 on the prospects for justice in
Cambodia, recommending the establishment of a U.N. Tribunal for
Cambodia along the lines of the ICTY.1
42
In the intervening period, Hun Sen, the former Second Prime Minis-
ter, staged a coup which led to the formation of a coalition government
in November 1998 between Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party and
the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-
operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the second most important party in
Cambodia, thereby ousting First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh.1
43
Over the next four years, Hun Sen's government engaged in negotiations
with the U.N. to establish a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge. Throughout
1999 and 2000, the Cambodian government, led in this effort by Senior
Minister Sok An,' 44 met with U.N. counterparts, Ralph Zaklin and Hans
Corell.'
4
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction, in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
141. Letter from the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia to the Secretary-
General (June 21 1997), annexed to U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1997/488 (1997).
142. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General As-
sembly Resolution 52/135, Identical letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the
General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (Mar. 15, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Report of the Group of Experts].
143. Michael Hayes, Another Chapter Opens as Hun Sen Gives Prince Ranariddh the
Deal, PHNOM PENH POST, Nov. 27, 1998, at 1.
144. Sok An serves as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and President of the Task
Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Preparation of the Proceedings for the
Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders.
145. See, e.g., One Hurdle Left on KR Trial, PHNOM PENH POST, Sept. 3, 1999, at I
(noting that agreement between the U.N. and Cambodia had been reached on most points,
with the exception of the number of judges); Anette Marcher, National KR Tribunal Takes
Shape, PHNOM PENH POST, Nov. 26, 1999, at I ("Key aspects of the Government's latest pro-
posal on the Khmer Rouge tribunal include Cambodian jurisdiction for the trial and the
appointment of judges by the Supreme Council of Magistracy."); Anette Marcher & Yin
Soeum, KR Trial Sails Through Council, PHNOM PENH POST, Jan. 7, 2000, at 1 (noting that
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The result of these negotiations is the proposed tribunal rooted in the
Cambodian domestic judiciary, with a mix of international and local
prosecutors and judges applying international law. In mid-1999, differ-
ences of opinion between the Cambodian government and the U.N.
emerged on several key issues, namely the nationality of the majority of
judges and the prosecutor, the status of amnesties granted leng Saray,
and the willingness of the government to arrest indictees. 4 6 International
diplomacy eventually led to a breakthrough in the negotiations and the
novel proposal for a tribunal with a majority Cambodian bench, but re-
quiring a supermajority, including at least one international judge, to
convict.
147
On December 29, 2001, Sok An presented the Cambodian govern-
ment's draft law for a semi-internationalized tribunal as part of the
domestic judiciary to the National Assembly, 48 which unanimously
passed the law three days later. 49 Further delay ensued as the Constitu-
tional Council, Cambodia's highest judicial authority, challenged the
law's constitutionality on grounds that article 3 of the draft law incorpo-
rates aspects of the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956 that provide for the
death penalty, in violation of article 32 of the Cambodian Constitution.'50
While finding that the general semi-internationalized format of the pro-
posed court was constitutionally permissible,' the Council sent the law
the "Council of Ministers yesterday approved the draft law for future trials against former
Khmer Rouge leaders").
146. Anette Marcher, KR Tribunal Talks Inch Forward, PHNOM PENH POST, Mar. 31,
1999, at 1. From July 4 to July 7, 2000, Hans Corell engaged in negotiations with the Cambo-
dian government in an attempt to resolve these differences. After these meetings observers
were upbeat noting that "its beginning to look like the real thing." Anette Marcher, Agreement
Close on KR Trial, PHNOM PENH POST, Jul. 7, 2000, at 1.
147. See, e.g., Anette Marcher & Vong Sokheng, Kerry Visit Raises KR Tribunal Hopes,
PHNOM PENH POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at 1.
148. See Sok An, Presentation and Comments to the National Assembly on the Draft
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Dec. 29,
2000 & Jan. 2, 2001 (on file with author) (outlining the details of the law and describing it as
"embody[ing] new formulas, new concepts, and new and significant principles").
149. See Vong Sokheng & Phelim Kyne, Trial Law Sails Through Assembly, PHNOM
PENH POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at I (noting that "legislators unanimously passed 47 of 48 articles of
the Khmer Rouge tribunal law without a whisper of debate").
150. Paragraph 2, article 32 of the Cambodian Constitution is unambiguous: "there shall
be no capital punishment." CAMB. CO NST. art. 32(2); see Constitutional Council, Case No.
038/001/2001 (Jan. 17, 2001), Decision No. 040/002/2001 (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with au-
thor). Paragraph 1, article 3 of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Law incorporates ten articles of the
Penal Code of 1956 which allow "third degree criminal penalty." Article 21 of the Penal Code
states that "third degree criminal penalty is the death sentence."
151. Among other issues considered, the Council found "that prohibiting the Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia to request amnesty ... does not infringe the Constitution." Case No.
038/001/2001. It approved "Articles 9 to 32, which define the composition of the Extraordi-
nary Chambers," noting that there "is no article in the Constitution found to prohibit a national
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back to the National Assembly to "remove any mention" of the death
sentence. 
52
Even after the revision of the law to conform to the Constitutional
Council's order,'53 significant delays in implementation continued.5 4 The
standoff between the U.N. and the Cambodian government on the issues
of the independence of the prosecutor and the status of amnesties previ-
ously granted to Khmer Rouge leaders was exacerbated by statements
from Prime Minister Hun Sen loudly critical of the U.N.'55 In January
2002, Sok An and Hans Corell yet again exchanged letters in an attempt
to reconcile these differences, but were unable to do so. ' On February 8,
2002, the U.N. withdrew from negotiations, concluding that "as cur-
rently envisaged, the Cambodian court would not guarantee
independence, impartiality, and objectivity."'57 After a seven month delay,
in early September 2002, the U.N. indicated a willingness to reenter into
discussions if the Security Council or General Assembly gave "a man-
date to do so." ' At the time of publication, this process is ongoing and
its outcome remains uncertain.
institution, in particular the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, from appointing people from
the United Nations." It found that the extension of the statute of limitations on certain crimes
was appropriate as "Cambodia has not ruled that [statutes of limitations] are a fundamental
principle of equal value with its Constitution." Id.
152. Id.; see also Phelim Kyne & Vong Sokheng, KR Law Moves, But Fine Print Threat-
ens, PHNOM PENH POST, Feb. 16, 2001, at 1.
153. See Vong Sokheng, Senate Approves KR Tribunal Law Change, PHNOM PENH POST,
Aug. 3, 2001. Subsequently, King Norodom Sihanouk signed the draft law in mid-August
2001. See Vong Sokheng & Bill Bainbridge, King Signs KR Law, But Obstacles Loom, PHNOM
PENH POST, Aug. 17, 2001.
154. Vong Sokheng, UN Role in Tribunal Decisions Under Fire, PHNOM PENH POST,
July 6, 2001 (asking why a "matter that took the Council of Ministers about [fifteen] minutes
to approve has taken six months to get done").
155. Hun Sen is on record as saying that "[i]f you are not taking part, we will proceed
without the United Nations, because when we toppled Pol Pot's genocidal regime we did not
have United Nations help at all." Seth Mydans, U.N. Ends Cambodia Talks on Trials for
Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2002, at A4 (quoting Hun Sen); see also Vong Sokheng,
Trial Delay UN's Fault-PM, PHNOM PENH POST, Nov. 23, 2001 (noting the Prime Minister's
comment that "the tribunal law to try the former Khmer Rouge was approved and they (the
UN) vetoed it").
156. Interview with Sok An, Chairman, Cambodian Council of Ministers, in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia (Jan. 11, 2002).
157. Mydans, supra note 155, at A4.
158. Seth Mydans, Cambodia and U.N. Break an Icy Silence on Khmer Rouge Trials,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at Al l. In mid-November, the U.N. Sixth Committee provided that
mandate through a resolution requesting the continuation of negotiations. Elizabeth Becker,
U.N. Revives Plan to Try Remnants of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002,
at A8. The resolution of the Sixth Committee, however, has been much criticized by interna-
tional observers for relaxing standards of due process and granting too much power to
Cambodia to structure and administer the court. See id.
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The first principal claim of this Section is that the preceding saga of
repeating cycles of small steps toward the creation of a semi-
international court, followed by delay and backpedaling can be
explained by divisions within the Cambodian political elite. Steps for-
ward have occurred when the policy externalities of enforcement of
international criminal law have benefited ruling members of the political
elite; steps back have occurred when proposed enforcement has threat-
ened controlling members of this elite.'59
Cambodia remains a relatively illiberal democracy with a narrow
and extremely powerful political elite. The Cambodian government is
not the kind of democratic polyarchy Robert Dahl describes as being
"completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens."' 60 More-
over, Cambodian civil society-still in its infancy-lacks what Dahl
refers to as "organizational pluralism."' 6' Exemplary of this lack of plu-
ralism are reports by election monitors that in the February 2002
commune elections, the government's "landslide would not have been
possible but for a pre-polls campaign of vote buying, intimidation, and
violence, including the killing of more than twenty candidates and party
activists."
'
'
62
In circumstances such as these, government policy rests not with the
broad spectrum of the Cambodian people, but instead with a narrow po-
litical elite. Liberal international relations theory indicates that the
government's actions on the international stage represent some subset of
the domestic polity. 63 In Cambodia, then, that subset is a political power
elite. Government by elites occurs when, to quote C. Wright Mills, "the
159. That justice in Cambodia should turn on politics is not surprising in a country in
which history, culture, death, and memory have all been purposefully politicized by the gov-
ernment to entrench power and undermine enemies. See Mary K. Magistad, Pol Pot's Shadow:
The Politics of Memory in Cambodia, Remarks to the Radcliffe Institute Colloquium, Apr. 29,
2002.
160. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 2 (1971); see also
Freedom House Survey Team, Freedom in the World 2002: The Democracy Gap, available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/essay2OO2.pdf (last visited Nov. 24,
2002) (describing Cambodia as "not free").
161. Robert A. Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, in THREE FACES OF PLURALISM 191, 192, 187
(S. Ehrlich & G. Wootton eds., 1980) (defining organizational pluralism as "the number and
autonomy of organizations that must be taken into account in order to characterize conflicts
among a given collective of persons" and observing that "organizational pluralism is ordinar-
ily a concomitant, both as a cause and effect, of the liberalization and democratization of
hegemonic regimes").
162. Leo Dobbs, Spotlight: Cambodia Votes, 165 FAR E. ECON. REV. 6 (2002). Likewise
Cambodia's own election-monitoring organizations have found hundreds of cases of irregu-
larities during the campaign. See Lon Nara, Election Monitors List Irregularities, PHNOM
PENH POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at 6 (noting 128 cases of illegal activities by the CCP and 105
cases of intimidation).
163. Moravcsik, supra note 114, at 513.
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men of the circles composing this elite, severally and collectively...
make ... key decisions."' 6
When a government is controlled by a political elite, private con-
flicts are often acted out on a very public stage. According to Robert
Putnam's seminal work in the area, political elites consist of "networks
of personal communication, friendship and influence" which, at times
"act out private drives and conflicts, cloaking this fact in publicly ac-
ceptable rhetoric."' 61 While such elites are often "homogeneous in terms
of party affiliation" and political goals, cleavages within elites are fre-
quent.166 Putnam explains: "In some societies intraelite competition and
fragmentation reaches extreme levels" directly affecting political out-
167
comes.
Understanding the outcomes of the negotiations between the U.N.
and the Cambodian government requires characterizing the dynamics of
this political elite. Competition within the political elite in Cambodia has
at times driven the creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and, at other
times, delayed the process. A principle division within the Cambodian
government falls precisely along the line of the establishment of a tribu-
nal for the Khmer Rouge. The side of this issue on which a member of
the Cambodian elite falls depends largely on the individual's position
during the time of Khmer Rouge rule. As the U.N. Group of Experts ex-
plains: "[B]oth of the principal political parties have over the years had
strong connections with the Khmer Rouge and include former Khmer
Rouge among their members, including some who might be targets of
any investigation into atrocities of the 1970s. ' 'I68 Obviously, likely targets
of investigation and their supporters are strongly against the creation of a
tribunal. Further, while Prime Minister Hun Sen suggests that the pro-
posed tribunal be limited to ten suspects at most,169 others fear that they
may be implicated in the proceedings by damaging information revealed
in the course of judicial inquiry. For example, former Khmer Rouge
commanders, such as Sou Met and Yim Phana, who currently hold
164. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 28 (1956); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES 9 (1976) (describing how "a tiny proportion
of the citizens of any of these countries has more than an infinitesimal chance of directly in-
fluencing national policy").
165. Id. at 72.
166. Id. at 113.
167. Id. at 119 (noting that "[a]lmost inevitably such cleavages rend the national political
elite and raise the specter of civil war, as in America in the 1860s, Germany in the 1930s, and
Nigeria and Northern Ireland in the 1960s").
168. Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 142, 96.
169. Justice Not Vengeance; Prime Minister Hun Sen Supports a War-Crimes Tribunal-
So Long As It Focuses Only on Top Khmer Rouge Leaders, NEWSWEEK (Atlantic Edition),
Aug. 13, 2001, at 17.
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high-ranking army posts, have publicly expressed concern that "the trial
might be connected to us."'70 Yim Phana admits that these personal tribu-
lations have direct effects on "other politicians and other political
parties."'
While fear of prosecution leads some members of the Cambodian
elite to argue against the creation of a tribunal, others see the tribunal as
an opportunity to expose and implicate political enemies. To use an
analogy from a military officer: "[T]he trial should end up like a meal of
shrimp soup: [W]hen diners pick up one shrimp three or four others
cling on."'' 2 As one Cambodian official explained on condition of ano-
nymity: "There are many powerful people in government who fear this
trial will reveal something about them, but there are also many even
more powerful who would be happy to have facts about others revealed.
It is a political game and the stakes are very high."'7 3
The second principal argument of this Section is that both the efforts
toward and delays in creating a Khmer Rouge tribunal play directly into
the hands of the Cambodian government. At the center of the ongoing
political game in Cambodia sits Prime Minister Hun Sen, himself a for-
mer member of the Khmer Rouge before defecting to Vietnam in the
1970s.174 While he and his closest advisors would not be subject to legal
proceedings by any proposed tribunal, many of his political rivals, such
as those in the FUNCINPEC Party, which was "closely allied with the
Khmer Rouge in the struggle against Viet Nam" could be damaged by
information which might surface in the course of trial. 75 Information that
could potentially emerge in a trial has been described by some as "a
powerful weapon to hold over [some of] his FUNCINPEC coalition
partners.'
' 76
Yet, Hun Sen's own allies are not immune from the threat of possible
trials. Revelations about some sitting government officials from one po-
tential defendant, Ta Mok, have been described as "career wrecking at
best, and at worst could result in criminal charges being brought.
'
'
77
More recently, Cambodian political commentators have suggested a split
within Hun Sen's own Cambodian People's Party between Chea Sim and
Hun Sen over the tribunal issue, reflecting this private political game
170. Vong Sokheng, Senior KR Nervous as Trial Looms, PHNOM PENH POST, Aug. 31,
2001.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Interview with Cambodian Official, Office of the Council of Ministers, in Phnom
Penh, Cambodia (Jan. II, 2002).
174. Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 142, $ 96.
175. Id.
176. Trials for Khmer Rouge Ever More Remote, PHNOM PENH POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at 1.
177. Id.
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being played out on a national policy-making stage.'78 By controlling this
process, Hun Sen is able to threaten his rivals while simultaneously rest-
ing secure that his allies will not in fact be subject to prosecution.
In 1997, when Hun Sen and his co-Prime Minister wrote to the U.N.
seeking assistance in the establishment of the tribunal, the threat of a
court may well have seemed a potent tool to use against political ene-
mies, particularly those with extremely close Khmer Rouge ties. Given
the seemingly remote likelihood of an actual trial, it was presumably a
weapon that Hun Sen could brandish at will to scare, coerce, and control
other factions within the government. After all, no one could be sure
what files might turn up at trial. A comment by Om Yen Tieng, Senior
Advisor to Hun Sen on the creation of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal is sug-
gestive of the power this issue may have given to the Prime Minister:
"There were lots of different views about this within the government.
Before we could start to draft the law we had to resolve these internal
differences. The Prime Minister was able to look at the problems and
neutralize the different factions.' 79
However, as the tribunal came closer to reality over the past few
years and it appeared that the U.N. would have greater authority than the
Cambodian government, Hun Sen may well have realized that a trial-at
least one outside of his direct control-could be dangerous. According to
one European diplomat in Phnom Penh "there is still the lingering doubt
that if [Hun Sen] cannot control the trial, it could produce some evidence
that would be embarrassing either for people close to him or for him-
self."' 80 Another political commentator has observed: "[T]he trials might
both implicate his party allies and foster subversive ideas about legal
accountability in the minds of his restive citizens.""'8 This fear of loss of
control may well have driven the demands by Hun Sen's government to
either end negotiations or to leave final authority over the proceedings to
Cambodia, including the appointment of a majority of Cambodian
judges. This sentiment was reflected by Senior Minister Sok An: "[W]e
must conduct the process with full respect for national sovereignty."'
82
By asserting sovereignty and delaying a final deal with the U.N., Hun
Sen may have been seeking to protect himself from embarrassment,
178. Robert Carmichael & Lon Nara, Sar Kheng: On the Job, The Trial, Crime and
Politics, PHNOM PENH POST, Aug. 31, 2001 (interviewing Sar Kheng, Deputy Prime Minister
and co-Minister for the Ministry of the Interior).
179. Interview with Om Yen Tieng, Advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen, in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia (Jan. 12, 2002).
180. Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Trials Won't Be Fair, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at A 12.
181. Chung Kuo Jih Pao, Cambodia, UN Agree on Trial, CHINA DAILY, May 25, 2000,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn.
182. Interview with Sok An, supra note 156.
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while maximizing the effectiveness of the use of the "tribunal weapon"
against rival members of the Cambodian elite.
As Hun Sen further cements his hold on power, the need for the tri-
bunal as a hypothetical weapon against rivals may decline. Such a
decline could have two different effects on the negotiations. If Hun Sen's
own calculations suggest that trials would actually be more dangerous to
him and his friends, the tribunal issue could slip off the agenda. If, on the
other hand, he deems his enemies to be the more likely losers of actual
rather than hypothetical trials, the government's commitment to justice
may increase.
The looming omnipresence of a hypothetical tribunal may also have
played into Hun Sen's political hand, affording him a bargaining tool in
the negotiation of a peace deal with the Khmer Rouge. Judith Goldstein
observes in the context of NAFTA that the creation of legal mechanisms
"may be directed as much at domestic concerns as by considerations of
the more aggregate national interest."'83 Because the possibility of trial
existed, Hun Sen was able to offer surrendering Khmer Rouge protection
from eventual prosecution. In fact, in 1996, when leng Saray 84-a top
Khmer Rouge commander and a likely defendant-led the defection of
significant Khmer Rouge forces to the government, Hun Sen "recom-
mended that King Sihanouk grant Saray an amnesty and a pardon."'85
Thus, Hun Sen was able to win favor with still influential Khmer Rouge
cadres by offering them protection from the very threat of prosecution he
had hypothetically created.
Moving away from granting such amnesties may further serve Hun
Sen's interests. By claiming that the U.N. has forced him not to recog-
nize these grants of amnesty, he may be able to use the process of
183. Judith Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North
American "Unfair" Trade Laws, 50 INT'L ORG. 541, 562 (1996).
184. See HEDER & ITTEMORE, supra note 140, at 63-75 (noting that "there is sufficient
evidence of leng Saray's individual responsibility for CPK crimes, for repeatedly and publicly
encouraging arrests and executions within his Foreign Ministry and throughout Democratic
Kampuchea").
185. See Tom Fawthrop, No Reason for Standoff on KR Law, PHNOM PENH POST, Mar.
2, 2001, at 1. Note that according to article 27 of the Cambodian Constitution, "the King shall
have the right to grant partial or complete amnesty." Constitutional Council, Case No.
038/001/2001 (Jan. 17, 2001). However, the King only considers amnesty grants when so
requested by the government. Interview with Sok An, supra note 156. Om Yen Tieng has sug-
gested that the amnesties granted to Saray are not binding: "leng Saray was granted amnesty
when the government requested it. But because we are using a special chamber we don't be-
lieve that past amnesty is a bar to prosecution in any way." Interview with Om Yen Tieng,
supra note 179. For a further discussion of the binding nature and enforceability of amnesty
grants, see generally, William Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Applying Liberal Interna-
tional Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. J. INT'L L. 647 (2001)
(arguing that amnesties should not be given validity unless the enacting government was le-
gitimate and the amnesty itself is of limited scope).
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legalization to continue to threaten those same individuals he originally
pardoned. In the words of a European diplomat, Hun Sen "has no love
for any of these people [the senior Khmer Rouge leaders]"'86 and would
quite probably be happy to have them removed from the political land-
scape. As Om Yen Tieng, Hun Sen's senior advisor, explains: "We have
been working to 'prepare the land' for the trial like a gardener would...
The government is working hard to neutralize these people."'
87
In many ways, the threat of the possibility of prosecution-rather
than prosecution itself-is the most effective means of neutralizing these
former Khmer Rouge bosses. Fear of the unknown is often worse than
the event itself. Moreover, Hun Sen may not want to actually break the
"secret deals he made with key Khmer Rouge leaders to get them to de-
fect in the last few years."'188 Some of these Khmer Rouge commanders,
such as leng Saray, are rumored to have evidence and information about
Hun Sen's activities during the Khmer Rouge time, which would be ex-
tremely damaging if released.8 9
The Cambodian political landscape is a murky world of mystery and
intrigue. Rumors, threats, and uncertainty abound. What is clear is that
the slow negotiation process has been caused by splits within the politi-
cal elite and Hun Sen has been able to use the threat of prosecution as a
political tool against his enemies. In so doing he has externalized the
political costs onto the U.N. He created a political situation in which it
was left to the U.N.'s top negotiator to declare that "no amnesty shall be
a bar to prosecution"' 90 and demand that the prosecutor must be able to
make independent indictments.' 9' Thereby, Hun Sen can appear to be
respecting his promises to the Khmer Rouge leadership, while still
threatening them with the specter of prosecution.' 92
The third principal claim of this Section is that the way the U.N. and
international actors have structured the Cambodian tribunal creation
process has enhanced Hun Sen's power. As shown above, the stops,
starts, and delays in the process have given Hun Sen an important politi-
cal tool to use against his enemies. By allowing negotiations to drag out
over a period of years, the U.N. has tacitly condoned, or, at least, al-
lowed the continuation and use of justice as a political weapon.
186. Mydans, supra note 180, at AI2.
187. Interview with Om Yen Tieng, supra note 179.
188. Chung Kuo Jih Pao, supra note 181.
189. Magistad, supra note 159.
190. Fawthrop, supra note 185, at I (quoting Hans Corell).
191. Interview with Sok An, supra note 156.
192. In a similar context, Vojislav Kostunica's decision to allow Slobodon Milosevic's
extradition to The Hague, represents a similar kind of cost externalization onto the U.N.
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More directly, Hun Sen has been able to use the negotiation process
with the U.N. to enhance his own legitimacy. Andrew Moravcsik has
argued that "international cooperation" such as between Hun Sen's gov-
ernment and the U.N. "redistributes control over four important political
resources: initiative, institutions, information, and ideology ... such
shifts tend to benefit ... national executives."'' 3 The negotiations over
the creation of the tribunal may have "created informational asymme-
tries" in the government's favor and allowed Hun Sen's government to
"manipulate the [perceived] credibility of government policy" as he ap-
peared to commit himself to an international process, which lent
"ideological legitimation" to his regime. '94 The process of negotiation-
even without results-may have thus bolstered Hun Sen's political
power at home.
Finally, the proceeding discussion of the creation of the Khmer
Rouge tribunal has important implications for understanding the politics
of international criminal law enforcement. It is apparent that semi-liberal
or illiberal States do negotiate for the creation of international criminal
law enforcement mechanisms when such negotiation furthers the politi-
cal goals of the controlling elite. Where political elite divide along pro-
enforcement and anti-enforcement lines or where the government in
power is largely immune from prosecution, an illiberal State may well
favor the creation of a judicial enforcement mechanism. Such circum-
stances should be identified as real opportunities for domestic or semi-
internationalized criminal law enforcement.
There is, of course, risk in the creation of international criminal law
enforcement mechanisms when they are used as a political tool by par-
ticular elements of a domestic government. First, the Cambodian
example highlights the possibility that political infighting can undermine
the creation of a tribunal, where the threat of prosecution is a more valu-
able political commodity than prosecution itself. Second, politics may
subjugate the rule of law to the point where it no longer has the charac-
teristics of obligation, precision, and delegation associated with legalized
regimes in international relations.'95 Comments by the U.N. upon with-
drawal from negotiations in February 2002 were indicative of this failure
to achieve impartial justice. 96 The Cambodian example thus draws atten-
193. ANDREW MORAVCSIK, WHY THE EUROPEAN UNION STRENGTHENS THE STATE:
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 63 (Ctr. for European Studies, Work-
ing Paper Series No. 52, 1994).
194. Id. at 10, 12, 14.
195. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG.
401 (2000) (defining legalized regimes as those "characterized by three components: obliga-
tion, precision, and delegation").
196. See Mydans, supra note 155, at A4.
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tion to the crucial role international organizations and third States will
have to play in achieving fair and just outcomes when international
criminal law becomes overly politicized.
Political fissures along such fault lines are likely to be a frequent oc-
currence in States recovering from massive ethnic violence and thus
present numerous opportunities for the enforcement of international
criminal law. Some elements of the sitting government are likely to have
been involved in the atrocities, while others likely have cleaner hands.
Political divisions can provide an opportunity for the creation of a do-
mestic enforcement mechanism by generating strong domestic political
interests in favor of prosecution. The international community needs to
be able to identify such opportunities for the creation of enforcement
mechanisms and to provide appropriate outside pressure and assistance
to realize them.
In the process of deciding how and whether to support domestic at-
tempts at semi-internationalized criminal justice, the U.N. and
international actors must understand that their negotiating tactics may
become part of a domestic political game. Where a potential tribunal has
become a political as well as judicial weapon, international actors will
further the interests of some subset of domestic political interests. While
external pressure may give the pro-enforcement forces the upper hand,
international involvement has a direct effect on domestic political bar-
gaining.'7 This is not to say that the U.N. should not support the creation
of semi-internationalized courts, but in doing so, it must recognize and
evaluate their impact on domestic politics. The international community
must be on guard against strengthening the hand of a regime or particu-
lar politician in the name of international justice. Careful analysis of
domestic political interests, fractions, and dynamics will be required for
such international pressure to be successful.
2. East Timor: Nation Building and Cost Externalization
The ongoing prosecutions of crimes against humanity and war
crimes in East Timor present two additional situations in which States
and international organizations may establish domestic enforcement
mechanisms for international criminal law. First, when the U.N. exer-
cises effective sovereignty over a territory in the wake of mass violence,
it may impose international criminal justice. Second, States may use
semi-internationalized courts in order to externalize the political costs of
prosecutions vis-h-vis a powerful neighbor onto an international organi-
zation.
197. See, e.g., Robert Putman, Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 43 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988)
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The troubled history of East Timor, its Portuguese colonial era and
Indonesian occupation,' the violence of its quest for independence in
1999,"'9 and the role of the U.N. in reconstruction thereafter 200 have been
well documented. Prior to the December 1975 Indonesian invasion, East
Timor was a Portuguese colony. Over the next quarter century, a
Timorese independence movement fought a sometimes violent struggle
• 201
for independence. In January 1999, the government of Indonesia of-
fered a "popular consultation" with the potential for independence 2 2
Prior to, during, and after the August 1999 consultation, "Indonesian
security forces unleashed a wave of violence in which pro-independence
supporters were terrorized and killed., 2°3 Amidst increasing violence, the
government of Indonesia agreed to the presence of an international force
under Australian leadership, which was deployed on September 20,
1999.2° Through Resolution 1272 of October 25, 1999, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council, acting under chapter VII authority, established the U.N.
Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), which exercised
sovereign authority over the territory through May 2002.205
The first claim of this Section is that the U.N. may effectively "im-
pose" international criminal justice on territories it administers. Given
198. See generally NATALIE L. REID, PEBBLES AND SAND: CASE STUDIES IN SECOND-
HAND CONFLICT 21 (1999) (describing Indonesia's occupation of East Timor as "second hand
colonialism" which implies "the imposition of political control by military force, and the oc-
cupation and exploitation of the recolonized territory by its new masters").
199. See, e.g., Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East imor to the
Secretary-General, annexed to Identical Letters Dated 31 January 2000 from the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security
Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 96, IT 5-13, U.N. Doc. A/54/726 (2000) [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry
Report] (summarizing the period from 1991-1999); id. 1$ 26-92 (documenting specific ex-
amples of violence in 1999); Situation of Human Rights in East Thnor: Note by the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 54th sess., Agenda Item 116(c), IT1 10-22, U.N. Doc A/54/660 (1999)
[hereinafter Human Rights Report 1999] (discussing the violence surrounding the 1999 elec-
tion in considerable detail).
200. See, e.g., Hansjrg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN
and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 107 (2001) (comparing U.N. administration of Kosovo and East Timor); Boris
Kondoch, The United Nations Administration of East Timor, 6 J. CONFLICT SECURITY L. 245-
65 (2001) (considering the relationship between East Timor and the U.N.); Suzannah Linton,
Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F.
185, 202-06 (2001); Sarah Pritchard, United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Efforts: New And Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Tmor, 24 U.N.S.
WALES L.J. 183, 183-90 (2001).
201. See REID, supra note 198, at 33.
202. Human Rights Report 1999, supra note 199, 9 18.
203. Id. 120.
204. Id. [22.
205. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272
(1999).
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the U.N. reputation as a foremost protector of human rights as well as its
obligation to prosecute certain international crimes such as crimes
against humanity and war crimes,2°6 the U.N. Administration in East
Timor faced significant pressure both from within the organization and
from Member States to design an adequate enforcement mechanism for
the prosecution of serious crimes committed in East Timor during 1999.
The Security Council Resolution establishing UNTAET granted the U.N.
Transitional Administration the power to "exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice. 207 Less than
two months later, on December 10, 1999, the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights Report on East Timor affirmed that "the
international community would exert every effort to ensure that those
responsible [for serious crimes in East Timor] would be brought to jus-
tice ' ' and suggested that an international criminal tribunal might be
appropriate to guarantee "individual responsibility for the crimes com-
mitted in the past year.
' 29
The Secretary-General has noted the heightened responsibility of the
U.N. to ensure accountability. In a cover letter to the report of the Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry established to gather information on
violations of human rights in East Timor,2" he noted: The "United Na-
tions ... has a particular responsibility to the people of East Timor in
connection with investigating the violations, establishing responsibilities,
206. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing that "[a] state's
complete failure to punish repeated or notorious instances" of certain international crimes
constitutes a violation of international law); WELLER & BURKE-WHITE, supra note 63 (noting
that States may face an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction over certain international
crimes); Kondoch, supra note 200, at 261 (noting that "[a]lthough the United Nations is not a
party to the above named conventions it is undisputed that the United Nations has legal per-
sonality, which implies that the United Nations can be bound mutatis mutandis by customary
international law" to prosecute certain crimes). Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62 (observing that "[e]ach High Contracting Party shall be
under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed ... such grave breaches,
and shall bring such persons ... before its own courts"); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., set. C, no. 4, 174 (July 29, 1988) (finding a duty under the
Inter-American Convention to "carry out a serious investigation of violations committed
within its jurisdiction").
207. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 205, 1.
208. Human Rights Report 1999, supra note 199, 3.
209. Id. 74(5).
210. The International Commission of Inquiry was established by the U.N. Economic
and Social Council in 1999 pursuant to E.S.C. Dec. 1999/293, Resolutions and Decisions
Adopted by the Economic and Social Council at Its Resumed Substantive Session of 1999,
Agenda Item 14(h), at 10, U.N. Doc. E/1999/INF/2/Add.3 (2000).
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punishing those responsible and promoting reconciliation. 2 The Com-
mission of Inquiry's report found that "all persons who committed or
authorized violations of human rights or international humanitarian law
were individually responsible and accountable for those violations and
must be brought to justice."22 Likewise, the Commission called on the
U.N. to "establish an independent and international body" to "prosecute
those guilty of serious human rights violations."23
As the sovereign authority over East Timor, the U.N. was committed
to the enforcement of international criminal law. The most obvious pos-
sibility was to establish an ad hoc tribunal similar to the ICTY and the
ICTR. The Human Rights Report, after all, had specifically recom-
214mended such an international criminal tribunal. Under a chapter VII
mandate, the tribunal would have the enormous benefit of obligating In-
donesia to cooperate and turn over indictees for prosecution.
Yet, for at least three reasons, a fully international tribunal was not
created. First, the ad hoc international tribunals are created through
chapter VII resolutions,2 ' requiring a finding of a "threat to peace and
security" and raising the possibility of veto by permanent Security
Council members. Some have argued that the presence of UNTAET in
East Timor eliminated the threat to peace and security,2 16 thereby under-
mining the legal basis to create an international tribunal under chapter
VII. With sufficient political will, the Security Council probably could
have found a continuing threat to peace and security in the region, but
such political will was lacking. Indonesian President Wahid had specifi-
cally requested the use of national, rather than international, means to
bring the perpetrators of the 1999 crimes to justice.27 The Secretary-
General, noting Indonesia's Foreign Minister's assurances "of the
Government's determination that there will be no impunity for those re-
sponsible,' 28 agreed that "if the government has the capacity and
willingness to do it, you don't want to create another tribunal."2 9 More-
211. Identical Letters Dated 31 January 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council and the Chairper-
son of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/54/726, S/2000/59.
212. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 199, 13.
213. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 199,9 152.
214. Human Rights Report 1999, supra note 199,1 74(5).
215. See Mydans, supra note 155, at A4.
216. Kondoch, supra note 200, at 263.
217. See E. Timor Inst. for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis, Sites for Justice
Related Efforts, LA'O HAMUTUK BULL., Oct. 2001, at 2, 2, available at http://www.etan.org/
lh/bulletin.html [hereinafter Sites for Justice Related Efforts].
218. Sites for Justice Related Efforts, supra note 217 (quoting Secretary-General Annan).
219. Linton, supra note 200, at 213 n.95.
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over, Indonesia's powerful allies on the Security Council deferred to Ja-
220karta's request that it have the right to prosecute its own.
The second reason the U.N. rejected calls for another ad hoc tribunal
was financial. As discussed above,22' the costs of an international tribunal
can be exorbitant. The total budget for governing East Timor, including
judicial reconstruction, for 2001 was U.S.$65 million.222 Yet, that same
year, the ICTY budget was U.S.$96.4 million.23 Even assuming a far
more modest ad hoc tribunal for East Timor, the budget of such an inter-
national tribunal could have easily exceeded that of the entire
government of East Timor. To create such a tribunal, either additional
funds would have to be contributed by international actors or other gov-
ernment services curtailed. Permanent members of the Security Council
were generally unwilling to increase assessed contributions to fund a
third ad hoc tribunal and East Timor itself had few spare resources at its
disposal .224
The third justification for rejecting calls for another ad hoc tribunal
was the perceived need for local justice and the reconstruction of the
East Timorese judiciary. An integral part of UNTAET's mandate was to
"support capacity building for self-government.,,21' By situating the en-
forcement mechanisms of international criminal law within the East
Timorese system, rather than as an external international court,
UNTAET could further this reconstruction process often overlooked by
international tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR. Likewise, the 1999
Human Rights Report and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry had
both noted that "the primary responsibility for bringing perpetrators to
justice rested with national judicial systems. 226 Even calls for an ad hoc
international tribunal by East Timorese NGOs noted that "trying crimes
before domestic courts will in most cases be preferred due to a number
of reasons, not least from the perspective that the perpetrators of crimes
should be brought to justice in the country in which the crimes were
committed.'227
220. Sites for Justice Related Efforts, supra note 217.
221. Supra Section I.B.
222. This figure is separate from the UNTAET peacekeeping budget of approximately
U.S.$560 million. See AMNESTY INT'L, EAST TIMOR: JUSTICE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6
(July 2001), Al Index: ASA 57/001/2001 [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, EAST TIMOR]; see also
Press Release, UNTAET Press Office, UNTAET Basic Facts (Dec. 2, 2001) (on file with au-
thor).
223. See ICTY Key Figures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last modified
Nov. 8, 2002); Wald, supra note 55, at 536 n.3.
224. Sites for Justice Related Efforts, supra note 217.
225. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 205, 2(e).
226. Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 199, T 3.
227. Nelson Belo & Christian Ranheim, Prosecuting Serious Crimes in East Timor, in
JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EAST TIMOR: INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND OTHER
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Given the lack of political will, the costs of an ad hoc tribunal, and
the perceived benefits of local prosecution, the Security Council placed
judicial authority in the hands of UNTAET 28 and demanded "that those
responsible for [violations of international law] be brought to justice"
either by UNTAET or by the Government of Indonesia. 9 With that
authority, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG),
Sergio Vieira de Mello, signed Regulation 1999/1 establishing the law
of East Timor 230 and creating a Transitional Judicial Service Commis-
sion with the goal of creating a judicial system.23' In early 2000,
UNTAET established a court system for East Timor, including Special
Panels, composed of "both East Timorese and international judges,"
with universal jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and murder.32
Taken together with similar actions by the U.N. Mission in Kos-
ovo, 233 the creation of semi-internationalized courts appears to be the
preferred method for accountability in U.N. administered territories. It
seems likely this trend will continue. Michael Matheson has argued that
"the role of the U.N. has substantially expanded ... with respect to the
governance of societies affected by conflicts. '234 Such cases of nation
building-though not necessarily U.N. administration per se-are more
numerous than might at first be imagined; they include Haiti, Rwanda,
Mozambique, Uganda, and Bosnia.235 Moreover, nation building or "gov-
ernment building" is likely to become a more frequent phenomenon in
OPTIONS, REPORT OF A ONE-DAY SEMINAR IN DILl 5, 6 (Oct. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/justicereport.pdf.
228. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 205. However, note that UNTAET itself could not estab-
lish an international tribunal in the mold of the ICTY or ICTR with jurisdiction over
individuals in Indonesia as "its mandate only extends to East Timor and not Indonesia." Kon-
doch, supra note 200, at 263.
229. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1264 (1999).
230. On the Authority of the Transitional Administrator in East Timor, UNTAET Reg.
1999/1 § 3.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (Nov. 27, 1999).
231. On the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service Commission, UNTAET
Reg. 1999/3 § 1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/3 (Dec. 3, 1999).
232. UNTAET Reg. 2000/11, supra note 108, §§ 10.1, 10.3.
233. Strohmeyer, supra note 200, at 111-13, 119. Security Council Resolution 1244
established the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under a similar mandate to that of
UNTAET. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1264
(1999). While plans for special panels for international crimes were not implemented in Kos-
ovo, international judges do sit alongside Kosovar Judges in ordinary domestic courts and
even on the Supreme Court. Strohmeyer, supra note 200, at 118.
234. Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 76 (2001).
235. Fareed Zakaria, Don't Abandon Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 28.
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the years ahead. 2 6 Though then-Presidential candidate George W. Bush
was initially skeptical of nation building, the Bush administration's
actions in Afghanistan and plans for a possible post-war Iraq speak to the
growing importance of nation building.2 This points to a more general
opportunity to create enforcement mechanisms for international criminal
law where the U.N. administers a territory or reconstructs a government
after war, revolution, or ethnic strife.
The second claim of this Section is that the case of East Timor dem-
onstrates how weak States may create semi-internationalized courts to
externalize the political and diplomatic costs of prosecution onto interna-
tional actors. While the creation of the Special Panels can be attributed
to U.N. administration of the territory, the decision by the newly formed
government of East Timor to continue those trials after independence on
May 20, 2002 requires a separate explanation.
Throughout the winter and spring of 2002, the democratically
elected Constituent Assembly of East Timor met in Dili to draft a consti-
tution and design a new government around the blueprint of the
UNTAET administration.239 The new constitution specifically provides
that "acts committed between the 25th of April 1974 and the 31st of De-
cember 1999 that can be considered crimes against humanity of
genocide or of war [sic] shall be liable to criminal proceedings with[in]
national or international courts.,,240 However, the first draft of the consti-
tution failed to provide for the continued operation of Special Panels of
national and international judges to hear cases of serious crimes.4 Once
236. Richard Lowry, Two Cheers for Nation Building, NAT'L REV. ON-LINE, Oct. 22,
2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/vlowry/iowryprint102201.html (noting the importance
of nation building and arguing that the U.S. "should generally be pursuing it").
237. See Jane Perlez, For Eight Years, a Strained Relationship with the Military, N.Y
TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2000, at A] 7 (observing "[in the presidential campaign, Governor George W.
Bush of Texas expressed an almost visceral distaste for assigning America's fighting forces to
nation-building missions").
238. See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2 (Sept.
19, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (making it a national priority
to "expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of
democracy").
239. Seth Mydans, U.N. Certifies First Election in the Newly Born East Timor, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at Al5.
240. E. TIMOR CONST. § 160 (Serious Crimes). The text of this section demonstrates a
misunderstanding of the drafters as to the meaning of crimes against humanity. According to one
member of the Constituent Assembly, the international legal adviser had told them that crimes
against humanity included all international crimes and therefore it was not necessary to enumer-
ate the particular crimes, as are currently enumerated in UNTAET Regulation 2000/11. E-mail
from Caitlin Reiger, Judicial Systems Monitoring Program, East Timor Constituent Assembly
(Apr. 26, 2002) (on file with author); see UNTAET Reg. 2000/11, supra note 108, § 10.1.
241. Press Release, Judicial Systems Monitoring Program, Constituent Assembly Adopts
Serious Crimes Articles, Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org. It appears
that the draft constitution lacked the requisite provision due to a misunderstanding of the
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legislators were made aware that the new constitution as written would
extinguish the jurisdiction of Special Panels, they amended the section to
allow continuation of the Special Panels as long as "deemed strictly
necessary.' 242 According to one local court observer: Despite the restric-
tive wording of this provision, "the intent of the drafters was to continue
with the current Serious Crimes Investigation Unit and Special Panels in
the Dili District Court. 243 Moreover, funding has been secured for the
continued operation of the Special Panels at least through June 2003.244
This decision to continue internationalized trials in independent East
Timor raises the question of why a newly emergent State with extraordi-
nary resource constraints would seek to continue prosecuting crimes
against humanity, particularly when funds for the court are drawn from
the overall East Timor budget and not specifically earmarked by the U.N.
for that purpose.245 One answer, of course, is momentum2 6 With such
prosecutions already underway, continuing them merely maintains the
status quo. While institutional momentum may have played a part, after
operating for just over a year, the Special Panels were hardly well en-
trenched by May 2002. A second possibility is that preferences of
domestic interests in favor of accountability have been articulated in
government policy. Various domestic interest groups have lobbied hard
for justice and accountability with an international component to ensure
fairness.2 47 The new President of East Timor has acknowledged the "peo-
drafters. Only when NGOs "lobbied the Constituent Assembly about the original wording was
some ... attention paid to the issue" leading to the new version of the text. E-mail from Cait-
lin Reiger, supra note 240.
242. E. TIMOR CONST. § 163(1) (Transitional Judicial Organization). The section reads in
full: "The collective judicial instance existing in East Timor, integrated by national and inter-
national judges with competencies to judge serious crimes committed between the 1st of
January and the 25th of October 1999, shall remain operational for the time deemed strictly
necessary to conclude the cases under investigation." Id. This provision has been interpreted
by the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit as "mean[ing] they can just continue, and there
doesn't seem to be any suggestion that investigations will be curtailed after independence." E-
mail from Caitlin Reiger, supra note 240.
243. E-mail from Caitlin Reiger, supra note 240.
244. Interview with Stuart Alford, Prosecutor, UNTAET Special Crimes Unit, in Dili,
East Timor (Jan. 14, 2002). Presumably, this funding will again be renewed by the U.N. in
mid-2003.
245. The limited availability of funding for the court must be contrasted with the rela-
tively generous funding for the office of the prosecutor drawn from assessed U.N.
contributions and specifically earmarked for the serious crimes unit.
246. See, e.g., Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of Inter-
governmental Organizations, 50 INT'L ORG. 593 (1996).
247. Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, Yayasan HAK, in Dili, East Timor (Jan. 17,
2002); see also Letter from East Timorese NGOs to the Members of the Security Council
(Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with author) (calling for the establishment of an international tribunal
for East Timor).
[Vol. 24:1l
A Community of Courts
pie's profound understanding of the need for reconciliation."'2 8 Addi-
tional research by comparative political scientists is required to
determine the salience of these possible explanations, but it seems likely
that interest groups within East Timor have led to the formulation of a
national preference in favor of holding the perpetrators of the 1999
crimes accountable.
Once the underlying preference has been established, the pursuit of
accountability through semi-internationalized courts and their continued
operation after independence must be separately analyzed. The semi-
internationalized tribunal has allowed the new government of East Timor
to externalize the political and diplomatic costs of prosecution vis-h-vis
Indonesia onto the U.N. To invoke a concept coined by Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye, East Timor and Indonesia are in an interdependent rela-
tionship.249 More particularly, this relationship can be characterized as
one in which East Timor is both extremely sensitive and highly vulner-
able.25° In other words, policy changes in Indonesia are quickly felt in
East Timor and East Timor has few viable alternative options but to fol-
low the policy preferences of Indonesia for the time being. ' As the
former colonial master, the regional hegemon, and the only State to
share a land border with East Timor, Indonesia's influence is beyond
dispute. Given East Timor's isolation and relative poverty,252 it has few
means at its disposal to alter the political balance and decrease its sensi-
tivity vis-A-vis Indonesia. East Timorese President Gusmao has been
swayed by this combined sensitivity and vulnerability, defining the East
Timorese national interest as one of "guaranteeing stability along the
border and of strengthening our cooperation with Indonesia."
253
Through its actions and public statements, Indonesia has made its
preference to avoid prosecution of international crimes in East Timor all
248. President Xanana Gusmao, Reconciliation-the Challenge for All, Address to the
Stockholm International Forum, Conference on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Apr. 23,
2002), available at http://www.stockholmforum.gov.se.
249. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 8 (1977) ("Interdependence in world politics refers to situations
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries
.... .).
250. Keohane and Nye describe sensitivity as involving "degrees of responsiveness
within a political framework-how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in
another." Id. at 12. The "vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative avail-
ability and costliness of alternatives that various actors face." Id. at 13.
251. At least until oil and gas production in the Timor Gap between East Timor and
Australia comes on line, East Timor has few resources to decrease its vulnerability. See Becky
Gaylord, Accord Is Set on Timor Gap Energy Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at WI (not-
ing that "East Timor is expected to receive substantially more than $3.6 billion in revenue
from existing and planned developments in the area the next 24 years").
252. See AMNESTY INT'L, EAST TIMOR, supra note 222, at 6.
253. Gusmao, supra note 248.
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too clear. Though a limited human rights tribunal is finally sitting in Ja-
karta, the government of Indonesia has taken every possible opportunity
254to delay proceedings. The cases now being heard have been criticized
for both lack of fairness and mild sentences!"5 Even UNTAET Transi-
tional Administrator, Sergio Vieiera de Mello, expressed concern that the
Indonesian tribunal might not "get down to work. 256 Indonesia's prefer-
ence for impunity has been further evidenced by its systematic failure to
cooperate with the UNTAET judiciary.257 Despite a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between Indonesia and UNTAET reaffirming the
commitment to hold the perpetrators of the 1999 crimes accountable and
providing for extradition,5 Indonesia has repeatedly refused to hand
over suspects for prosecution.259
The continuation of prosecutions in East Timor, despite this strong
pressure for impunity from a powerful neighbor, can be explained by
political cost externalization. Had East Timor initiated prosecutions
without U.N. mandate, pressure from Indonesia to cease might have be-
come overbearing. Instead, the East Timorese Constituent Assembly and
President Gusmao have shifted the diplomatic costs of prosecution vis-A-
vis Indonesia onto the international community. Since the U.N. created
the Special Panels, East Timor can legitimately claim that it had no
choice but to allow prosecutions. While the decision to continue opera-
tions of the Special Panels is within East Timor's control, the East
254. The Indonesian law on Human Rights Tribunals was passed in 2000, yet numerous
technicalities were found to delay the initiation of proceedings. See RI Opens Historic East
Timor Tribunal, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 14, 2002; Trial Begins in Indonesia This Week for East
Timor Crimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 2002, available at http://iiasnt.leidenuniv.nl (not-
ing the "long delayed trials").
255. Seth Mydans, East 7imor's Scourge Serves Time on His Patio, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
200 1, at A4.
256. Press Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General to East Timor, in Dili, East Timor (Jan. 17, 2002).
257. See Linton, supra note 200, at 223 (describing an "atmosphere of hostility and
unwillingness to cooperate").
258. Memorandum of Understanding Between The Republic of Indonesia and the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regarding Cooperation in Legal, Judicial
and Human Rights Matters § 9.1 (entered into force Apr. 6, 2000), reprinted in Official Ga-
zette of East Timor, vol. 1, No. I, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/GAZ/2000/Add.2, 93 (Feb. 16, 2000),
available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/MOU.htm ("Parties undertake to transfer to
each other all persons whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are prosecuting
for a criminal offence.").
259. See, e.g., Linton, supra note 200, at 223 (observing that Indonesia has "refused to
transfer the militia leader Enrico Guterras to stand trial" in East Timor); Indonesia to File First
Timor Abuse Cases Thursday, REUTERS, Feb. 20, 2002, available at http://iiasnt.leidenuniv.nl
(noting a comment by the spokesman for the Indonesian Attorney General that "Indonesia has
no obligation to send suspects across the border"); Seth Mydans, Modest Beginnings for East
Timor's Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at AI0 (commenting on a unanimous view
in East Timor that "no Indonesian is likely ever to be sent to court in East Timor").
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Timorese government can cite strong U.N. pressure, rather than its own
national preferences as the driving force behind prosecution. In so doing
it can avoid Indonesia's wrath. Moreover, by having two international
judges on each panel, East Timor can "blame" the internationals and dis-
tance itself from decisions implicating Indonesian suspects. This
hypothesis of cost externalization was frequently confirmed by officials
and observers in the judiciary and policy community in East Timor.26 °
To cast this argument in the terms of liberal international relations
theory, East Timor and Indonesia have divergent national preferences
with respect to prosecution. If East Timor were to prosecute crimes
without U.N. mandate, the negative policy interdependence of these
preferences might make the costs of prosecution too high for East Timor
to bear. According to Moravcsik, policy interdependence "can be de-
scribed as the set of costs and benefits for dominant social groups in
foreign societies ... that arise when dominant social groups in a given
society seek to realize their own preferences internationally."2 6' In this
case, the costs of the East Timorese preference in favor of prosecution
are extremely high on dominant Indonesian social groups, which might
be implicated or prosecuted. Liberal international relations theory "as-
sumes that this pattern of interdependence among state preferences ...
imposes a binding constraint on state behavior.' 26 2 Without U.N. in-
volvement, Indonesian preferences against prosecution could impose
such a binding constraint on East Timor's behavior.
However, the involvement of an international actor such as the U.N.
can change the policy interdependence resulting from divergent national
preferences. The U.N. has effectively shifted the cause, or, at least the
perceived cause, of the negative externalities imposed on Indonesia by
East Timorese prosecutions, thereby expanding the set of possible out-
comes. What would have been a "zero-sum ... bargaining game
[between two governments] with ... a high potential for interstate ten-
sion and conflict" is transformed into a three-level game in which
international preferences articulated through U.N. involvement shift the
policy interdependence between East Timor and Indonesia.263
This concept of a three-level game builds on Robert Putnam's two-
level game model. Two-level games operate first at the national level, at
260. Interview with Jim Coy, Human Rights Officer, UNTAET (Jan. 15, 2002) (noting
that it is "politically much easier to have the U.N. prosecute these crimes. East Timor needs
good relations with Indonesia. The advantage of the internationalized tribunal is that the UN,
not East Timor, is seen as pushing Indonesia.").
261. Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assess-
ment, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Colin Elman & Miriam Fendius
Elman eds., forthcoming 2003) (manuscript ch. 5, at 7, on file with author).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 8.
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which "domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the govern-
ment to adopt favorable policies and politicians seek power by
constructing coalitions among these groups.' 2 4 Second, on the interna-
tional game board, "national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures. '265 In East Timor, a third level is
added, in which both the East Timorese and Indonesian governments
must also negotiate with the U.N. and UNTAET. Gusmao and the As-
sembly may have "spot[ted] a move on one board that will trigger
realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unat-
tainable objectives. '66 More specifically, Gusmao could call for amnesty
for some perpetrators as a means of strengthening cooperation with In-
donesia. Yet, simultaneously, prosecutions could continue under the
U.N. mandate, placating domestic interests strongly in favor of account-
ability26 and satisfying the demands of UNTAET. 269 This is a clear
example of "complex patterns of interdependence ... creat[ing] new
possibilities for creative statecraft, 2 70 To invert a claim made by Peter
Evans, domestic bargains are not simply about the relations between the
State and its citizens. They are also about the distribution of costs and
benefits between States and international organizations. 27' Yet another
way to frame this cost externalization is to see East Timor as "borrowing
government" from the U.N. to decrease its accountability vis-A-vis Indo-
272
nesia.
The possibility of international institutions externalizing political
costs was first suggested by Keohane and Nye as early as 1974.273 Arthur
264. Putman, supra note 197, at 434.
265. Id. at 434.
266. Id.
267. See Gusmao, supra note 248 (defending the need for amnesty for those indicted).
268. Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, supra note 247 (noting a "high demand for jus-
tice" among the East Timorese people).
269. Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, supra note 256.
270. Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theory of
International Bargaining, in DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 16 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
271. This is the inverse of Peter Evans's claim that "[i]ntemational bargains are not sim-
ply about relations between nations. They are also about the distribution of costs and benefits
among domestic groups and about domestic opinion divided on the best way of relating to the
external environment." Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and
Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections, in DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNA-
TIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra note 270, at 397.
272. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (forthcoming Nov. 2003) (manu-
script ch. 5, at 13, on file with author) (explaining that the phenomenon of borrowing
government allows a foreign government to adjudicate a rule or dispute where the domestic
State is unable or unwilling).
273. Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organization, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 61 (1974) (suggesting the "political significance of interna-
tional organizations").
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Rovine has similarly suggested that legalization of dispute settlement
through international organizations gives "weaker states ... an obvious
advantage ... in disputes with more powerful opponents ... the strong
give up much of their leverage in a contest of legal briefs and
,,214
argumentation. Similarly, one explanation for ratification of the Rome
Statute was that the ICC might "effectuate a change in interstate power
relations by moving an important category of interstate disputes out of
the diplomatic realm and into that of compulsory jurisdiction. 275 While
semi-internationalized courts-such as the Special Panels in East
Timor-do not provide the same kind of compulsory jurisdiction, con-
flicts between more vulnerable States and their powerful neighbors are
still moved from the world of interstate diplomacy to that of interna-
tional legal settlement. Although powerful States may see through this
political cost externalization, legalization and the involvement of inter-
national institutions is a politically savvy strategy to alter policy
interdependence and expand the range of possible outcomes in favor of
accountability.
To generalize, the political context of the Special Panels in East
Timor yields two significant propositions. First, where the U.N. serves as
the administrating power in a nation-building context, it may interna-
tionalize (both in terms of law and judges) local courts to ensure the
prosecution of serious international crimes. Second, where a vulnerable
State faces pressure from a more powerful neighbor not to prosecute
(presumably because the neighbor will be implicated in the proceed-
ings), the vulnerable State may borrow adjudicatory mechanisms or
individual judges from other States and the international community,
thereby externalizing political costs, altering policy interdependence, and
creating the possibility for otherwise unattainable justice.
274. Arthur Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 313, 319 (Leo Gross ed., 1976). In addition to the weaker
State gaining political power through the use of institutions, Andrew Moravcsik has observed
that such international negotiations "tend to benefit those domestic actors-generally, but not
always national executives-who control access to international negotiations" MORAVCSIK,
supra note 193, at 63. The newly elected East Timorese government may well have seen the
possibilities of strengthening its hand domestically, as well as internationally, through contin-
ued involvement with the U.N. in judicial proceedings.
275. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 19, at 219, 233.
276. Rovine, supra note 274, at 319 (noting that "this is precisely why many leading
nations are not particularly anxious to establish a Court regime of peaceful change").
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3. The Rwandan Gacaca: Domestic Demands
and Resource Constraints
The Gacaca courts in Rwanda suggest two additional circumstances
in which States may develop domestic enforcement mechanisms for in-
ternational criminal law. First, when domestic interests in a responsive
(if not fully liberal) State demand accountability and the international
externalities of prosecution are either positive or only slightly negative,
domestic courts may be used to enforce international law. Second, where
resource constraints limit the effectiveness of international tribunals and
normal domestic courts, specialized domestic mechanisms of account-
ability may be created.
A brief history of the creation of the Rwandan Gacaca courts is a
necessary starting point. After serving as a "bystander to genocide" in
Rwanda the U.N. established an international criminal tribunal for
Rwanda, along the lines of the ICTY, with jurisdiction to prosecute seri-
ous violations of international law during 1994.278 By December 2002,
however, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had only com-
pleted eleven cases,279 a paltry figure given the more than 110,000
Rwandans in detention for genocide related crimes at that time. 2 0 Ac-
cording to a Report by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities,
officials in the Rwandan government were "so frustrated . .. by the
ICTR's initial dysfunction ... that in early 1996 they created special
courts within the existing judicial system., 28' An August 1996 law em-
powered these special courts to hear cases "of genocide, or crimes
against humanity" and divided these crimes into four categories based on
the seriousness of the offense.282 Yet even these specialized courts were
277. See Samantha Power, Bystanders To Genocide, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at
85 (documenting how the United States and the international community "let the Rwandan
tragedy happen").
278. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 51. For a discussion of the reasons for creation of the
ICTR, and, in particular, a contrast between the "international legal paradigm" and "the more
ethnocentric journalistic one," see Jos E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons
from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 369 (1999). See also Paulus, supra note 53.
279. ICTR Website, http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
280. Aloisea Inyumba, Chairwoman, National Commission on Unity and Reconciliation,
Restoring Human Dignity and Reconciling the People of Rwanda, Presentation at the Stock-
holm International Forum: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Apr. 23, 2002).
281. International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP), Report on the 1994 Genocide
in Rwanda and Surrounding Events 1 18.35 (July 7, 2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 141, 213
(2001) [hereinafter IPEP Report].
282. See Rwanda Organic Law No. 8/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity
Committed Since October 1, 1990, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/
domestic/rwanda.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). Article 2 of this law divides crimes into four
categories. Category I includes "person[s] whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal par-
ticipation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of
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unable to address the overwhelming number of outstanding cases. Be-
tween 1996 and 1998, only 1,500 to 2,500 trials occurred, with one
hundred times that many accused and still in detention. 3 A more dra-
matic solution to the problem of accountability for the 1994 genocide
was therefore needed.
Since 1999, the Rwandan government has been designing and pre-
paring to implement the Gacaca system. Those individuals falling into
Category I-namely the planners and organizers of genocide and crimes
against humanity-will appear before normal courts, all other suspects
will be handled through the Gacaca process.2M Gacaca is not a standard
judicial forum. Rather, the idea derives from a traditional dispute resolu-
tion mechanism in the form of a "meeting which is convened whenever
the need arises and in which ... inhabitants of one hill [the basic com-
munity structure in Rwanda] participate [and] supposedly wise old men
... seek to restore the social order."25 While the Gacaca as applied will
have some resemblance to a judicial proceeding, it will be largely based
on this traditional model. Communities will meet under the leadership of
elected "judges" or local elders. Suspects will be presented to them and
members of the community will have the chance to speak for or against
the accused.86 In a May 2001 pilot program, some communities met al-
most as if in an early version of the common law grand jury2. to review
the crime of genocide or a crime against humanity," persons who "acted in positions of author-
ity at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level or in a political party who
fostered such crimes," "notorious murderers," and "persons who committed acts of sexual
torture." Category II includes "persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal partici-
pation place them among the perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of international
homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death'" Category III includes "per-
sons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other
serious assaults against the person." Category IV includes "persons who committed offenses
against property." Id.
283. IPEP Report, supra note 281, 18.36, at 214 (citing the 1,500 trial figure); cf AM-
NESTY INT'L, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE 2 (Apr. 2000), Al Index: AFR
47/10/00 (citing the 2,500 trial figure) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, RWANDA].
284. Interview with Isabelle Kalihangabo, Supreme Court of Rwanda, Gacaca Division,
in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 13, 2001).
285. IPEP Report, supra note 281, 18.43, at 215. The term comes from the Kinyar-
wanda (the Rwandan language) word for "the grass that village elders once sat on as they
mediated the disputes of rural life." Ian Fisher, Massacres of '94: Rwanda Seeks Justice in
Villages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A3; see also Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Restruc-
tive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 370-71 (2002)
("Gacaca courts have been used for hundreds of years for domestic disputes involving prop-
erty settlement and the like.").
286. Interview with Pierre St. Hilaire, Legal Advisor, USAID, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug.
28, 2001); GOV'T OF RWANDA, ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF GACACA COURTS (on file with
author).
287. R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Cannon Law, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 613, 613 (1983) (observing that "the modem grand jury traces its origins to the
Assize of Clarendon, an enactment of King Henry H in 1166. The Assize called for inquiry to
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cases against certain detained individuals. 288 Following a massive
publicity campaign,289 a nationwide election was held in October 2001 to
select 260,000 local elders as judges (more than twice as many "judges"
as accused) for the 11,000 Gacaca courts eventually to be convened. 2 90 In
June 2002, Gacaca courts began operation in twelve select communities
with additional courts scheduled to open across the country over the
coming months.29
The explanation for the creation of the Gacaca presented here pro-
ceeds in two steps. Understanding these two steps requires separating
national preferences-the set of fundamental preferences defined across
States of the world-from national strategies-the particular transient
policy goals that constitute the everyday currency of international poli-• 292
tics. First, domestic interest groups within Rwandan society are
strongly in favor of accountability and have generated a national prefer-
ence in favor of prosecution. Second, resource constraints drove the
government to choose the Gacaca system as the particular strategy to
achieve accountability.
It appears that there is a widely held preference for accountability
and a widely held perception that justice is a prerequisite for reconcilia-
tion. A recent survey of over 1,500 Rwandans conducted by Johns
Hopkins University found that nearly half the population fears a "re-
peated occurrence" of genocide293 and is "overwhelmingly in favor" of
reconciliation through accountability.94 This fear of repeated cycles of
violence could well be a root cause of the preference for accountability.
be made, by the oath of twelve men from every hundred and four men from every village, as
to what persons were publicly suspected of robbery, murder, or theft or of receiving men
guilty of those crimes.").
288. See Mary Kimani, Community Frees Four Genocide Suspects During Pilot Gacaca
Justice Process, INTERNEWS, May 30, 2001, at http://www.intemews.org/activities/
ICTRjreports/ICTR-reports-may2001 .htm.
289. See Jules Marius Bishogoro, The Final Stretch, Judicial Diplomacy:
Chronicles and Reports on International Criminal Justice (Oct. 2, 2001), at
http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/RwandaUK3.htm (noting that the judicial election
and preceding publicity campaign had cost the government of Rwanda U.S.$2.5 million).
290. Jules Marius Bishogoro, Massive Participation in Elections for Gacaca Judges,
JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY: CHRONICLES AND REPORTS ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Oct. 5, 2001), at http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/RwandaUK5.htm.
29 I. Marc Lacey, Kanombe Journal; After the Horror, Truth and Some Healing, Maybe,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A4.
292. Moravcsik, supra note 261, (manuscript ch. 5, at 6 n.4) (observing: "States' prefer-
ences ... are by definition causally independent of and prior to specific interstate strategic
interactions.").
293. S. GASIBIREGE & S. BABALOA, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GACACA LAW IN
RWANDA: EVIDENCE FROM A MULTI-METHOD STUDY 9 (Johns Hopkins Ctr. for Communica-
tion Programs Publ'n No. 19, 2001) (reporting that 43.5 percent of respondents expressed a
"fear of repeated occurrences").
294. Id. at 13.
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According to one "opinion leader," justice "will bring Rwandans closer
together. It will bring about unity and reconciliation." '295 Overall, 87 per-
cent of the survey respondents were fairly or highly confident that the
Gacaca program would "succeed in resolving the problems of trials" for
the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide and 53 percent expressed high
confidence that Gacaca would "promote sustainable peace in the coun-
try.' 296 Additional reports suggest upwards of 80 percent of the Rwandan
population supports the Gacaca process, "at least in principle.
'29 7
Demands for justice in Rwanda are particularly strong as they come
from both victims and accused. Victims, as one participant in the draft-
ing of Rwanda's new constitution put it, find speedy justice "very
important to reconciliation. Once the trials are carried out, we hope that
there will be no further problems, because the truth will have been un-
earthed. ' 298 Some victims link their personal demands for justice to the
overall political process. As one young man who lost his parents in 1994
commented: "[W]e need to see justice, to see justice done, so we can live
together again. This is a major political priority for me., 299 Likewise, the
accused and their families demand access to justice, particularly those
with legitimate claims of innocence.3°° As one accused woman impris-
oned (with her children) for killing a neighbor put it: "Seven years later I
am still innocent. If the Gacaca will show [the authorities] my inno-
cence, then let it come fast."30'
These sentiments suggest that the numerous interest groups within
Rwanda are strongly in favor of accountability. For such preferences to
be represented in State policy, however, the institutions of government
must serve as a "transmission belt" between preferences and policy.0 2
Contrast, however, Cambodia, where, despite strong domestic
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Daly, supra note 285, at 374; Foundation Hirondelle, Rwandans Express Mixed
Feelings on New Court System, May 4, 2001, at http://www.hirondelle.org.
298. Aloys Hakizimana, Comments at the Conference on Constitutional Development, in
Kibuye, Rwanda (Aug. 22, 2001), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 104 (William Burke-White et al. eds., 2002) (on file with author). The author
served as the Special Rapporteur to the Legal and Constitutional Commission of the Govern-
ment of Rwanda.
299. Interview with Anonymous Rwandan Genocide Survivor, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug.
28, 2001).
300. Elizabeth Neuffer, Kigali Dispatch: It Takes a Village, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10,
2000, at 18 (noting that the families of the accused are "push[ing] for... trial date[s] ... [as]
at least under gacaca the truth will come out").
301. Interview with Anonymous Accused, in Ruhungeri, Rwanda (Aug. 29, 2001).
302. Moravcsik, supra note 261, (manuscript ch. 5, at 5).
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preferences for justice a tribunal has yet to be established. 3 As in Cam-
bodia, a small subset of the political elite, rather than a broad national
polity, controls government policy. While Rwanda is by no means a per-
fect polyarchy, 3°4 nor even an ideal liberal State,3"' the Rwandan
Government has made significant advances both in terms of representa-
tive government generally,3°6 and the issue of justice more specifically.
Massive education campaigns on justice and reconciliation helped
ensure that 82 percent of the respondents in the Johns Hopkins survey
were familiar with Gacaca. °7 Such efforts have included a traveling play
about Gacaca, weekly radio spots, radio talk shows, and Gacaca soccer
matches.08 Linked to this education campaign have been numerous con-
sultations with the Rwandan people to ensure the government is familiar
with their views. 9 The feedback between the people and the government
on this issue has manifested itself most strongly in the broad-based elec-
tion of Gacaca judges. Ninety percent of the population participated30 by
spending a day "in groups made up of ten neighboring households ... to
designate those persons in the group believed to be honest or wise" to
serve as judges.3"' These judges act as intermediaries between the people
and the governmental authorities, both in the prosecution of offenses and
in the communication of ideas, views, and interests.
Efforts to make the government responsive to the people have
largely succeeded; the Rwandan government has heard and internalized
popular demands for justice. For example, the Chairman of the Legal
and Constitutional Commission has recognized that the Gacaca was im-
plemented because:
[T]he Rwandan people did not accept amnesty. Throughout the
history of Rwanda, the government of the day has granted am-
303. See William W. Burke-White, Preferences Matter: Conversations with the Cambo-
dian People on the Prosecution of the Khmer Rouge Leadership, in JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA:
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE KHMER ROUGE (Beth van Schaack et al. eds., forthcoming 2003).
304. See DAHL, supra note 160, at 3.
305. See Slaughter, supra note 115.
306. The Rwandan government is in the process of drafting and consulting the popula-
tion on a new constitution, guaranteeing broad representation and free elections.
307. GASIBIREGE & BABALOA, supra note 293, at 11.
308. Johns Hopkins Univ., Ctr. for Communication Programs, Rwanda: Gacaca, at
http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca/htm [hereinafter Rwanda: Gacaca].
309. For example, the author, as Rapporteur for the Legal and Constitutional Commis-
sion, is personally familiar with the efforts of the Commission, whose members have traveled
across the country meeting with groups and communities to discuss the new constitution and
its provisions relating to justice mechanisms. Likewise, the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission undertook "national exercises of consulting Rwandans on their unity and recon-
ciliation, by engaging them in grassroots participatory discussions." Inyumba, supra note 280.
310. Rwanda: Gacaca, supra note 308.
311. Bishogoro, supra note 290.
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nesty, and throughout history, the government has been involved
in the massacres and then granted amnesty ... Amnesty encour-
aged impunity. For these reasons, [the people] wanted to try
something else in Rwanda.
' 2
Likewise, the government's chief prosecutor, Gerald Gahima ex-
plains the decision to hold perpetrators accountable through Gacaca
based on domestic preferences:
We are asked why we didn't take the South African approach of
amnesty ... you can only do what is politically possible in your
own society .... In the aftermath of genocide there was an over-
whelming feeling that there must be accountability, people must
be punished so it will not happen again." '
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has noted the importance of do-
mestic politics3 4 in the decision to "bring the thousands of genocide
suspects to justice."3 ' Thus, a national preference in Rwanda in favor of
accountability developed as a result of the interests within Rwandan so-
ciety and the ability of those interests to influence national policy
through the representative institutions of the State.
The second step in this development was the decision to use the
Gacaca system as the particular strategy to realize the national prefer-
ence in favor of accountability. It is argued here that this strategic choice
was largely driven by resource constraints. In the wake of the 1994
genocide, nearly one in fifty Rwandans was in prison. 16 With a signifi-
cant portion of the able-bodied population dead, the additional burden
imposed by such a high incarceration rate was simply not sustainable.
Families of the detained often had to provide food and money for their
incarcerated relatives and the State had to support the prisons on an al-
ready insufficient budget. The desperate need for labor in agriculture and
reconstruction required many prisoners to work in groups in the commu-
nities around the prisons. Moreover, the government was subjected to
312. Tito Rutaremara, Chairman, Legal and Constitutional Commission of Rwanda,
Comments at the Conference on Constitutional Development, Kibuye, Rwanda (Aug. 22,
2001), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 298, at 99.
313. Victoria Brittain, Time for Truth as Rwanda Strives for Reconciliation, GUARDIAN,
Apr. 6, 2001, at 14.
314. Interview with President Kagame, President, in Kigali, Rwanda (June 25, 2000).
315. Interview with President Kagame by Marc Hoogsteyns (Apr. 13, 2002) (on file with
author), available at http://www.rwandal .com/government/president/interviews/200I/
drcserious.html.
316. Estimates suggested that upwards of 125,000 genocide suspects were incarcerated
in the late 1990s, out of a total post-genocide population of approximately six million. Neuf-
fer, supra note 300, at 18.
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significant NGO criticism for horrific prison conditions3 7 and the lack of
318adequate documentation for more than 40,000 detainees. With vocal
calls from international civil society and with the financial strain of high
incarceration rates, the Rwandan government had no choice but to in-
crease the effectiveness and speed of the domestic judiciary in
prosecuting international crimes.
Existing judicial resources in Rwanda proved unable to meet this
daunting task, despite a plan to create specialized domestic courts to hear
only genocide and crimes against humanity cases. 3 9 At one point "it was
estimated it would take between two and four centuries to try all those in
detention."32 At first, the government believed the ICTR might offer a
solution, yet it quickly became apparent to President Kagame and his
advisors that the ICTR could not provide large-scale justice.32' In Ka-
game's words, the government needed "a better solution to this problem
of bringing the thousands of genocide suspects to justice. ' As neither
the domestic judiciary nor the international community had offered a
workable solution, the Rwandan government had to consider more radi-
cal alternatives. Turning to the traditional model of Gacaca circumvents
these resource constraints. The Gacaca system is relatively inexpensive,
easy to operationalize on a large scale, and closely tied to the communi-
ties in which crimes occurred. Gacaca thus offered a strategy derived
from national preferences and able to accommodate the limited means
available to the Rwandan government.
The central premise of this Part is that politics, and particularly the
policy interdependence between the preferences of national actors in a
variety of States, is essential to the enforcement of international criminal
317. The author has visited prisons in Ngozi, Burundi (June 2000) and in Kibuye and
Ruhungeri, Rwanda (Aug. 2001) and can personally attest to the overcrowding, unsanitary
conditions, and hunger that mark many prisons.
318. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by the Special
Representative, Mr. Michael Moussalli, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1999, Feb. 20,
2000, 1 135, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2000/4125; see, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, RWANDA, supra note
283, at 12 (noting "extremely poor prison conditions and inadequate access to medical care");
IPEP Report, supra note 281, 18.36, at 214 (describing "deplorable conditions" and ac-
knowledging that "several thousand detainees died [in 1998 alone] from AIDS, malnutrition,
dysentery or typhus").
319. IPEP Report, supra note 281,1 18.35, at 213.
320. Id. $I 18.37, at 214.
321. Press Conference, President Paul Kagame, Kagame Urges Rwandans to Build a
Better Future Learning from the Mistakes of the Past (Apr. 6, 2002), at http://
www.rwanda I .com/government/president/interviews/2001/genocideweek.html.
322. Interview with President Kagame by Marc Hoogsteyns, supra note 315.
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law. While the political prospects for the creation of new international
mechanisms of enforcement-such as the ad hoc tribunals-are limited,
the opportunities for the creation of domestic and semi-internationalized
enforcement bodies are promising. Certain political alignments are likely
to give rise to the creation of semi-internationalized tribunals, as illus-
trated by the three case studies discussed here. First, domestic tribunals
may emerge where political divides within an illiberal State's elite gen-
erate political benefits for powerful members of that elite who support
international criminal justice. Second, where the U.N. serves as adminis-
trator of a territory in the wake of international crimes, the U.N. may
establish such a mechanism. Third, semi-internationalized tribunals may
be created where they shift policy interdependence and allow a vulner-
able State to externalize the costs of prosecution vis-A-vis a more
powerful neighbor onto the international community. Fourth, in liberal
States strong preferences of domestic interests may result in a govern-
ment policy of accountability. Finally, resource constraints may lead
governments to pursue creative strategies for the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law.
None of these conditions may be necessary or sufficient for new
domestic and semi-internationalized enforcement bodies to be created.
But, where these conditions exist, the prospects for domestic enforce-
ment of international criminal law appear high. Paying attention to the
political contexts discussed here is essential, both to identify opportuni-
ties for the creation of new enforcement mechanisms and to spot
potentially dangerous circumstances in which courts become so politi-
cized they no longer serve as independent arbiters of the law.
III. THE OPERATION OF INTERNATIONALIZED COURTS
IN EAST TIMOR
If, as argued above, domestic courts-and more particularly, semi-
internationalized domestic courts-are to become a significant
enforcement mechanism of international criminal law, then a close
analysis of the effectiveness and operation of such tribunals is necessary
to determine how their usefulness can be enhanced in the future. In Part
11 the situation in East Timor was presented to illustrate the political cir-
cumstances in which countries establish domestic courts to enforce
international criminal law. This Part builds on that presentation, provid-
ing a focused study, based on in-depth field research and on-site
observation, of the operational successes and challenges faced by the
Special Panels of the District Court in Dili, East Timor.
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The form and structure of the Special Panels of the District Court of
Dili have been described elsewhere,3 23 but a few background facts should
be recounted. Security Council Resolution 1272 established the U.N.
Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET).324Among the
early acts of the SRSG was Regulation 2000/11, establishing the district
courts of Dili and vesting them with "exclusive jurisdiction over serious
criminal offenses, particularly Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against
humanity, and murder."'325 In June 2000, the SRSG established Special
Panels in the District Courts of Dili with "universal jurisdiction" over the
serious offenses listed above. The Special Panels were to consist of one
East Timorese judge and two international judges,326 with the East
Timorese judge named by the SRSG after consultation with an East
Timorese Transitional Judicial Services Commission."7 The first Special
Panel began operation in January 2001 and a second Panel convened in
November 2001.
With the foregoing general background, this Part engages in a the-
matic consideration of the principal successes and challenges facing the
Special Panels in East Timor. The analysis is not intended to be exhaus-
tive, but rather to focus on one country and highlight some of the areas
in which semi-internationalized courts have been particularly effective
and where they have fallen short.
A. Areas of Success
1. Physical & Judicial Reconstruction
Possibly the most obvious success of the Special Panels in East
Timor is the reconstruction of the integrity and physical premises of the
judicial system, literally from the ground up. When the U.N. administra-
tion arrived in Dili in 1999, most of the city had been burned. There
were neither judicial institutions nor buildings from which to work.2 8 In
late 2001, a new courthouse opened in the center of Dili, with office
space (including limited space for court-appointed defense counsel), di-
rect-to-CD recording technologies (provided by a USAID grant), and
323. See, e.g., Suzannah Linton, Prosecuting Attrocities at the District Court of Dili, 2
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 414 (2001) [hereinafter Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities]; Linton, supra
note 200; Daryl Mundis, Current Developments: New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of
International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 934, 942-45 (2001).
324. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 205.
325. UNTAET Reg. 2000/1l, supra note 108, TI 10.1.
326. Id. [22. 1.
327. For a discussion of the process of locating and selecting East Timorese judges,
including aerial dropping of advertisements across East Timor, see Strohmeyer, supra note
200, at 175-77.
328. Interview with Caitlin Reiger, Judicial System Monitoring Program, in Dili, East
Timor (Jan. 18, 2002).
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holding cells.3 29 At the very least, the physical reconstruction stands as a
powerful symbol of the renewed commitment to the rule of law.
Beyond the physical premises, the integrity of the judicial process
has begun to be restored, with the Special Panels operating and hearing
cases. In less than two years, sixteen judgments have been rendered33-a
number that far exceeds the equivalent period for the ICTY and ICTR
combined. A number of other crimes against humanity cases are now
pending before the court.33' At least some of the criminals from the 1999
atrocities have faced justice and a few victims have found catharsis in
332this process. Justice is being done and, notwithstanding its many faults,
the judicial system in East Timor "has come a long way.' 333
2. Judicial Cross-Fertilization
One of the most significant contributions of the East Timorese Spe-
cial Panels, both for East Timor and for the development of international
criminal law more generally, is the cross-fertilization of law, precedent,
and thought, facilitated by foreign judges sitting with their East
Timorese counterparts on the bench. This internationalization exempli-
fies what Anne-Marie Slaughter has described as "judicial
globalization," whereby judges look, talk, and sometimes act "beyond
the confines of national legal systems ... [sharing] a deep sense of par-
ticipation in a common global enterprise of judging."' 3 Judicial
globalization in East Timor serves a dual function: first to ensure fair,
unbiased, and informed judgments in cases before the court and, second,
to develop capacity and expertise within the local judiciary. This coop-
eration, sharing, and teaching has been remarkably effective.
Internationalized panels have served an important purpose in ensur-
ing impartial decisions based in international legal principles, while
respecting and understanding local custom. During the period of Indone-
sian rule, East Timorese were excluded from government, leaving a void
of local judicial experience upon Indonesian withdrawal in 1999. Even if
329. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, Judge, Dili Special Panels, in Dili, East Timor
(Jan. 19, 2002).
330. See Judicial System Monitoring Program, http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/
Trialsnew.htm. The principal crimes against humanity case is Prosecutor v. Marques (Los
Palos Case), Case No. 9/2000, Judgment (Dili Special Panel, Dec. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/trials.htm.
331. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sarmento (SAME Case), Case No. 18/2001, Indictment (Dili
Special Panel, Aug. 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. da Silva (Lolotoe Case), Case No. 4/2001, Indict-
ment (Dili Special Panel, Feb. 6, 2001).
332. Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, supra note 247.
333. JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAM, JUSTICE IN PRACTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS
IN COURT ADMINISTRATION § 4.1 (JSMP Thematic Report No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter JUSTICE
IN PRACTICE], available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/JSMPl .pdf.
334. Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1104.
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local judges had been available, the politically charged situation after
1999 raised legitimate concerns about bias. The presence of international
judges and particularly the ratio of two international to one East
Timorese judge has avoided many potential claims of bias and provided
a degree of expertise on the panels.335
Partnership with local judges (even with their limited experience)
has facilitated the international judges' understanding of the East
Timorese context and local traditions. Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira,
the East Timorese judge, was educated in Bali, Indonesia and is there-
fore familiar with the Indonesian Penal Code in effect in East Timor.
Likewise, she is familiar with local customs. Judge Gusmao Pereira re-
lates a story from the Carlos Suarez murder case, in which a claim of
mitigating circumstances was based on an East Timorese belief in "black
magic"-that the victim had placed a curse on the accused's two chil-
dren. Judge Gusmao Pereira "assisted the Italian judge in understanding
how this belief could exist in East Timor" and they collectively identified
provisions of the applicable Indonesian Penal Code allowing them to
336take such belief structures into consideration.
While international training sessions for local judges, primarily or-
ganized by the government of Portugal, have not proved particularly
successful,"7 sitting on the bench with international colleagues has been
a powerful educational tool. Judge Gusmao Pereira observes: "I have
learned a great deal from the two international judges. I was never a
judge before this and they have helped me think about particular argu-
ments and principles." '  From the international perspective, the
Burundian Judge, Sylver Ntukamazia, comments: "Judge Maria and I
discuss things together. I am helping her to understand and interpret in-
ternational law. This was the first time she had heard of crimes against
humanity so we talked about that a lot together."339 Education has been
reciprocal. Judge Ntukamazina observes: "Judge Maria knows Indone-
sian law and I have learned about that. And I have learned about
transitional situations, something that will make my job at home in Bu-
rundi easier as some similar crimes were committed there and now I
335. Interview with Caitlin Reiger, supra note 328.
336. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, Judge, District Court of Dili, in
Dili, East Timor (Michael Anderson trans., Jan. 18, 2002).
337. The failure of these training classes is largely due to their being conducted only in
Portuguese, a language the East Timorese judicial officers do not speak. Likewise, many of the
training sessions have been scheduled while cases were in session, requiring judges and de-
fense counsel to either miss court or to skip the training sessions.
338. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.
339. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
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think they could qualify as crimes against humanity and genocide."3 40 A
possibly unintended effect of the use of international judges then is
cross-fertilization of judicial thought and precedent both to and from the
host State. Similar partnering of international and local personnel has
also been a feature of the offices of the prosecutor14 ' and public de-
fender.
3 42
3. The Office of the Prosecutor
Another success story of the East Timorese model is the Serious
Crimes Unit-the office of the prosecutor under UNTAET rule and now
in independent East Timor. Despite initial concerns about the effective-
ness of the Serious Crimes Unit, after a reorganization in 2001, it has
emerged as an effective and efficient body. 4 Responsibilities are gradu-
ally being shifted to the East Timorese General Prosecutor, Longunhos
Montiero, who has indicated a desire to press ahead with priority crimes
against humanity cases, rather than the simple murder cases that charac-
terized most early indictments." The Serious Crimes Unit consists of a
number of international personnel, including British barristers, U.S.
prosecutors, and civil law investigating judges, many of whom have ex-
perience at the ICTY or ICTR. While the East Timorese officers in the
Serious Crimes Unit have significantly less experience, training from
their international colleagues is now becoming part of the Serious
Crimes Unit's mission.3 5
In addition to a strong human resource base, the Serious Crimes Unit
has significant finances at its disposal. It is funded from the UNTAET
budget by assessed (mandatory) U.N. contributions and is, therefore,
comparatively "blessed by resources. 346 It has put those resources to use,
hiring numerous translators and investigators as well as ensuring ade-
quate access to road and helicopter transportation for investigation and
transport of witnesses. This budget has been confirmed through at least
May 2003 and effective operation is therefore expected to continue. With
340. Id.; see also Interview with Sylvia de Bertodano, Dili Public Defender, in Amster-
dam, Netherlands (Jan. 26, 2002) (De Bertodano is an English Barrister).
341. Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244.
342. Interview with Siphosami Malunga, Zimbabwe Public Defender, in Dili, East Timor
(Jan. 17, 2002).
343. The Serious Crimes Unit was completely reviewed and restructured following the
arrival of Dennis MacNamara, the new Deputy Special Representative, who was tasked with
reforming the Serious Crimes Unit.
344. Interview with Longunhos Montiero, General Prosecutor, East Timor, in Dili, East
Timor (Jan. 16, 2002). Montiero notes that most indictments to date had been for simple mur-
der due to the difficulty of proving the crimes against humanity elements.
345. Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244.
346. Id.
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both experienced personnel and sufficient resources, by March 2002 the
Serious Crimes Unit had issued more than thirty-three indictments
against eighty-two accused, including ten charges of crimes against
humanity. 47 Moreover, in every case brought before the Dili District
Court, the accused have been convicted on at least some counts.
B. Challenges and Difficulties
1. Judges and Judicial Resources
Despite the success of judicial cross-fertilization, locating and re-
cruiting qualified judges (both East Timorese and international) has
proved a significant challenge. While the international judges are clearly
committed to their work in East Timor, none of them have significant
experience in international law and many have no experience in criminal
trials. Judge Ntukamazina, for example, was a junior magistrate judge in
Burundi before applying to the U.N. for a judicial affairs officer position
and then subsequently being appointed a Special Panels judge.349 While
he holds a Masters degree in law from the University of Bujumbura, he
openly admits to having no experience in international criminal law prior
to his arrival in East Timor.350 Other judges and senior judicial appointees
have come from Mozambique, Cape Verde, Italy, and Brazil, but, like
Judge Ntukamazina, many lack significant experience in international
criminal law despite UNTAET requirements for judicial appointees.'
Two factors have contributed to this problem. First, salaries for judicial
officers (low by Western standards) provide little motivation for highly
qualified judges to leave stable careers for work in Dili. Second, the se-
lection of judges may well have been motivated more by the UNTAET
347. Mohammad Othman, Former Prosecutor General for East Timor, Remarks at the
Amsterdam Centre for International Law Conference on Internationalized Criminal Courts
and Tribunals (Jan. 25, 2002).
348. See Judicial System Monitoring Program, http://www.jsmp.minihub.orgl
Trialsnew.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
349. See Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
350. See id.
351. See Interview with Caitlin Reiger, supra note 328. UNTAET Regulation 2000/15
requires that "account shall be taken of the experience of the judges in criminal law, interna-
tional law, including international humanitarian law and human rights." On the Establishment
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, UNTAET Reg. 2000/15
§ 23.2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000); see also JUSTICE IN PRACTICE,
supra note 333, § 3.1.1 n.32 (noting that pursuant to UNTAET Regulation 1999/3 all interna-
tional judges are supposed to be vetted by the Transitional Judicial Services Commission, but
to date none have been); Linton, supra note 200, at 228.
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goal of ensuring geographic diversity of staff, rather than a direct con-
sideration of the appropriate qualifications for the position.
352
The limited judicial experience in international and criminal law is
significantly exacerbated by the lack of available support resources.
There are no judicial clerks or assistants as is common in most jurisdic-
tions.353 There is likewise no judicial library (though a few legal books
have been collected).354 Until December 2001, judges did not have per-
sonal Internet access, making any research almost impossible.55 Judicial
training sessions are often conducted in Portuguese, a language most of
the judges do not speak.3"6
The lack of judicial resources has been manifest in the quality of ju-
risprudence. Judge Ntukamazina admits: "I don't have time or resources
to do independent research. I go through the prosecution's submissions
and what they say was done by the ICTY and ICTR. I try to check them,
but don't have time to make my own research."37 Not surprisingly, until
the Los Palos crimes against humanity decision in early 2002, "no deci-
sion contained any reference to international jurisprudence." '358 Even in
that case, according to the prosecutor, the judges "adopted arguments put
forward by the prosecution and defense without their own legal in-
quiry.'
359
Jurisprudence on key legal issues is often questionable. For example,
in determining the context of a systematic attack against a civilian popu-
lation, the court in one case merely noted that the Indonesian plan to
deport hundreds of thousands of East Timorese "do[es] not call for any
formal evidence in light of what even the humblest and most candid man
in the world can access. ' 36 While from a local perspective this may be
352. See Press Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, supra note 256
(referring to the importance of diversity in UNTAET and noting the 107 nationalities repre-
sented in the mission).
353. See Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. While a number of Austra-
lian law graduates offered their services as legal assistants, the East Timorese Ministry of
Justice refused to allow them to serve, apparently on grounds of bureaucratic difficulties and
insurance risks.
354. See JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note 333, § 3.1.2.
355. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
356. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.
357. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
358. JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note 333, § 3.1.1.
359. Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244.
360. Prosecutor v. Leki, Case No. 5/2000, Judgement (Dili Special Panel, June 11,
2001), available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org; see JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PRO-
GRAMME, PROSECUTOR V. JONI MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS, TRIAL REPORT § 3.2.1.2 (2002)
[hereinafter MARQUES TRIAL REPORT], available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/
Resources.htm (noting that in the Los Palos Case the Public Defenders did not contest that
there was a "widespread and systematic attack.., but merely disputed their clients knowledge
of it"); see also Prosecutor v. Marques (Los Palos Case), Case No. 9/2000, Judgment (Dili
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self-evident, the role of a court is to apply law to facts, something the
Special Panels have not been able to do with any regularity. In determin-
ing whether the nexus to an armed conflict is a requirement for crimes
against humanity, the court appears to have simply misunderstood exist-
ing law."' While commentators are correct to describe the Los Palos
judgment as "a major achievement and an important contribution to ju-
risprudence internationally and within East Timor," 362 the lack of judicial
resources and expertise were clearly manifest in the quality of the judg-
ment itself.
2. Applicable Law
A second area in which the Special Panels experienced difficulties
relates to the applicable law in East Timor. UNTAET Regulation 1999/1
provided the applicable laws would be the laws of Indonesia as applied
in East Timor "prior to 25 October 1999 ... in so far as they do not con-
flict with the [international] standards referred to in section 2, the
fulfillment of the [UNTAET] mandate, or the present or any other regu-
lation ... issued by the transitional administrator.'3 63 Thus, Indonesian
law applies as long as it conforms to international standards and is not
superceded by UNTAET Regulations. While this convoluted specifica-
tion of applicable law may have been necessary (as there was no other
law to apply and international standards had to be observed), commenta-
tors have noted that it "proved rather difficult to apply as it did not
actually spell out the laws or specifically identify the elements that were
Special Panel, Dec. 11, 2001) The court's findings were based largely on the U.N. Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry Report, which was quoted at length in the judgment.
361. Significant attention is paid to finding that there was an armed conflict in East
Timor as a necessary element for proving a crime against humanity. See Marques, Case No.
9/2000, Judgment [ 680-85. However, while the armed conflict nexus is included in the
ICTY Statute, it is not included in UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, which is taken from the
Rome Statute of the ICC. MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.2.1.2. Moreover, the
Tadic case, a leading ICTY decision that relaxes the required nexus between crimes against
humanity and international armed conflict, has not yet been cited by the court. MARQUES
TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.2.1.2. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-IA,
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber (Jul. 15, 1999); see also Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugo-
slavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237 (2002) (defining the elements of crimes
against humanity in ICTY jurisprudence).
362. MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 4.7.
363. UNTAET Reg. 1999/I, supra note 230, § 3.1. Section 2 refers to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel,
Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Id. § 2.
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inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards."364
As Judge Gusmao Pereira candidly comments: "The hardest part for me
was to interpret the law ... the Indonesian, UNTAET, and international
laws didn't always fit. 3 6 One public defender noted that these overlap-
ping laws were a "cause of great confusion."
3 66
The challenge of determining the applicable law was exacerbated by
often incorrect or unavailable translations. Again Judge Gusmao Pereira
comments: "There is a language problem here. The Indonesian version
[of many UNTAET documents] is often wrong, basically useless. 367
Moreover, in many cases relevant Indonesian laws were simply unavail-
able or, in some cases, were rejected by the East Timorese as a remnant
of Indonesian occupation.368 In addition to applying law to extraordinar-
ily difficult facts, under-resourced judges face the added burden of
attempting to distill the law from numerous, often contradictory and
sometimes unavailable sources.
The direct use of much of the Rome Statute in UNTAET Regulation
2000/15 provided a further challenge for judges in East Timor. While the
Rome Statute is a useful starting point and represents an international
consensus on the laws and structures of an international criminal court, it
is, by its nature, a compromise designed for a well-funded, fully interna-
tional court, operating where national courts are unable or unwilling to
prosecute. Prosecutors in East Timor have found the Rome Statute useful
as the elements of the crimes could be borrowed from the Preparatory
Commission materials.3 69 However, the wholesale adoption of the Statute
may not have been appropriate for the East Timorese context, where
physical constraints significantly limit the judiciary. Tailoring provisions
of the Rome Statute to East Timorese circumstances, particularly the
unavoidable limits on judicial capacity, might have been more appropri-
ate.37° For example, the lengthy and potentially confusing definition of
364. Strohmeyer, supra note 200, at 174; see also Hansjbrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and
Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East imor,
95 Am. J. INT'L L. 46, 59 (2001) (noting that this system of laws led to "considerable legal
and political difficulties").
365. See Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.
366. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342.
367. See Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.
368. See Strohmeyer, supra note 200, at 174.
369. See Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244; see also S.C. Res. 1272, supra
note 205.
370. See Phakiso Mochochoko, Government of Lesotho, Address to the Amsterdam
Centre for International Law Conference on Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals
(Jan. 26, 2002); see also Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342 (noting that the
ICC "statute was created for different purposes and the provisions of the Rome Statute should
have been adapted for local use").
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war crimes in the Rome Statute and in Regulation 2000/15 might not
have been needed in East Timor.
3. Equality of Arms
The lack of equality of arms between prosecution and defense is a
third area in which the Special Panels have failed to meet their mandate.
The comparative lack of defense resources largely arises from
fundamental differences in the way the prosecution (Serious Crimes
Unit) and the public defense service are funded. Due to the mandate in
Security Council Resolution 1272 to prosecute international crimes, the
Serious Crimes Unit is funded directly from assessed U.N. contribu-
tions.37 The trial chambers as well as the office of the public defender,
however, is funded from the general budget of East Timor and must
compete for funds with other government entities.3 72 This has led to, and
will presumably continue to cause, 373 significant disparities between
prosecution and defense budgets.
At trial, these disparities have manifested themselves in significant
ways. For most of 2001, six public defenders had to cover all cases in
East Timor-both regular cases and those before the Special Panels.374
Inadequate resources and personnel limitations in the office of the public
defender have meant that one defender is often assigned to multiple de-
fendants in the same trial.375 In the Los Palos case, for example, three
East Timorese public defenders had to represent five clients, while an
additional three international public defenders represented the remaining
three accused. 6 This problem is exacerbated when public defenders'
contracts expire or when they are away for training sessions.
The resource disparities between prosecution and defense has re-
stricted the ability of defendants to call witnesses. Prior to January 2002
no defense witnesses had been called in any cases. 377 This is, in part, due
to the lack of UNTAET funds to pay witnesses' expenses up front and
the fact that many potential witnesses remain in West Timor, beyond the
court's subpoena power.3 78 U.N. vehicles frequently have not been avail-
371. See Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244.
372. See id.
373. For at least fiscal year 2002-03 the Serious Crimes Unit will continue to receive
funding directly from the U.N. assessed budget. Id.
374. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342.
375. See MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.1.2.
376. See id.
377. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342; Interview with Jim Coy,
supra note 260.
378. JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note 333, § 3.4 (noting that while UNTAET Regulation
2000/30 provides for reimbursement, the "administration of such reimbursement has been a
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able for the public defenders to investigate cases and locate witnesses.
The lack of defense resources has been so severe that one public de-
fender is considering appeals based on a claim of unfair trials. 9
4. Court Administration
The easiest problems to rectify relate to the administration of the
East Timorese courts. Most of these problems are directly attributable to
a lack of financial resources, not surprising considering that the total
budget for the East Timorese government is about two-thirds of the
ICTY's funding and the budget allocation for Special Panels is equiva-
lent to that of the Dili Fire Brigade. 80 These resource limitations directly
affect the proceedings of the court. For example, translation services are
wholly inadequate. Judges have commented on the pressing need for
interpretation-both in court and of documentary evidence."' Translation
difficulties are exacerbated by the use of numerous languages. In the Los
Palos trial, for example, six languages were spoken, often requiring the
use of three separate translators for one conversation.382 Even for rela-
tively simple English-Indonesian translation, the number of available
translators was simply inadequate; translators often had to work straight
for eight-hour shifts, and defense counsel had to rely on the prosecu-
tion's interpreters to communicate with their own clients as no
independent translators were available.3"3 Likewise, no transcripts are
available, a fact that significantly interferes with the right to an appeal.
While USAID funding allowed for the installation of a direct-to-CD re-
cording system in the Special Panel courtroom, the lack of a trained
technician caused sporadic operation. Moreover, judges were unable to
access relevant portions of the CD recordings and so relied instead on
recurring problem"). The Serious Crimes Unit has taken to reimbursing witness expenses out
of pocket, a solution not available to most public defenders. Id.
379. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. The basis of his claim may
lie in article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, binding law
in East Timor, pursuant to UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, which provides a right to examine
witnesses. See UNTAET Reg. 1999/1, supra note 230, § 2. Despite his intent to appeal, the
UNTAET Human Rights Officer contends that trials are fair, though defense concerns are
valid. See Interview with Jim Coy, supra note 260.
380. Othman, supra note 347.
381. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.
382. These languages include Bahasa Indonesian, English, Tetun, Portuguese, Makasa,
and Fataluku. For a discussion of the challenges of interpretation in the Los Palos trial, see
MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.2.4.
383. Id.
384. UNTAET Regulation 2000/11 requires written or recorded notes of proceedings.
UNTAET Reg. 2000/11, supra note 108, § 26.1. The need for adequate transcripts has been
found integral to the right of appeal in the United States and the United Kingdom, among
others.
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notes taken by the presiding judge on a laptop computer.8 1 Most of these
problems could presumably be solved with adequate funding. In the
ICTY, for example, LiveNote software allows simultaneous translation in
both written and audio form for English, French, and Bos-
nian/Serbian/Croatian.
An additional challenge of court administration is that trials rarely
follow a prescribed schedule. During the author's visit to East Timor,
judges went on an unanticipated week long strike.38 Such disruption and
unpredictability make it extremely difficult for the local population to
observe the judicial process. Even when judicial proceedings are an-
nounced, they are often poorly publicized and, on occasion, East
Timorese are excluded from the courthouse by guards. While the prob-
lems of scheduling and access were rectified by judicial order during the
Los Palos case, they have hindered the restorative and reconciliatory
functions of the Special Panels. 388
A third problem in court administration is a general lack of internal
management and oversight. The Special Panels have no registry or clerk
of court to coordinate schedules, trials, and witnesses. This lack of inter-
nal administration led to unlawful detention by UNTAET during the run-
up to the Los Palos case, when several of the accused's detention orders
lapsed. When this came to light in mid-January 2001, the Special Panel
issued new arrest warrants for accused already in custody.389 The issu-
ance of new arrest warrants was subsequently overruled by the Court of
Appeals.390 The net effect, that "several of the accused were unlawfully
detained at least from 30 August to 19 October 2000," could have been
avoided with better management, organization, and oversight.39'
385. MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.2.5.
386. The East Timorese judges were striking because they sought lifetime appointments
after their two year provisional appointment. See Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao
Pereira, supra note 336. Yet, the SRSG refused, commenting that this was a decision that
should be made by the East Timorese government after independence on May 20, 2002. Press
Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, supra note 256.
387. See JUSTICE IN PRACTICE, supra note 333, § 4.1.
388. See MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.2.3 (noting that "several East
Timorese people were not allowed into the court building by the security personnel as they did
not have U.N. identity cards"). When the presiding judge became aware of this situation, he
ordered the guards to allow the observers to enter the building. Based on the author's observa-
tions of the new courthouse in Dili, the problems of public exclusion have been largely
rectified.
389. See id. § 3.1 .1.
390. See Prosecutor v. Bosco, Case of Appeal No. 2/2000 (Dili Special Panel).
391. MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3.1.1.
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5. Cooperation with Indonesia
The final challenge that has limited the effectiveness of the Special
Panels is the need to secure cooperation from Indonesia. Despite a Secu-
rity Council resolution "stress[ing] the need for cooperation between
Indonesia ... and UNTAET," the Indonesian government has been
largely unsupportive of the Special Panel's work. Defendants, witnesses,
and key evidence are often in Indonesian West Timor, beyond the sub-
poena power of the Dili courts.392 While UNTAET and Indonesia have
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding,' 93 calling for mutual judi-
cial cooperation, and while negotiations between UNTAET and
Indonesia have been frequent, cooperation remains limited. UNTAET
has little authority or ability to enforce the Memorandum of Understand-
ing or to secure the transfer of individuals and evidence from Indonesia.
This lack of international cooperation has frustrated both prosecution
and defense efforts.3 94 As one public defender notes, "without subpoena
power, the courts will only ever get the small fish."'3 95
Before concluding this Part, a few brief observations are appropriate
about the similarly situated internationalized courts in Kosovo, which
have faced equivalent challenges and to which much of the above analy-
sis applies.3 96 Security Council Resolution 1244 provided the U.N.
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with the authority of "performing basic
civilian administrative functions," including the operation of the judicial
system.397 Under U.N. supervision, a new judiciary has been constructed,
consisting of one supreme court in Pristina as well as five district courts
in Pristina, Mitrovicia, Gjilan, Prizen, and Pec, with fifty-five local
judges and prosecutors initially appointed.3 9 Due, however, to perceived
392. See Interview with Longunhos Montiero, supra note 344.
393. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Republic of Indonesia and the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regarding Cooperation in Legal,
Judicial and Human Rights Related Matters, supra note 258 (providing for mutual assistance
in taking evidence, serving documents, executing arrests, and transferring persons).
394. See Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities, supra note 323, at 456 (noting that "Indonesia
has not transferred any of the suspects for whom the Special Panel has issued arrest war-
rants").
395. Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342.
396. See Christopher Karphammar, Former Judge of the District Court of Mitrovica,
Address to the Amsterdam Centre for International Law Conference on Internationalized
Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Jan. 25, 2002).
397. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 233, § 11 (b).
398. See AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR INT'L LAW, INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS: PRACTISE AND PROSPECTS, COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS 9-
10(2002).
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and real ethnic bias, UNMIK Regulation 2000/6 provided for the ap-
pointment of international judges with the authority to choose
particularly sensitive cases.399 Although plans for a special court to hear
crimes against humanity cases have been abandoned, 4°° as of January
2002, eight international judges and six international prosecutors were
actively working in regular Kosovar domestic courts and efforts were401
underway to recruit twice that number. While the internationalized
courts in Kosovo have reported generally successful operation, many of
the challenges facing East Timor discussed above are equally applicable
in Kosovo.
Certainly in East Timor and presumably in Kosovo as well, interna-
tionalized courts present a mixed record. Cases are being investigated;
decisions are being rendered; justice is being done. However, personnel
shortages, resource limits, managerial failures, and power constraints
have restricted the work of the Special Panels and have raised real ques-
tions about the quality of justice. Judges and defense counsel alike note
the fundamental paradox of the Special Panels in East Timor: "[T]he
world has expectations for us of an international tribunal, with none of
the resources and support. '' 2
The larger point is that most of the problems and challenges dis-
cussed above are easily solved. They are caused by capacity constraints
and misunderstandings, not by willful violations. Additional resources,
careful staff recruitment, and good management would alleviate most, if
not all, of the difficulties the East Timorese Special Panels have experi-
enced. As an East Timorese public defender put it: "[T]his is an
ambitious experiment, which, with a little effort and support, would suc-
ceed. ' '3 The overriding lesson from the case study of the East Timorese
Special Panels, then, is that internationalized courts can work if, and
only if, they are given the sufficient resources and support. Semi-
399. See On the Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges and In-
ternational Prosecutors, UNMIK Reg. 2000/6, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/6 (2001).
400. E-mail from Brigitte Rath, Judicial Affairs Officer, OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Dec.
14, 2001) (on file with author).
401. AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR INT'L LAW, supra note 398, at 9. For more details on the
internationalized courts in Kosovo, see Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Mission in Kosovo I 48-52, U.N. Doc. S/2001/926 (200 1). See also RULE OF LAW
DIVISION, OSCE MISSION IN Kosovo, REP. 2, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Kosovo JUDICIAL
SYSTEM (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/Justice
(covering the period); DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, OSCE MISSION IN Kos-
OVO, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN KosoVo, available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice (reports covering Feb. 2001-Feb.
2002).
402. Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. A similar theme was aired by
Judge Ntukamazina. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
403. Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342.
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internationalzied courts are far less expensive than international tribu-
nals, but they are not free. If the U.N. has learned these lessons, there is
reason to hope that the internationalized courts now being established in
Sierra Leone414 will overcome many of these difficulties and function
more effectively. To be successful, however, these semi-internationalized
courts will need to be part of a cooperative global system of justice from
which they may draw the necessary resources, funds, and personnel. The
following Part considers such a system in detail.
IV. A COMMUNITY OF COURTS
The decade of the 1990s was a period of significant advancement for
international criminal law: individuals were held accountable; important
decisions were rendered; law was clarified and codified. The challenge
that lies ahead is the development of an extensive, effective, and efficient
means for enforcement of international criminal law.
If the argument and observations in the preceding Parts of this Arti-
cle are correct, a particular vision of a system of international criminal
law is forming. In this system, the bulk of international criminal law en-
forcement will occur at a quasi-national, rather than supranational level.
As the Introduction to the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
sets forth, "the primary burden of prosecuting ... perpetrators of [inter-
national] crimes will ... reside with national legal systems '40 5 While the
ICC will undoubtedly have a place in this system, the principle of com-
plementarity ensures that national courts will form the front line for
prosecution of international crimes.4 ° Moreover, the realities of global
politics suggest that, while the prospects for the creation of new suprana-
tional tribunals are poor, there are numerous political openings for the
creation of national and semi-internationalized enforcement mecha-
nisms. Although these mechanisms are far from perfect, with appropriate
support and assistance they have great potential.
The best way to conceptualize the emerging system of international
criminal law enforcement is as a community of courts.4 0 ' The courts
comprising this system are interactive, interdependent, and intercon-
nected.48 They are not, in William Aceves's words, merely "a series of
404. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002 (on file with author).
405. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, at 24.
406. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 16.
407. Abram Chayes, Remarks at the Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compli-
ance and Effectiveness, in 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. Poc. 50, 56 (1997) (describing this
phenomenon as a "dense network of organizations and relationships").
408. See supra Part I.
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parallel systems ... separately applicable within the various nations of
the world.'"4 Rather, these enforcement mechanisms are overlapping,
mutually supportive and mutually dependent. Their jurisdictions inter-
sect. They apply a similar body of law. They draw on each other's
jurisprudence.4 As Anne-Marie Slaughter describes it, the new system
consists of "horizontal and vertical government networks ... [in] a
three-dimensional web" of interaction.4 1' These networks include courts
engaged in the common enterprise of ensuring accountability through
the rule of law. They are a "community of courts. ' 2
This Part explores this community of courts and the relationships be-
tween them that bring order to the system. It first considers how
enforcement of international criminal law differs from the standard in-
ternational law or international relations enforcement models. The
vertical and horizontal relationships within this dispersed enforcement
system are then analyzed. From them, basic principles which regulate
dispersed enforcement of international law can be distilled. Finally, this
Part turns to the primary actors within the system-an epistemic com-
munity of international criminal law judges.
A. Enforcement: A Two Level Analysis
Unlike most fields of international law, the primary obligations im-
posed by international criminal law are on individuals, not on States 3
In many ways, the central purpose of international criminal law is to de-
ter and punish individuals who commit international crimes. To that end,
international criminal law directly regulates individual behavior, in ways
far more similar to domestic criminal law than to traditional international
law. Only the secondary obligations of international criminal law are on
States. Through a variety of legal instruments, States are required to
suppress primary violations by individuals and to exercise jurisdiction
over individual perpetrators of international crimes. Because obligations
409. William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet
Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 129, 138 (2000).
410. In East Timor, for example, the submissions of the Prosecution in the Los Palos
case relied heavily on ICTY jurisprudence, which was also consulted by the judges. See
Prosecutor v. Marques (Los Palos Case), Case No 9/2000, Judgment (Dili Special Panel, Dec.
I1, 2002). Likewise in the Kunarac Case, the ICTY drew on national criminal law to
determine the elements of rape in international law. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement (Feb. 22, 2001)
411. SLAUGHTER, supra note 272, (manuscript ch. 4, at 2).
412. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 372; Slaughter, supra note 2, at 187.
413. See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 70, at 13-16 (arguing that
"[ijnternational law now protects citizens against abuses of power by their governments. It
imposes individual liability on government officials who commit grave ... crimes. It must
now impose direct obligations on individuals .... ).
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in international criminal law are directed at two different subjects-both
individuals and States-traditional compliance models fall short. Under-
standing compliance with international criminal law requires analysis at
both the individual and State levels. Such dual-level analysis has impor-
tant implications both for international criminal law and for other areas
in which international legal rules regulate both individuals and States,
such as international economic law and international environmental law.
Analyzing compliance on both the individual and State level requires
reframing the literature on the enforcement of international law. Most of
this literature focuses only on why States comply with international law
and how States can be forced to do so. To date, little attention has been
paid to the dynamics of enforcement and compliance where primary obli-
gations regulate individuals and only secondary obligations regulate
States.
In 1968, Louis Henkin wrote: "[A]lmost all nations observe almost
all the principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time."' 4 For Henkin, it is nations which "generally ob-
serve law.' 415 In their theory of compliance, Abram and Antonia Chayes
offer a managerial model of why States comply with "formal" treaties.
4
'
6
Likewise, Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom counter the managerial model by
proposing a carrot-and-stick approach to generating compliance. They
too operate within the traditional paradigm of State compliance with ob-
ligations targeted at States themselves. 7
Both Chayes and Chayes and Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom define
compliance as fulfillment of obligations vis-A-vis other States and think
of enforcement as ways States can generate compliance by other
States. 8 In international criminal law, however, the primary obligations
of individuals to refrain from committing international crimes must be
separated from the secondary obligations of States to suppress and pun-
ish crimes. As the nature of obligations on the individual and State levels
is distinct, different theories of compliance may be needed at each level.
414. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
415. See id. at 48.
416. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 1 (1993).
417. George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
418. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 17-18; Downs et al., supra note 417, at
386 (arguing that "the punishment must hurt the transgressor state.., the specific mechanism
by which states punish violations is less relevant to the relationship between the depth of co-
operation and enforcement than is the magnitude of enforcement").
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1. The Individual Level
The primary obligations of international criminal law are at the indi-
vidual level. International legal instruments require individuals to refrain
from international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Individuals comply with these primary obligations
when they do in fact refrain from such acts. Enforcement of international
criminal law at the individual level occurs when courts (domestic or in-
ternational) punish violations of such primary obligations.
The primary obligations for individuals to refrain from international
crimes are extremely specific. The Statutes of the ICC, ICTY and ICTR,
and the UNTAET Regulation defining international crimes in East Timor
all provide unambiguous descriptions of criminal behavior.1 9 Such pre-
cise obligations leave little room for deviation. While there will be
debate as to whether the bombing of television stations in Belgrade, con-
voys in Afghanistan, guerillas,,in Chechnya, or individuals in Yemen
violate international law, it is clear that individuals must not cross into a
narrow and carefully demarcated zone of internationally prohibited con-
duct. Moreover, the primary obligations of international criminal law do
not allow any derogation. Those who do cross the line into the zone of
proscribed behavior are clearly and absolutely in violation of their inter-
national legal duties. Given that these obligations on the individual level
are primary and aimed directly at preventing prohibited conduct, any
violations of international criminal law may "unravel" the regime it-
self.420 The deliberate commission of international crimes cannot be
reconciled with a regime of international criminal law.
The framework of legalization put forward by Kenneth Abbott and
coauthors provides a useful means of characterizing the nature of inter-
national criminal law obligations at the individual level. Abbott and
coauthors evaluate legalization of a set of rules based on the degree of
obligation, precision, and delegation. Applying these criteria first to in-
dividual obligations in international criminal law, there is a high degree
of what Abbott and coauthors deem "obligation." Individuals are bound
by specific sets of rules. Second, these obligations are extremely precise.
To accord with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the various in-
struments of international criminal law must "unambiguously define the
conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe., 42 Third, at the level of
419. Genocide, for example, is defined in the Rome Statute as "any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group." Rome Statute art. 6.
420. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 20.
421. Abbott et al., supra note 195, at 401; see also Rome Statute art. 22 ("The definition
of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambigu-
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individual obligations, courts-both domestic and supranational-have
been delegated the authority to enforce the rules of international law. To
use Abbott's terms, with respect to the primary individual obligations of
international criminal law, "parties [have] agree[ld] to binding third-party
decisions on the basis of clear and generally applicable rules. 422
The obligations imposed by international criminal law on individuals
can thus be characterized as "hard legalization," with high levels of obli-
gation, precision, and delegation. At. the individual level, strict
compliance is required. The leaders of the Khmer Rouge cannot recon-
cile the extermination of three million people with the obligation to
refrain from international crimes nor can the Hutu perpetrators of crimes
in Rwanda reconcile the slaughter of the Tutsi with such obligations. At
the individual level, international criminal law does not and cannot toler-
ate even the slightest defection. These hard obligations and an
extraordinarily narrow zone of acceptable compliance suggest a conver-
gence around a precise set of rules that various judicial mechanisms will
uniformly enforce against individual transgressors.
In the context of hard, primary obligations on individuals, Chayes
and Chayes's managerial approach to compliance may be neither viable
nor appropriate. The basic principle of managerial compliance is that
most violations are not willful.423 The commission of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, however is a "premeditated and
deliberate violation. 424 Chayes and Chayes admit that their managerial
compliance model may not extend to situations in which violations are
deliberate. Because managerial compliance is inadequate to ensure the
primary obligations of international law are met, effective mechanisms
to enforce international criminal law against individual violators are
needed. While the preferences and identities that drive individuals to
commit international crimes may be shifted over time, Downs and coau-
thors are correct to note the crucial role of enforcement mechanisms in
ensuring immediate compliance.425 The most effective means of prevent-
ing individuals from committing international crimes is the sure
knowledge that they will face justice, either before domestic or suprana-
tional courts, if they transgress the law. National courts are the most
effective mechanisms to enforce individual compliance with interna-
tional criminal obligations. As Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests: "[T]he
ity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.").
422. Abbott et al., supra note 195, at 415.
423. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 10 (noting that "only infrequently does a
treaty violation fall into the category of a willful flouting of legal obligation").
424. Id. at 9.
425. See Downs et al., supra note 417, at 391.
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global rule of law depends on the domestic rule of law.' 44 6 Likewise, Wil-
liam Aceves notes the "benefits from the institutional framework that
already exists at the national level to enforce the rule of law.' 427 The exis-
tence and effectiveness of national courts depends on the secondary
obligations of States to exercise jurisdiction over individual violators.
2. The Interstate Level
While the primary obligations of international criminal law require
individuals to refrain from committing international crimes, States face
secondary obligations to criminalize such behavior, to have the neces-
sary domestic mechanisms to exercise jurisdiction over violators, and,
428in many cases, to affirmatively exercise that jurisdiction. States can
and do comply with these secondary obligations in a variety of ways,
including: passing appropriate domestic legislation, granting ordinary
courts jurisdiction over international crimes, establishing specialized
courts, and vesting jurisdiction in an international tribunal. The various
treaties and customary rules from which these secondary obligations
arise do not impose on States a specific set of required behavior. At the
State level, unlike at the individual level, there is a broad "zone within
which behavior is accepted as adequately conforming. 4 29 States are
given a great deal of leeway to determine how they seek to comply.
While some treaties require domestic criminalization of particular con-
duct, most leave the choice of forum to the discretion of the State.
However States do so, compliance with their obligations yields mecha-
nisms through which States can enforce international criminal law
against individual perpetrators. Unfortunately, there is also significant
426. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000).
427. Aceves, supra note 74, at 173.
428. The obligation to criminalize individual violations can be found, for example, in the
Genocide Convention, according to which States must enact "the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective pen-
alties for persons guilty of genocide." Genocide Convention, supra note 140, art. 5. The State
obligation to exercise jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of international crimes can be
found, for example, in the "extradite or prosecute" requirement of the Torture Convention and
the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which obligate States to "undertake
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions" for grave breaches and to
"search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches and ... bring [them] be-
fore its own courts." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386; see also Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, art. 5(2), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 ("Each State Party shall likewise take such meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the
alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.").
429. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 17.
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noncompliance-many States have failed to enact the necessary do-
mestic legislation to exercise international criminal jurisdiction.40 Yet,
as these courts are part of a community, noncompliance by one State
does not threaten the overall regime-other States and international
institutions can step in to take its place.
There is a second distinction between compliance at the individual
and State levels. At the State level, failure to comply "will not necessar-
ily unravel the regime itself."'431 The obligations of States to exercise
jurisdiction over violators are merely secondary obligations. This is not
to say they are unimportant, but their purpose is to ensure that individu-
als comply with the primary obligation not to commit international
crimes. Thus, the failure of States to comply with their obligations is
once removed from the purpose of the primary obligations. Moreover, at
the State level, overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction ensures that, even
where one State fails to comply with its obligations to exercise jurisdic-
tion, other States and supranational institutions will be able to do so.
These other States and institutions can then step in and punish the perpe-
trators of international crimes, thereby ensuring respect for the primary
individual obligation to refrain from the commission of international
crimes.
Applying the rubric of legalization to international criminal law
at the State level brings some important characteristics of the system
into sharper focus. First, in terms of obligation, international criminal
law at the State level undeniably consists of powerful (arguably jus
cogens) obligations-"states ... are bound by a ... set of rules or
commitments" to enforce international criminal law. 32 Second, in
terms of precision, State obligations are relatively imprecise. They do
not unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or pro-
scribe. 433 In fact, the international legal instruments establishing
State obligations with respect to international criminal law allow
States to exercise jurisdiction over individual violators in any number
of ways. The variance in State practice demonstrated throughout this
Article-including reliance on national courts, international tribunals,
military commissions, and semi-internationalized courts-speaks to
the wide range of acceptable compliance.
Third, at the State level, there is little or no delegation to or empow-
erment of a higher authority to assure compliance. Delegation requires
that "third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret
430. See generally WELLER & BURKE-WHITE, supra note 63.
431. Id. at 20.
432. Abbott et al., supra note 195, at 401.
433. Id.
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and apply the rules. '434 Whereas at the individual level national and in-
ternational tribunals have been given the authority to apply the primary
rules of international criminal law to individuals, at the State level there
is no higher authority delegated the power to force State compliance.
Though it is theoretically possible that a case could be brought before
the ICJ based on a State's failure to exercise jurisdiction over an interna-
tional criminal, given the structural nature of the ICJ and the lack of
pressing State interest in this issue, such a case seems unlikely.
On a spectrum between hard obligations and anarchy, according to
Abbott's framework of legalization, interstate international criminal law
falls somewhere in the middle. The State level obligations of interna-
tional criminal law are somewhat soft. This is not to say that the
obligations themselves are not based in hard sources of law such as trea-
ties and custom, but rather to point out that the obligations on States are
relatively imprecise and some degree of defection is tolerated.435 States
thus have significant leeway in how they comply with their obligations
under international criminal law and some level of defection, though by
no means preferable, can be accommodated.
The implications of the flexibility of international criminal law obli-
gations on interstate relations are significant. While some have
"dismissed" soft obligations as an irrelevant "factor in international af-
fairs," soft obligations may well offer "more effective ways to deal with
uncertainty" than traditional hard obligations. 436 Soft obligations cannot
be ignored: After all, many of these obligations implement an underlying
substantive jus cogens norm. Procedural soft obligations allow States
greater flexibility to interpret and conform to these obligations within the
context of their domestic circumstances, thereby expanding the zone of
compliance. Soft obligations thus respect the legitimate differences be-
tween States while still furthering the overall goals of international
criminal law. 37
Soft obligations also allow States to experiment and improvise
mechanisms of compliance-such as the semi-internationalized courts
discussed previously. As Michael Doff and Charles Sabel explain in their
argument for "democratic experimentalism," "the freedom of maneuver
accorded local jurisdictions ... and the obligations of mutual regard [for
434. Id.
435. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidel claim that "soft law begins once legal ar-
rangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and
delegation." Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidel, Hard and Soft Law in International Gov-
ernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 422 (2000).
436. Id. at 422, 423.
437. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 4, at 42) (arguing that the princi-
ple of legitimate difference "reflects a desirable diversity of ideas about how to order an
economy or society").
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fundamental rules] that are its precondition ... both favor exploratory
problem solving and become the more effective for it." 3' Over time
States may develop and implement more effective approaches to compli-
ance than the drafters of hard obligations could have foreseen. This is
what Anthony Appiah describes as "universalistic cosmopolitanism: a
celebration of difference that remains committed to the existence of uni-
versal standards.,
439
The soft character of State obligations in international criminal law
also informs the means by which compliance can be secured. Downs and
coauthors present a model that requires a higher authority with the power
to force States to meet their international legal obligations. Such a model
is neither effective nor appropriate in international criminal law where
there is no central enforcement authority, where obligations themselves
lack precision, and where compliance by some group of States is suffi-
cient to suppress international crimes." In such cases, managing-rather
than imposing-compliance may be a more fruitful strategy. As Chayes
and Chayes argue, ensuring transparency, engaging in dispute settlement,
building capacity, and effectively using persuasion are the most effective
means of increasing State compliance with international criminal law.
4
'
These strategies can assist States to develop compliance mechanisms
that meet State obligations to exercise jurisdiction over international
criminals, while fitting within the domestic context and constraints of the
particular State in question.
While outright defection from the regime of international criminal
law-such as the U.S. repudiation of the ICC-is to be condemned, de-
viation from the regime can be managed. Those who claim that the
Special Panels in East Timor or the Rwandan Gacaca deviate from the
international criminal law regime must realize that deviation is seldom
willful, but has arisen due to resource constraints.442 The appropriate re-
sponse, according to Chayes and Chayes, would be "financial assistance,
to defray the incremental coats of compliance for developing coun-
tries. ' 443 As discussed above, with sufficient financial and judicial
assistance, most of the problems with the current prosecutions in East
Timor could be resolved and many of the concerning aspects of the
Rwandan Gacaca courts could be avoided. Even when States do
438. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 322 (1998).
439. Anthony Appiah, The American University in the Age of Globalisation, Lecture at
Oxford University (2002).
440. See generally Downs et al., supra note 417.
441. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 22-27 (discussing the components of the
managerial compliance model).
442. For a discussion of such deviation, see supra Part HI.
443. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 15.
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intentionally defect from the regime-such as the United States has
done-the goals of international criminal law are not directly threatened,
as other States can step in and exercise jurisdiction themselves.
In fact, the management of different approaches to compliance may
offer a net positive. Conflict, deliberation, argument, and contention can
lead to better outcomes. 444 Anne-Marie Slaughter refers to a kind of
"positive conflict," which Albert Hirschman claims can yield "the valu-
able ties that hold modern democratic societies together.' 445 The iterative
discourse of discussion and negotiation in the process of creating en-
forcement mechanisms may well strengthen the overall system of
international criminal law. The Cambodian understanding of interna-
tional criminal law today is very different than it was in 1998, primarily
because of the processes of negotiation with the U.N.4 6 Likewise, the
trial and error of various approaches to international criminal law
enforcement will likely inform future agreements between States to
create such courts. The internationalized court in Sierra Leone, for
example, is a far stronger institution because U.N. negotiators learned
from their efforts in Cambodia and East Timor.447
Moreover, the managerial model of compliance facilitates a kind of
socialization, allowing the norms of international criminal law to be-
come embedded in the domestic political system. Management of
obligations and the processes of socialization can change self-conception
and national identity of individuals and States. For example, the prefer-
ences of the Rwandan people, discussed above, may have shifted over
time as Rwandan identity was socialized and reconstructed after the
genocide. Anne-Marie Slaughter explains that "a socialized individual
[or State] may want something intensely, but will not seek it if doing so
would contravene prevailing social norms and result in social oppro-
brium. 4 48 Taking a slightly different approach to the concept, Harold
Koh describes the "transnational legal process, whereby global norms of
international ... law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately internalized
444. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 4 (Amy
Gutman ed., 2001).
445. SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 5, at 42); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, A
PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 235 (1995).
446. See supra Part 11.
447. See Alison Smith, Remarks at the Amsterdam Centre for International Law Confer-
ence on Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Jan. 25, 2002); Alison Smith, A
Response to "A 'Special Court' for Sierra Leone's War Crimes" (Aug. 15, 2001),
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sierra/court/2001/critique.htm (describing some of
the lessons learned in creating the Sierra Leone tribunal).
448. SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 5, at 38).
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by domestic legal systems.""' Critiquing socialization, Downs, Danish,
and Barsoom describe it as a "transformational approach ... believed to
generate increasingly greater commitment and deeper cooperation
through a process of iterative State-to-State negotiation that promotes
identity convergence.""45 This is, of course, a deeply constructivist ap-
proach. It assumes, to quote Alexander Wendt, that "world politics is
'socially constructed"' and that social "structures shape actors' identi-
ties.' ' Particularly in cases of national reconstruction, the management
of legal obligations and the socialization of actors may lead to the norms
of international criminal law becoming deeply embedded in the domestic
political system, through domestic laws, constitutional provisions, or
lasting domestic enforcement institutions.
The soft character of State obligations in international law informs
our understanding of the emergent community of courts. Within the soft
framework of State obligations, States will comply with international
criminal law by exercising jurisdiction over individual violators in any
number of ways. They may empower their own courts to hear interna-
tional criminal law cases, create semi-internationalized courts, or
delegate authority to an international tribunal. While States are unlikely
to be forced to comply with these obligations, their compliance can be
effectively managed. This will require commitment to transparency, per-
suasion, and, particularly, capacity building. Thereby, the norms of
international criminal law may become embedded in the domestic sys-
tems of many States. What will result is a rich diversity of enforcement
mechanisms through which States comply with their obligations to exer-
cise jurisdiction over international criminals. In so doing, States will
ensure that individuals comply with their own primary obligations of
international criminal law-to refrain from the commission of interna-
tional crimes.
Recognizing the soft character of State obligations also helps us bet-
ter conceptualize the interrelated community of courts that make up the
system of international criminal law. As the interstate obligations to cre-
ate such enforcement mechanisms are soft and the zone of acceptable
compliance broad, we will see a system with a significant variety in the
449. Koh, supra note 84, at 1399; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lec-
ture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998).
450. George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International Regime
Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 465 (2000).
Downs and coauthors argue that "at the micro-foundational level, the assumption that the
horizontal interaction that generates value changes at the small-group level will operate the
same way and to the same extent at the state level ignores many differences between the two."
Id. at 507.
451. Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT'L SECURITY 71, 71-
72 (1995).
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form, structure, and jurisdictional scope of enforcement mechanisms.
Some States will fail to create them at all. Other States will create courts
and tribunals with sweeping reach. Supranational organizations will step
in where national courts fail. At the individual level, however, hard law
and an extraordinarily narrow zone of acceptable compliance suggest
convergence around a precise set of obligations that various judicial
mechanisms-created based on interstate obligations-will uniformly
enforce against individual transgressors. In other words, the members of
this community will exhibit great variety in the types of enforcement
mechanisms States create, but legal rules enforced by these courts will
be remarkably similar and stringently enforced.
B. Relationships in the Community
The emerging community of courts is largely self-organizing and
self-regulating. Though some of the principles that regulate the commu-
nity are found in the Rome Statute, the community itself lacks any
controlling or regulating authority. Therefore, the relationships and in-
teractions among these courts are essential to the effectiveness of the
emerging system of international criminal justice. National courts with
all of their rich diversity (including the semi-internationalized courts
discussed above) will be the front line enforcement mechanisms of in-
ternational criminal law. The horizontal connections in the community of
international criminal law enforcement are relationships between na-
tional courts. The vertical connections within the community are the
relationships between supranational enforcement mechanisms-such as
the ICC or the ICTY-and national courts. While enforcement rests pri-
marily on the horizontal, national level, the vertical dimension serves as
an important backstop when national courts are unable to act. This Sec-
tion explores how interdependence and interaction on the horizontal and
vertical planes create a community of courts.
1. Horizontal Relationships
The guiding principle regulating the horizontal relationships be-
tween courts in this system is that of subsidiarity. The term is borrowed
from the Treaty of the European Union, according to which the Euro-
pean Community will only act outside its exclusive competence where
"the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 4 52 The
452. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2,
1997, title I, art. 3(b), O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]; see also
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French Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that subsidiarity requires
governance to "be close to the citizens, entrusting the implementation of
programmes to local authorities." '53 According to George Bermann, sub-
sidiarity demands that action "be taken at the lowest level of government
at which particular objectives can adequately be achieved.4 54 In the con-
text of the system of international criminal law, subsidiarity means that
enforcement will occur as close to the affected populations as considera-
tions of justice and fairness will allow.
As applied, subsidiarity will regulate the overlapping and conflicting
jurisdictions of national courts. The principle will lead most prosecutions
to be located on the territory where the international crimes occurred.
The benefits of this will be substantial. First, international criminal law
will be able to harness the power exercised by national governments.
4 5
National courts and law enforcement agencies already have the ability to
apprehend suspects, to subpoena witnesses and evidence, and to enforce
their judgments. Since the majority of suspects, witnesses, and evidence
presumably will be on the territory where the crimes occurred, courts in
that State are best positioned to apprehend those suspects and access that
evidence. Moreover, national courts and specialized national adjudica-
tory mechanisms created to deal with international crimes are the only
bodies with the sheer capacity to address the overwhelming number of
cases that may arise after an internal conflict.
From a normative perspective, national courts in the State where
crimes occur are the preferable enforcement mechanisms. The proximity
of these courts to the events, evidence, and witnesses makes them best
qualified to understand the context and circumstances of the case. 56
Moreover, from the perspective of restorative justice, local courts have a
significant advantage. As Martha Minow summarizes, "[r]estorative jus-
tice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and victims. It seeks
repair of social connections and peace rather than retribution against the
offenders. 457 Restoring social connections means touching the lives of
Case T-29/92, Vereniging van Samenwerkende prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouhijrerheid
v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 11-289, 331.
453. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commentaries on Subsidiarity,
http://www.diplomatie.fr/frmonde/euro/eu05.gb.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
454. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338 (1994).
455. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 6, at 50-5 1).
456. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996,
at 127, 133 (1996) (noting that "domestic courts can be more sensitive to the nuances of local
culture").
457. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 92 (1998). See gener-
ally Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on
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victims. For example, whereas most Rwandans are only vaguely familiar
with the ongoing proceedings before the ICTR a few hundred miles
away in Arusha, Tanzania, over 90 percent of the population participated
in the elections of the local Gacaca courts .4 This personal involvement
in the judicial process is crucial to the cathartic and restorative qualities
of judicial proceedings. Neil Kritz observes, "[T]he effectiveness and
local impact" of reconciliatory mechanisms is "undoubtedly enhanced
by ... physical presence in the territory."459 Finally, locating prosecutions
close to home is most likely to advance the socialization or transnational
judicial process created by international justice. Norms are more easily
internalized by individuals who are closely connected to the norm crea-
460tion processes.
National courts also offer the normative benefit of psychological
proximity and hence domestic legitimacy. The sense of connection be-
tween the national population and the judicial process is far more likely
where domestic courts are involved. Supranational enforcement mecha-
nisms risk being seen as "an instrument of hegemony for powerful
states. 4 6' National enforcement mechanisms are far more likely to be
perceived as legitimate in affected communities than are their suprana-
tional counterparts. As Jos6 Alvarez observes, "If Rwandan society
shares comparable notions of judicial legitimacy, it stands to reason that
having judges who come from the local community may itself be deter-
minative of the legitimacy of these processes., 46 Likewise, Jonathan
Charney observes that alternatives may be chosen for international dis-
pute settlement such that a tribunal can be structured in a way that
respects local "cultural factors." '463 Finally, the use of national courts in
the prosecution of international crimes increases the likelihood of open
debate and discussion within the domestic polity, enhancing the "public
deliberation [crucial to] ... creating legitimacy for the undertaking." 64
While the ideal approach to international criminal law enforcement
would be to locate courts as close to the victims and events as possible,
Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 79 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds.,
2000).
458. Bishogoro, supra note 290.
459. Kritz, supra note 456, at 131.
460. See generally Wendt, supra note 451.
461. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 7, 30 (2001). Akhavan observes: "The ICTR has often
been faulted for its remoteness from the Rwandese people. Its geographical location ... makes
it visibly distant." Id. at 25.
462. Josd Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 416 (1999).
463. Jonathan 1. Chamey, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International
Tribunals?, 271 HAGUE ACAD. INT'L L. 101, 133 (1998).
464. MINow, supra note 457, at 55.
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this is not always practicable or appropriate. Other States must intervene
when and where States fail to comply with international obligations to
vest their courts with the power to hear such cases, are unable to create
specialized international courts, purposefully avoid prosecution and in-
vestigation, or simply lack the capacity to prosecute. The first part of
such intervention should probably be managerial. Nonterritorial States
need to determine the root cause of the territorial State's failure to prose-
cute and to ascertain whether such failure. is due to misunderstandings or
capacity constraints. Where such misunderstandings or capacity con-
straints are the problem, such as in Rwanda, horizontal foreign
assistance-both judicial and financial-would be an appropriate re-
465
sponse.
When, however, a State's failure to prosecute is willful or when
problems cannot be resolved through foreign assistance alone, then the
right and duty to exercise jurisdiction passes to the courts of other States
or to supranational institutions. Such concurrent jurisdiction fully con-
forms with the principle of subsidiarity: Institutions more distant from
the affected population can intervene when those of the territorial State
are unable to achieve the overall goals of prosecution. In a horizontal
network, a variety of other courts, beyond the territorial State, may well
have jurisdiction over the case. Under standard principles of jurisdiction,
the courts of the perpetrator's or victim's nationality would have concur-
rent jurisdiction and the right to prosecute would pass across the
horizontal plane to alternative national forums.
There will be circumstances in which all three of these forums-the
territorial State, the perpetrator's national State, and the victim's national
State-are unable to prosecute. In such cases, any other court in the
community would be able to intervene and exercise jurisdiction. The first
consideration in determining which other members of the community of
courts should exercise jurisdiction will turn on which State apprehends
the suspect, though the Pinochet case indicates that the apprehending
State may simply be acting on a warrant issued by the prosecuting
State.466 Without explicitly mentioning subsidiarity, the Princeton Princi-
ples on Universal Jurisdiction-the aforementioned guidelines on the
exercise of universal jurisdiction-call on States to balance a number of
criteria in deciding whether to extradite or prosecute. These criteria in-
clude "the place of commission of the crime," "the nationality
connection of the victim to the requesting state," and "any other
465. Kritz, supra note 456, at 148 (observing, "the best scenario would be for the inter-
national community to provide appropriate assistance to enable a society emerging from mass
abuse to deal with the issues of justice and accountability itself").
466. See Aceves, supra note 74, at 163 (discussing Spain's extradition request for Pino-
chet).
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connection between the requesting state and the alleged perpetrator, the
crime, or the victim"4 67 While the Principles do not rank these considera-
tions, the commentaries indicate that "almost without exception, the
territorial principle was thought to deserve precedence" because "the
criminal defendant should be tried by his 'natural judge.' '4 68 Where
prosecution is solely under the universality principle, jurisdictional con-
flicts should thus be resolved in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity. This may require States to exercise restraint and to extradite
an accused to a State with a closer tie to the crime as long as prosecution
by the requesting State conforms to basic norms of fairness and justice.
Subsidiarity is fully compatible with liberal theories of international
law. Liberal international law theory derives from liberal international
relations theory, a set of positive assumptions about how State interactions
drive international outcomes. Liberal international relations theory as-
sumes "individuals and private groups" within a State are the
"fundamental actors in international relations." '469 Subsidiarity locates
prosecutions in institutions as close to these fundamental actors as the in-
terests of justice will allow. Liberal international law theories see the
"primary function of public international law ... [as] influenc[ing] and
improv[ing] the functioning of domestic institutions., 470 By keeping prose-
cutions as close to the location of the crime and affected communities as
possible, subsidiarity enhances the effectiveness of judicial action and
enhances the democratic connections between individuals and the insti-
tutions that govern them.
A final horizontal interaction within the community of courts arises
from the cross-citation and application of law by courts of different na-
tions. Recent studies document "constitutional cross-fertilization"
whereby courts of one State inform their constitutional decisions through
the jurisprudence of the courts of other States.' This trend is even more
common in international criminal law, where States apply the same sub-
stantive body of law. For example, the British House of Lords in the
Pinochet Case cites to the Israeli decision in the case of Adolph
Eichmann4 7' and, in the Eichmann case, the Israeli Supreme Court cites
frequently to the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and to the national
war crimes prosecutions under Control Council Law 10 after World
467. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, at 32 (Principle 8: Resolution of Competing
National Jurisdictions).
468. Id. at 53 (Commentary to Principle 8).
469. Moravcsik, supra note 114, at 516.
470. Slaughter, supra note 426, at 246.
471. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1104.
472. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 38
I.L.M. 579, 590 (H.L. 1999).
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War 11. 473 In so doing, the courts of one State borrow from and cite to the
courts of other States, not as binding precedent, but as the articulation of
common principles by similarly situated judges in a global community
of courts.
2. Vertical Relationships
In this global community of courts, vertical relationships regulate the
interactions between national and supranational courts.474 Though verti-
cal, these relationships should not be seen as strictly hierarchical (as in
the relations between a district and appellate court in the United States)
or even as federal (as in the relationship between a state supreme court
and the U.S. Supreme Court), but again as part of a community of courts
with different levels of international involvement and different degrees
of distance from the crimes. The German Federal Constitutional Court
describes similar vertical interdependence with the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) as a "cooperative relationship" in which both courts are
engaged in a similar enterprise, but in which the ECJ has "responsibility
for the entire area of the Community." '475 Thinking of this vertical inter-
dependence as a cooperative relationship is useful for it emphasizes the
fact that both national and supranational institutions will have to take
account of one another, respect one another, and defer to one another
when appropriate.
The guiding principle governing these vertical relationships is that of
complementarity, enshrined in the admissibility criteria of the Rome
Statute discussed in some detail above.476 In short, complementarity re-
quires the ICC to restrain from exercising jurisdiction unless national
courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute. 477 National courts exercise
primary jurisdiction, with supranational institutions stepping in only
when national courts fail or defer. Complementarity and subsidiarity fit
together neatly. Both emphasize keeping prosecution local where possi-
ble. Complementarity governs the allocation of jurisdiction between the
supranational and the national level, while subsidiarity determines the
location of prosecution within the national level.
473. See Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann (Isr. S. Ct. 1962), reprinted in 36 I.L.R.
277 passim.
474. See Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1103-04. See generally Heifer & Slaughter, supra
note 2.
475. BVerfGE 73, 339 (387); see also Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and
National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 229, 235 & n.20 (1997).
476. See supra Section I.A.
477. See Rome Statute art. 17.
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A regime of complementarity has two powerful effects: changing in-
centives and bolstering capacity. First, complementarity encourages
action by national institutions. Complementarity shifts incentives by
changing the default option from impunity to supranational prosecution.
Prior to the existence of the ICC, for example, a State would face the
choice of prosecuting at home or allowing impunity. Given the political
costs of domestic prosecution, many States chose the option of impunity.
With the ICC acting under the complementarity principle, the same State
would instead face the choice between national prosecution and suprana-
tional prosecution. In that circumstance, having some control over the
proceedings and locating the trial in their own courts might well be a
preferred outcome. Second, complementarity bolsters capacity in two
ways. Under a regime of complementarity, supranational courts become
available where national courts fail to act. Moreover, the experience and
resources at the supranational level trickle down to the national level,
providing national courts with precedent, personnel, and political cover.
An important and yet unresolved question in this allocation of juris-
diction is how often the vertical relationships should be invoked and the
forum of prosecution shifted on the vertical plane from a national to a
supranational forum. Some have argued that "the complementarity re-
gime of the Rome Statute is probably too strong ' 478 and supranational
courts such as the ICC should play a greater role. The accuracy of these
claims turns on the interpretation of "unwilling" and "unable," the two
core tests for complementarity embodied in the Rome Statute. The Rome
Statute leaves a great deal of discretion as to the meaning of these terms
to the Court, and thus the frequency with which international courts will
assume jurisdiction.479As Madeline Morris observes, "the ICC Treaty
articulates no principles or policies to govern ... decision making on
fundamental issues. 480
Thinking of national and supranational judicial mechanisms as part
of a community of courts in a "cooperative relationship" helps guide all
parties as to when supranational institutions should exercise jurisdiction.
For this community of courts to operate effectively, the interpretation of
"unwilling" and "unable" has to provide flexibility. The obvious case of
supranational prosecution envisioned by the Rome Statute is where na-
tional courts lack the capacity or the political will to prosecute and
supranational institutions must step in.
There are at least two additional circumstances in which suprana-
tional prosecutions are particularly appropriate and in which domestic
478. Kaul, supra note 24, at 59.
479. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 16.
480. Morris, supra note 19, at 177.
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courts should refrain from prosecution to allow supranational adjudica-
tion. First, the "Milosevic exception": Where a globally renowned despot
is tried for international crimes, the world at large may have an interest
in supranational prosecution. In such cases a purely domestic trial might
have dangerous political repercussions that threaten the stability of a
transitional State. Second, the "Kunarac exception": Where a case is of
groundbreaking precedential value, a supranational court may yield bet-
ter jurisprudence. In such cases, experience and judicial resources may
be required in order to ensure the codification of crucial areas of interna-
tional criminal law. For example, Dragoljub Kunarac, a low-level
commander of Serb paramilitaries, was tried before the ICTY for nu-
merous counts of rape as a crime against humanity. As the first
prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity,82 the Kunarac case set
an important precedent in an emerging area of international law. In do-
mestic law such groundbreaking cases tend to reach the highest court
through appeals procedures. In international law, however, the ICC has
no appellate jurisdiction from national cases. In this situation, deference
48
to the ICC by national courts may be appropnate. In these two scenar-
ios, domestic courts-even if able to prosecute-should cooperate with
the ICC, restraining their exercise of jurisdiction and deferring to supra-
national courts.48 If this system of complementarity on the vertical plane
is to work, the "unwilling" clause of the Rome Statute must be inter-
preted to allow supranational adjudication where domestic courts deem
themselves unwilling to prosecute because they believe supranational
institutions would be more effective in the particular case.
Adequate resolution of jurisdictional conflicts through vertical rela-
tionships will depend upon close cooperation and collaboration between
national and supranational courts.485 It will be incumbent on the judges of
supranational bodies to convince their national colleagues that they are
all part of the same judicial enterprise, "fellow professionals in a
481. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement
(Feb. 22, 2001).
482. See Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovac,
Third Amended Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23-PT (Dec. 1, 1999) (charging Kunarac
with "Rape, a crime against humanity punishable under article 5(g) of the Statute of the Tri-
bunal").
483. Similarly, the Akayesu case before the ICTR charging and convicting the accused of
genocide, set an important precedent and would be an obvious example of a case that should
be heard by a supranational court under the "Kunarac exception." See Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998).
484. See Morris, supra note 19, at 199 (noting that there are certain cases in which "ne-
gotiations" should be used "in forestalling national prosecutions").
485. In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995) (Judge
Calabresi describing this type of relationship as an "ongoing dialogue between the adjudica-
tive bodies of the world community").
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profession that transcends national borders." '486 Such relationships are not
built through the ratification of a treaty, but rather by ongoing contact,
cooperation, trust building, and mutual respect. Anne-Marie Slaughter
observes that the positive relationship between the ECJ and national
courts in Europe required "convincing national judges of the desirability
of using the ECJ. Through seminars, dinners, regular invitations to Lux-
embourg, and visits ... the ECJ judges put a human face on the
institutional links they sought to build. 487 The future judges of the ICC
should follow in the footsteps of their ECJ counterparts by building rela-
tionships with national courts. If the ICC is to become an effective body
and have a meaningful caseload, these relationships must be fostered.
Social interactions and seminars in The Hague as well as good jurispru-
dence will be essential.
Borrowing by national courts of supranational jurisprudence is the
final element of the vertical interactions within this community of courts.
In East Timor, Judge Sylver Ntukamazia "frequently relies on the ICTY
and ICTR. '88 Likewise, Stuart Alford, one of the international prosecu-
tors in East Timor, consults the Rome Statute Preparatory Commission
materials and the "judgments of the two ad hoc tribunals. 48 9 While these
sources are not binding precedent in East Timor, there is an implicit as-
sumption among many national judges and legal officials that
supranational institutions with their comparatively limitless resources
and greater international criminal law experience will reach sound, well-
reasoned decisions. These decisions should, therefore, carry great
weight. These then are soft relationships, created through respect and
persuasive judicial reasoning, rather than through formal hierarchy. Yet,
even soft linkages can ensure a relative uniformity of law. As Guenael
Mettraux explains, "[c]rimes against humanity has now come of legal
age ... The ICTY [has] played a crucial role in this transformation ...
Whereas national courts sometimes relied upon distinctively domestic
definitions of this offense" the tribunal has ensured a common jurispru-
dence.4 90 Given the importance of uniformity and the need to further
codify international criminal law, vertical interactions between courts are
crucial, as is deference to supranational courts for cases in which new
legal questions are raised. Even where entire cases are not deferred to the
ICC, there is nothing in the Rome Statute which would prohibit, for ex-
ample, a national court submitting a question of law to the ICC. This is
486. Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1124.
487. Anne-Marie Burley [now Slaughter] & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 62-63 (1993).
488. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
489. Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244.
490. Mettraux, supra note 361, at 238.
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comparable, at the domestic level, to the certified question process used
by U.S. federal courts in ascertaining state law where there are "unset-
tled questions of state law.' 49' Similarly, national courts of the European
Union Member States can refer interpretative questions to the ECJ,
thereby ensuring a relatively uniform interpretation of EU law among
Member States. 92 The situation would remain, nonetheless, one of defer-
ence out of respect and interdependence, and not of subordination or
hierarchy.
C. The Common Enterprise of Judging
The primary actors in this community of courts are judges. Judges
determine how courts interact vertically and horizontally. Thinking of
judges as key actors within a global community of courts transforms the
nature of their job and, possibly, even their self-identity. Many interna-
tional criminal law judges already see themselves as part of a global
process of accountability. When Patricia Wald, a former judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sat on the bench of
the ICTY, she was no longer specifically serving the United States, but
rather the global pursuit of justice.493 Likewise, when Sylver Ntukamazia
hears cases in East Timor, he is not working merely for East Timor or his
home State of Burundi: "[M]y goal is an international move toward jus-
tice. 494 Identities of international judges thus shift from a purely
domestic focus to dual loyalty to both national and international judicial
processes. This is a modem version of Georges Scelle's "d~doublement
fonctionnel"-intemational jurists have a truly double function and dou-
ble identity, both domestic and international. 495 Anne-Marie Slaughter
argues that such judges have both an "internal and external face" and
should "see themselves as representing a larger transnational or even
global constituency" in light of a "global public interest."
4 96
In this context, international criminal law judges and officials be-
come what Peter Haas refers to as an epistemic community, "a network
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particu-
lar domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
491. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 (1997). While the
process of certified questions is part of a federal system-which the community of courts is
not-the concept itself could well be applicable.
492. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 234.
493. See Wald, supra note 56.
494. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
495. Georges Scelle, Le Phinomne Juridique de Dgdoublement Fonctionnel, in
RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION 324 (Walter Schatzel & Hans-JUrgen
Schlochauer eds., 1956).
496. SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 6, at 22).
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within that domain or issue-area. '4 97 They share a set of "normative and
principled beliefs" in the rule of law as well as the "common policy en-
terprise" of accountability. 411 Seeing themselves as an epistemic
community with shared values and methods may help generate the mu-
tual respect and coordination essential to the successful operation of the
emerging community of courts. While, in Haas's model, epistemic
communities provide "information and advice" to decision makers, here
the epistemic community of international judges has been delegated the
power to make policy through judicial decisions. Thus the power and
influence of this community of judges "in shaping patterns of interna-
tional policy coordination," is great.499
If international criminal law judges are actively aware of belonging
to a larger epistemic community, they may be more able to serve and
assist one another in countless ways. As argued above, managing State
compliance with international obligations requires the provision of assis-
tance and capacity building. Who better to do so than the judges
themselves? Horizontally, this assistance could involve more interna-
tionalized domestic courts sharing judges. This is the basis of the East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodian models. Self-aware cooperation is
inherent in the recent offer of the government of India to send a judge to
Cambodia even if agreement with the U.N. is not reached. m Vertically,
this self-aware cooperation might involve sending judges with experi-
ence in supranational courts to national courts. Judge Sylver Ntukamazia
in East Timor remarked on his desire "to bring an ICTY judge to sit on
the panel here."5 ' Likewise, Patricia Wald, the former U.S. judge at the
ICTY, expressed a willingness to serve on the bench in a national court
hearing war crimes cases, such as the Special Panels in East Timor.
0 2
The ICC might well consider an outreach program where its judges were
seconded out to national courts for particular cases.03 Such judge-to-
497. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-
ordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
498. Id.
499. Id. at 35.
500. His Excellency Sok An, Senior Minister In Charge of the Office of the Council of
Ministers, President of the Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Prepa-
ration of the Proceedings for the Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders, Presentation to the
Stockholm International Forum: Truth, Justice And Reconciliation (Apr. 23-24, 2002) (thank-
ing "the Prime Minister of the Republic of India who has just pledged to send a judge" to
Cambodia).
501. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.
502. See Wald, supra note 56; Interview with Patricia Wald, Former Judge, ICTY, in
Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 7, 2002).
503. Such programs were noticeably absent in the early years of the ICTY and ICTR.
David Tolbert argues that the ICTY suffered from a "strategic failure in that [it] has not had
much impact on the development of courts and justice systems in the region." David Tolbert,
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judge contacts and assistance could strengthen the vertical and horizon-
tal interactions, improve the quality of justice rendered, enhance the
capacity of national courts, and generate respect and cooperation among
the epistemic community of judges. As judges come to see themselves as
part of a common community-the bearers of dual national and interna-
tional obligations-they will enhance the global pursuit of
accountability.
CONCLUSION
Undeniably, international criminal law has come of age. There now
exists a clear set of rules of proscribed conduct and a body of jurispru-
dence articulating and applying those rules. We are now witnessing the
development of a system of international criminal law enforcement. This
new system challenges basic notions of public international law en-
forcement, merging international and domestic institutions in the
creation of a highly interconnected, independent global community of
courts. The relationships within this community are the key to the suc-
cess of the system.
Enforcement of international criminal law begins with politics.
States must create or delegate authority to adjudicatory bodies-
domestic and supranational-for international criminal law to have bite.
The creation of supranational mechanisms began at Nuremberg, was re-
kindled in the 1990s with the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals, and
reached fruition in July 2002 with the entry into force of the Rome Stat-
ute of the ICC. Likewise, enforcement by national institutions began
with the Israeli trial of Adolph Eichmann, was fostered through laws al-
lowing the exercise of universal jurisdiction, and was embodied in the
Pinochet case.
A careful analysis of the politics underlying the creation of interna-
tional criminal law enforcement mechanisms anticipates that
supranational courts will have only a limited role and future enforcement
of international criminal law will largely occur at the national level. Ad
hoc tribunals were likely a phenomenon of the 1990s and the ICC's
mandate is limited. However, political opportunities for the creation of
enforcement mechanisms at the domestic level are numerous. First, as in
Cambodia, cleavages within political elites may foster the creation of
courts to hear international criminal cases. Second, U.N. administration,
such as in East Timor and Kosovo, may yield semi-internationalized
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and
Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 12 (2002).
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courts. Third, the externalization of political costs vis-A-vis powerful
neighbor States, as in the relationship between East Timor and Indone-
sia, may also support the creation of such adjudicatory bodies. Finally,
demands for justice among domestic interest groups-as in Rwanda-
may push liberal and quasi-liberal States to enforce international
criminal law and resource constraints may yield innovative new ap-
proaches. For political reasons, then, the future system of international
criminal law is likely to be predominantly horizontal, comprised of a
variety of different domestic and semi-internationalized courts. As the
East Timor situation demonstrates, such courts will, undoubtedly, face
numerous challenges. But these challenges can be overcome with suffi-
cient outside assistance and cooperation within the growing community
of courts.
By its very nature this community of courts is decentralized, inter-
dependent, self-organizing, and nonhierarchical. Yet, for the system to be
effective, it requires order. Such order, and the power it implies, comes
from relationships and from shared information. This community of
courts must be self-aware and must build trust and understanding
amongst an epistemic community of international judges.
The relationships among courts in this community possibly can be
guided by grand principles including those of accountability, subsidiar-
ity, and legitimate difference. In such a framework, States and domestic
polities must enforce international criminal law, but should be given the
flexibility to tailor institutions to their own domestic circumstances'
°4
and a "margin of appreciation" within which to fulfill their obligations.' °5
The successful organization and relations of this community of
courts will require the articulation and application of general overarching
norms to guide courts and judges alike. In the more immediate term,
however, narrower norms, closely tailored to the operation of a commu-
nity of courts, are needed. In a system in which information is power 
6
and in which compliance at the interstate level can be managed through
collaborative guidance and assistance, regulatory norms and imple-
mentation guidelines will enhance the effectiveness of the overall
system. To that end, a code of conduct for the enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law-particularly at the national level-would prove an
extraordinarily powerful tool.
504. See generally Anne-Marie Burley [now Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States:
Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
505. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22.
506. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 5).
507. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 416, at 22-26.
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In the past decade, codes of conduct have emerged as an important
means of regulating the international system. ' 8 They are effective in part
because they are "voluntary norms ... selected by individual actors."' 9
Doff and Sabel have described such codes as "rolling best practices
rules" whereby best practices are identified and complied with by a
community of actors.50 As soft law, a code of conduct can deal with un-
certainty and the changing nature of the system over time.5"' Such a code
should give substance to due process rights such as the presumption of
innocence, the right to speedy adjudication, the right to representation,
the right to confront evidence, and the right to appeal 5 2 It should specify
how equality of arms-the balance of resources between prosecution and
defense-can be achieved. It should create mechanisms for vertical and
horizontal exchange of law and judges within the system. Given that
many national courts, such as those in Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor,
and Rwanda, will depend on outside aid and capacity building, this code
of conduct could become a benchmark for the provision of aid, leading
to convergence around and uniform implementation of the basic princi-
ples of the code.
While the development of such a code of conduct for international
criminal law enforcement offers important future potential, the most
immediate challenge is to recognize this emerging community of courts
as a global system of international criminal justice. Rather than separate
508. Codes of conduct and similar types of soft law have proliferated in the past decade,
particularly in economic and environmental areas.
509. Slaughter, supra note 426, at 243.
510. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 438, at 350.
511. See Abbott & Snidel, supra note 435, at 422-23.
512. Each of these concepts is generally accepted as part of international customary law
and articulated in, among others, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Banjul [Af-
rican] Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam, and the European Convention. On the presumption of innocence, see American Con-
vention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8(2), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entered into force July 18, 1978); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights art. 7(l)(b), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1986); Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, art. 19(e), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts; European Convention, supra note 97, 213 U.N.T.S at 228.
On the right to a speedy trial, see American Convention, supra, arts. 7(5),(6), 1144 U.N.T.S at
146, 147; Banjul Charter, supra, arts. 6, 7(l)(d), 21 I.L.M. at 60; Cairo Declaration, supra, art.
19(e); European Convention, supra note 97, arts. 5(3)-(5), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-28. On the
right to counsel of choice, see American Convention, supra, art. 8(2)(d),(e), 1144 U.N.T.S at
147; Banjul Charter, supra, art. 7(l)(c), 21 I.L.M. at 60; Cairo Declaration, supra, art. 19(e);
European Convention, supra note 97, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228. On the right to
confront evidence and witnesses in a public forum, see American Convention, supra, art.
8(2)(f), 1144 U.N.T.S at 148; Banjul Charter, supra, art. 7(1)(c), 21 I.L.M. at 60; Cairo
Declaration, supra, art. 19(e); European Convention, supra note 97, art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S.
at 228. On the right to an appeal, see American Convention, supra, art. 8(2)(h), 1144 U.N.T.S
at 148; Banjul Charter, supra, art. 7(1)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 60.
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ad hoc attempts to enforce international law, this community of courts at
the supranational and, particularly, at the national level, is an interde-
pendent system engaged in a common enterprise. This realization will
require self-awareness among judges and recognition by lawyers that
they are part of a larger community. Such a realization, and the coopera-
tion, resource exchange, and intellectual cross-fertilization it implies,
may greatly enhance the effectiveness of international criminal law en-
forcement.
The community of courts outlined here may help bridge the growing
divide between the United States and Europe, which manifests itself
particularly in relation to the ICC."3 Compatible with the Bush admini-
stration approach, this community locates the primary right to exercise
international criminal justice in the domestic courts of the local State. In
line with the European approach, it stresses the important, but limited
role of supranational bodies as a backstop for their domestic counter-
parts. Such supranational bodies change the incentives facing domestic
actors, encouraging them to enforce international law at home. This sys-
tem is compatible with Pierre Prosper's argument that "we should be ...
helping the [local] States to develop the justice mechanisms necessary"
to prosecute international crimes5 4 In fact, the system will be greatly
benefited if Prosper's unofficial proposal for U.S. aid to domestic courts
engaged in international criminal justice becomes a reality. 5 Such aid
could well solve the problems currently facing East Timor explored in
Part III. Yet, for the system to function well, the United States must ac-
cept and acknowledge that supranational adjudicatory bodies will be
involved in giving national courts powerful new incentives to act and
backing them up where they fail. If the United States cannot move in that
direction, the community of courts will be compromised by the absence
of one crucial State.
Thomas Buergenthal, a judge for the International Court of Justice,
has observed that "the proliferation of international tribunals can ...
have adverse consequences."' 16 While he is right that there are reasons to
513. The recent passage by a U.S. House of Representatives Committee of the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act would authorize the President to invade the Netherlands to
rescue any American who comes before the ICC. See American Servicemembers' Protection
Act of 2001, H.R. 1794, 107th Cong. (2001). But see Adam Clymer, House Panel Approves
Measures to Oppose New Global Court, N.Y. TIMEs, May I1, 2002, at A3 (noting Representa-
tive Delay's comment that "'it was not a serious question' that the bill might require the
[United States] to invade the Netherlands").
514. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Remarks at the Harvard Colloquium on International Af-
fairs (Apr. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
515. Id.
516. Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It
Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 272 (2001).
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be concerned, if international criminal law enforcement is seen as a
community of courts engaged in a common enterprise, connected by ver-
tical and horizontal relationships, many of his concerns can be
overcome. Order is needed. General principles of international constitu-
tional magnitude and specific best practices in a proposed code of
conduct for international criminal law enforcement can provide the in-
formation and guidance needed for a self-regulating system. Such a
system, such a community of courts, may offer an important solution to
the challenges of international criminal law and for enforcement of in-
ternational law more generally.
